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Variable rate mortgages (VRMs) have been introduced 
into the mortgage market as a means of addressing the 
2 
housing finance problems encountered over the past two 
decades. To learn more 
st udy analyz es borrower 
about the demand for VRMs, this 
choice behavior and its economic 
determinants. In order to estimate the probability of 
borrowers choosing VRMs rather than conventional fixed rate 
mortgages, discrete choice (logit) models are specified and 
validated for both cross-section and pooled time-series 
cross-section data samples. These samples contain mortgage 
application information for the years 1978 
They were dr&wn from the Loan Register 
California Department of Savings and Loan. 
through 1981. 
Report of the 
The probability 
of choosing a VRM is estimated as a 
price components of the mortgage 
function of selected 
instrument, borrower 
characteristics, and economic expectations. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Inflationary pressures of the past two decades have 
precipitated sweeping changes in business institutions and 
bus i ness procedu res. One of the se ctors of th e eco nOI!lY 
tha t has under gone maj or evol ut i on has been the fi nancial 
sector, particularly banking. Inspired by inflation's 
impacts, since the late 1960's scores of new savings and 
investment instruments have worked their way on to the 
market. By successfully competing for funds these 
oppor tuni ti es hel ped under score the i ne ffi ciency and lack 
of flexibility that banking regulations promulgated, 
1 eadi ng to the banki ng dere gul ati on movement whi ch we are 
in the midst of currently. 
One of the financial instruments that 
institutions most at the mercy of inflation 
puts lending 
is long-term 
fixed interest rate mortgages (FRMs). When funds are 
loaned for periods of twenty to thirty years at a fixed 
nominal interest rate, unanticipated upward interest rate 
movements have a serious impact on the profitability of 
exi st i ng i nvestmen ts. Riai ng interest ra tes bene fi t 
borrowers with existing loans in that these loan costs 
remain below the new cost of fun.ds; conversely, they harm 
lenders, whose new costs of funds exceed their existing 
investment revenues. 
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As inflation's effect is to raise 
nominal rates, lenders of long-term mortgages are thus 
openly exposed to financial risk in inflationary periods. 
To offset this exposure a host of alternative 
mortgage 
the mid 
mortgages 
instruments have been marketed by 
1970's. One of these, variable 
(VRMs), has become especially 
lenders 
interest 
po pul ar 
since 
rate 
with 
lender s and borrowers. These mortgage instruments differ 
from the standard fixed rate mortga£,.e instruments in that 
the interest rate of these loans, and hence the borrower's 
monthly payment schedule, is adjusted periodically to 
reflect the changing cost of funds to the lender. 
!he focus of the present research is mortgage choices 
and their determinants. Specifically, this research 
addresses itself to that mortgage instrument, VRMs (also 
known as adjustable rate mortgages or ARMs), which has 
gained the most popularity in recent years. VRMs have the 
longest and most extensive history of all alternative 
mortgage designs, and they promise to be the alternative 
mortgage most likely to compete with FRMs in the future. 
According to a survey conducted in 1982 by the American 
Mortgage Insurance Company, sixty-two percent of the 
savings and loan associations (S&Ls) polled offered VRMs in 
the month of September, as opposed to thirty-seven percent 
surveyed one year earlier (Colton, 1983). More recent 
reports confirm the growth of this trend. For example, the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board is repor-ted as stating that 
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VRMs made up fifty percent of single-family conventional 
loans in October 1983 - double the percentage accounted for 
a mere three months earlier (Wall Street Journal, 1983). 
No other alternative mortgage instrument has come close to 
thi s re cord. 
Wha t expl ai ns the popul ari ty of these mor tgage loans 
among borrowers? Does the initial rate at which the loan 
is issued, or other "pricing" features of the loan, 
influence the borrower's decision to accept a VRM? If so, 
how strong might that influence be? Answers to these 
questions continue to be sought by financial and regulatory 
institutions. Additional questions, such as whether the 
socio-economic characteristics of borrowers or the economic 
climate influence the choice of mortgage loan, also remain 
unanswered at this time. These questions are timely and 
have a direct bearing on the aealth of the lending 
industry, the housing industry, and the national economy. 
At present, little is known about the future 
acceptance of VRMs or about the specific factors that may 
influence the magnitude of its acceptance. The reasons for 
thi s absence of knowl edge are practi cal ones. VRMs have 
not been widely available for very long, making historical 
data scarce. Also, privacy regulations and lack of 
coordination among individual lending institutions make 
research projects requiring large scale record retrieval 
difficul t. 
This study explores the demand for VRMs in the 
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California mortgage market in the years 1978 through 1981. 
Using microdata provided by a unique data base known as the 
Loan Register Report, loan application information from 
mortgage borrowers is analyzed. Combined with supplemental 
economic data, this information affords the opportunity to 
explore the effective demand for VRMs. After developing a 
model based on the economic theory of utility-maximization 
to explain the probability of borrowers choosing a VRM, 
statistical models are estimated in order to quantify the 
"probabilitity" of borrowers choosing VRMs rather than 
FRMs. These estimates incorporate the influence of 
mortgage pricing factors, borrower characteristics, and 
economic expectations. In addition, estimates are derived 
of the changes in the choice probability due to changes in 
selected variables. 
a brief Before developing the mortgage choice model 
history of the emergence of alternative mOi'tgage 
related to instrument.s is provided, and the literature 
mortgage choice is reviewed. 
CHAPTED II 
BACKGROUND: 
THE EMERGENCE OF ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS 
Since the 1930's, the vast majority of housing 
purchases in the Uni ted States have been facil ita ted by 
long-term, fixed-interest-rate, fixed-payment mortgages. 
Standard fixed-rate mortgages were developed at a time when 
the typical featul'es of a home mortgage loan were a low 
loan-to-value ratio and a "balloon w payment to be paid at 
the end of a term usually lasting less than ten years. In 
order to increase homeownership, an explicit goal of 
federal policy, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
encouraged the use of FRMs. The instrument served to 
accomplish this goal by reducing downpayment requirements 
and spreading the borrower's repayment of interest and 
principal over a longer period of time. 
FRMs served their purpose well not only for 
borrowers. Lenders too discovered that FRMs met their 
needs. Irrespective of the introduction of FHA insurance 
intended to protect lenders against the risk of default, 
lenders found long-term, high loan-to-value, 
s elf - am 0 I" t i z in g loa n s pro fit a b 1 e • However, in order to 
remai n pro fi ta bl e, these loans req uired sta bl e economi c 
conditions specifically, little unanticipated upward 
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movement in inflation. 
Since 1965 when inflation began to act unpredictably, 
lender disenchantment with FRM's has grown increasingly 
strong. In principle, if future short-term interest rates 
rise beyond expectations, outstanding long-term fixed-rate 
loans can impose permanent losses on lenders. Financial 
intermediaries borrow short and lend long, which is to say 
that the return on their assets is tied into long-term 
interest rates while their liabilities are determined by 
short-term interest rates. As a result, when interest 
rates rise an asset maturity/liability imbalance occurs in 
which lenders pay more for their new funds than they 
receive in revenue from their old assets. Thus, bes ides 
incurring the usual investment risks associated with 
changi ng asset val ues, infl ati on hei gh tens a se co nd ri sk 
factor associated with investments, interest rate risk. 
Alternatively, in prinCiple FRMs can impose permanent 
1 osse s on borrowers when fut ure shor t- term interest rate s 
fall below general expectations. This is because borrowers 
would be making payments at the original interest rate, one 
which exceeds the cost of new funds. 
Despit.e the apparent risks, until recently losses of 
these sorts have generally been avoided by 
Borrowers have been insulated from serious 
both parties. 
ri sks through 
the prepayment provision of mortgages, whose penalties are 
usually slight. With refinancing as an option, borrowers 
incur relatively minor losses. These stem primarily from 
the extra 
ref i na n c i n g . 
tr ansa ctions and time costs involved 
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in 
From the lender's perspective the borrower's 
perogative presents them with a no-win situation since the 
possibility of windfall losses is unavoidable, while the 
possibility of windfall gain is remote. Contract 
provisions enabling lenders to renegotiate mortgage loans 
with borrowers have generally not been part of the 
conventional mortgage instrument. 
Yet, lest it appear that lenders faced inordinate 
exposure to interest rate risk, it should be noted that 
historically 
protection. 
lenders received 
Government-imposed 
an indirect form of 
interest rate ceiling 
regulations, by stifling competition, kept the cost of 
funds to lenders at low and stable levels. This protection 
was a mixed blessing, however. Though lenders were 
shielded from hi gher cost s, interest rate cei lings al so 
encouraged savers and investors to withdraw their funds 
from conventional bank accounts and deposit them instead 
into unregulated accounts where yields were higher. This 
process, known as diSintermediation, caused the earnings of 
many lending institutions to plummet, leading more than a 
few of them into bankruptoy or merger. 
Without the protection of interest rate ceilings, the 
need for new types of mortgage instruments has become 
especially pressing for lenders. Not surprisingly, in the 
past ten years financial institutions have been made aware 
of other inherent shor t comi ngs in the standard mortgage. 
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Besides the stresses caused by underestimating the level of 
future interest rates, lenders of fixed-rate loans can face 
cash-flow difficulties when short-term rates are 
temporarily high. The interest rate charged for a 
long-term loan under these circumstances would normally be 
below the current interest rate, because future rates would 
be expe cted to decl i ne. Hence, in the early par t of the 
term a revenue shortfall would prevail even though total 
revenues generated throughout the entire term of the loan 
may equal the cost of capital over the entire term. This 
si tua ti on, though uncommon, has occu rred in re ce nt year s. 
Here again it should be noted that lenders enjoy a modicum 
of protection against risk through their abilities to build 
up reserves, borrow on the capital markets, or otherwise 
hedge. These protections are limited, though, by 
regulatory and market constraints, and they are costly. 
In a corresponding way, the recent inflationary 
peri ods have adver se ly affected mortgage borrower s, too. 
Disintermediation, ceused by the combination of rising 
interest rates and interest rate ceilings, 
responsible for the wide fluctuations in the 
was largely 
availability 
of housing finance funds experienced over the past decade 
and a half. 
Another problem for borrowers in inflationary periods 
has been termed the "til t effect". As i nfl ati on and 
nominal interest rates on mvrtgage loans increase, the 
match between household income and mortgage payments 
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becomes increasingly misaligned. Since co n vent i onal 
mortgages require level or' equal .DQ1!!.i.n.sl payments over 
their entire terms, future inflation causes a decline in 
the r~.sl, or "inflation-adjusted", pattern of payments. In 
order to offset this decline, lenders must demand higher 
nominal payments in the earlier years of the loan. This 
resul ts in a downward til t in the stream of real mortgage 
payments from the start to the end of the term of the loan. 
The effect of this tilt is to make housing payments 
especially bu~densome during the first years of the 
mortgage, at a time when many households, particularly 
young ones, can least afford it. 
One solution to the tilt problem is alternative 
financing 
However, 
such 
no 
ameliorated, 
as se cond 
matter how 
be it by 
!!lor tgages and co nsumer credi t. 
the cash-flow problem is 
alternative finanCing, lower 
downpayments, postponement of purchasing, or shifts in the 
quantity/quality of the housing acquired, the",e is little 
doubt that during inflationary periods this tilt effect of 
conventional mortgages imposes added costs on borrowers. 
It should be noted though, that the til t effect has at 
least one beneficial side effect it accelerates the 
accumUlation of borrower equity. As borrower equity is a 
major determinant of default risk, tilt may make possible 
the issuance of mortgages of high loan-to-value ~at1os that 
are of no greater risk than lower loan-to-value mortgages 
during periods of low inflation. 
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Responding to the economic conditions of the past 
twen ty year s wi th the re co gni tion that increase d mor tgage 
instrument choice could improve credit market functioning, 
the lending industry gradually introduced innovative loan 
instruments into the residential mortgage market. 
Regulatory constraints and legal obstacles notwithstanding, 
some states, most notably California, have allowed lending 
institutions to experiment with alternative mortgage 
instruments. Not long ago, the Comptroll er of the 
Currency, the National Credit Union Administration, and the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board adopted re gul a tions 
authorizing federally-chartered depository institutions to 
deal in alternative mortgage instruments. This movement 
culminated in the enactment by the U. S. Congress of the 
"Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982", 
Title VIII of the "Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions 
Act of 1982", which asserts the following: 
Alternative mortgage transactions are essential t.o 
the provision of an adequate supply of credit 
secured by residential property necessary to meet 
the demand expected during tbe 1980's. (p. 1545) 
The purpose of this legislation is to provide non-federally 
chartered housing creditcrs parity with federally chartered 
institutions. This legislation authorizes "all housing 
creditors to make, purchase, and enforce alternative 
mortgage transactions so long as the transactions are in 
conformity with the regulations issued by the Federal 
agencies" (p. 1545). In sum, this legislation paves the 
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way for au unlimited variety of new types of mortgage 
instruments to be offered by lenders nationwide. 
Currently, the potential combinations and varieties of 
mortgage features are almost unlimited. Only the lender's 
imagination and the consumer's desire restrict the choices. 
Alternative mortgage instruments now being offered 
are essentially of two types. Graduated payment mortgages 
(GPMs) are distinguished by installment schedules which 
call for larger and larger payments as time goes on. One 
relatively common variety of GPM is the deferred interest 
mortgage (DIM). It allows for negative amortization of the 
loan, providing for lower initial payments than on similar 
standard mortgages. The unpaid nominal interest is added 
back to the principal balance and is offset by higher 
payments later in the term. Another variation on the 
graduated payment mortgage, the growing equity mortgage 
(GEM) does not invol ve negative amortization but rather a 
shortening in the term of the loan as the payments 
increase. 
The second basic alternative mortgage instrument 
design is the variable rate mortgage (VRM). This type of 
mortgage ties the loan's interest rate to a selected 
financial market interest rate, called a "reference rate", 
which is supposed to reflect the real costs of funds for 
the lender. The frequency with which the interest rate on 
the mortgage is adjusted to the reference rate, as well as 
some of the other specifics of the loan such as whether or 
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not limits exist on the extent of the interest rate 
adj ustment, vari es wi th the i nsti tu ti on offeri ng the loan 
and the regulatory and statutory environment. 
Despite the fact that these two designs are the ones 
most widely used as alternatives to the standard fixed-rate 
mortgage, neither solves all the problems inherent in the 
FRM. GPMs provide potential relief for the tilt and 
cash- f1 ow pro bl ems home buyers co nfront, bu t do nothi ng to 
relieve the liquidity problems that lenders face. On the 
other hand, the VRM design helps lenders shift iaterest 
rate risk to borrowers L~t <ioes not directly address or 
alleviate the tilt problem. Though VRMs may reduce 
borrowers payments by allowing for initially lower interest 
rates and by perhaps encouraging lower inflation premiums, 
these benefits will generally not be sufficient to greatly 
offset the payment tilt. 
In light of these limitations a number of more 
elaborate designs have been proposed. For example, the 
price level adjusted mortgage (PLAM) features a mortgage 
composed of a "real" rate of interest that is fixed, and a 
price index which is used to adjust the size of the 
principal to inflation. Another design, the constant 
payment factor VRM (CPF-VRM), a hybrid of the GPM and VRM, 
also involves two separate rates, 1. e., a debiting factor 
for calculating the outstanding balance and a payment 
factor used to recompute the future periodic payments. 
These instruments address the problems of borr'owers and 
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lenders simultaneously, but they are also more complex and 
pose new types of risks and uncertainties. Thus, these 
instruments remain relatively unpopular at the present 
time. 
Amidst this wide variety of alternative mortgage 
instruments now available in the mortgage market, the one 
most competi tive wi th FRMs is clearly the VRM. There are 
several reasons why thi s is so. From the borrower's 
perspective, VRMs are the instrument most similar to the 
conventional FRM. With the exception of a provision 
calling for periodic interest rate adjustments, VRM 
features can be identical to those of the FRM. This means 
that borrowers need not be concerned with a host of 
unfamiliar complexities, such as the conditions under which 
negative amortization occurs. Rather, VRM borrowers face 
mortgage features that parall el those of the conventional 
mortgage instrument. 
Addi ng to its 
initial interest rate 
attractiveness to borrowers, the 
on VRMs is usually below comparable 
FRM rates. 
protection, 
Because VRMs provide lenders with interest rate 
it is in lenders' interest to encourage 
borrowers to accept VRMs. Often, thi s encouragement takes 
the form of offering borrowers lower initial interest 
rates. The advantages of relatively conventional features 
and interest rate discounts combine to make VRMs more 
marketable than other alternative mortgage instruments. 
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In summary, the emer gence of VRMs has 1 ar gely been 
due to the inflationary conditions of the past twenty 
years. These economic pressures, coupled with innovations 
in financial markets, made painfully clear the inadequacies 
of fixed-rate mortgage financing. In r'esponse, lending 
institutions were given permission by regulatory agencies 
to develop new forms of mortgage instruments. To date, the 
most popular of these new instruments ha3 been the VRM. By 
allowing for periodic adjustments to the interest rates of 
1 ong- term loans, VRMs shi f t some interest rate ri sks from 
lenders to borrowers. In doing so, VRMs help break the 
"lend-long and borrower-short" syndrome that caused 
fi na ncial difficulties for lenders. By providi ng another 
means for lenders to restructure their portfolios, these 
instrument s are viewed as hel pi ng to ensure the via bil i ty 
of lending institutions and hence, the housing finance 
market. 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The economics of housing is one of the major 
interests in the field of urban economics. In the study of 
housing, three topics have captured the largest share of 
resear ch effort. These are: 1) estimation of the income 
el asti oi ty of demand for hous i ng serv ices and the pri ce 
elasticities of demand and supply; 2) the degree of racial 
segrega ti on and di scrimi na ti on in the hous i ng mar ket and 
its implications for housing quality and prices as well as 
job opportunities; and 3) the influence of intra-urban 
location on variations in housing prices (Struyk, 1916). 
Of course, within each of these 
of research and analysis has 
areas a significant amount 
focused on examini ng the 
impact of federal, state, and local government laws and 
r e gu 1 at ion s • 
Recent research in the economics of housing has taken 
a new twist. The unpredictable economic cycles of the past 
decade and unexpectedly high inflation have shifted 
attention to the topic of housing finance. Several 
important subj ects are contai ned wi thi n thi s topic. These 
i ncl ude the functi oni ng 0 f the se condary mortgage mar ket 
and its i nterrel a ti onshi p wi th the primary mar ke t, the 
impact of banking regulations such as Regulation Q on the 
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availability of mortgage funds, and the influence of 
monetary policy on the cost of mortgage funds. What gives 
these diver se fi na nce and banki ng su bj ects somethi ng in 
common with the economics of housing is that they each have 
a significant impact on one of society's greatest concerns, 
housing "affordability". 
Beginning in the latter half of the 1960's with the 
onset of higher and higher levels of inflation, it appeared 
to mal'lV that adeq ua te hous i ng was becomi ng i ncrea si ngly 
difficul t to purchase for a large number of households. 
Several seemingly ominous developments appeared 
simultaneously to nurture this belief. These were the 
apparent erosion of consumer purchasing power, the ri se in 
the costs of new home construction and housing upkeep and 
operation, and the increased price ~f mortgage finance. 
Many prominent economists and government officials 
viewed the conventional mortgage financing method its 
effects on both lending institutions and borrowers - as the 
major contributor to the problem of housing affordability 
(Poole, 1972; Tucker, 1975; Lessard & Modigliani, 1975; 
Hendershott & Villani, 1977 ) • In call for immediate 
action, Frank E. Morris, president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston summed up these views: 
After a decade of failure it is time to turn away 
from makeshift re~ponses to the problem of housing 
finance and begin to seek fundamental answers. 
These answers, it seems to me, lie in the 
restructuring of the mortgage instrument. (Morris, 
1975, p. 9) 
This advice has since been heeded. 
In th e pa st de cade 
studying new mortgage 
th e resear ch 
instruments 
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activity devoted to 
has ind.eed 
impressive. Prominent among the research conducted 
been 
is a 
series of investigations initiated in 1976 by tne Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). 
MQr1E~E~_ln~1rYID&n1~_]~§~s£gn_~1YQ~ (AMIRS), this project 
culminated in the publication, in three large volumes, of 
the findings of twenty different studies. Toge:her they 
cover almost the entire spectrum of issues surrounding 
alternative mortgage instruments (Kaplan, 1977). 
One of the issues investigated in the FHLBB project 
was borrower acceptance of alternative mortgage 
instruments. Two studies involving VRMs specifically 
addressed this topic. A more recent 
conducted for the Federal National 
study, a Harris poll 
Mortgage Association 
(FNMA), also looked into borrower attitudes towards and 
knowledge of alternative mortgage instruments. 
studies, two of which are AMIRS efforts, 
Fou r more 
simulated 
alternative mortgage instrument demand using an assortment 
of assumptions and data bases. 
In the first AMIRS study of borrower acceptance, 
attitudes towards and preferences for various types of 
alternative instruments were surveyed by telephone and mail 
(Colton, Lessard, & Solomon, 1979). The main findings 
identified young renter households, particularly tnose in 
lower income brackets with expectations of rising incomes, 
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as amenable to GPMs. Less clear were the findings for 
VRMs. Moderate receptivity to alternative instruments and 
a preference for GPMs was also found in the focused group 
discussion study conducted for FNMA (Louis Harris & 
Associates, 1982) in which twenty-nine percent of the 
participants found the GPM to be the most attractive of all 
alternative instruments, and only sixteen percent preferred 
VRMs. 
The second FHLBB borrower acceptance study (Albaum & 
Kaufman, 1977) is also a survey, this time of actual 
borrowers. It presents data gathered from VRM and FRM 
households in California. In addition to collecting social 
and economic household characteristics, this study 
investigated household perception and knowledge of the 
various mortgage instruments, satisfaction with the 
respe cti v e mort gage pl ans, and the process under gone to 
obtain residential mortgages. Interesting though the 
findings of this study are, the authors caution that they 
must be interpreted in light of the fact that VRMs had been 
widely introduced in California for les:: than two years. 
Also, up through the completion of this study, California 
borrowers of VRMs had yet to have the interest rates on 
their loans adjusted from their initial rates. 
Regarding borrower characteristics, Albaum and 
Kaufman found moderate differences be tween V RM househol ds 
and households who borrowed FRMs after VRMs became widely 
available. Ethnicity, age, sex, formal education level 
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achieved, employment status) and income were similar across 
borrowers, as was the distribution of the number of 
children living at home at the time of mortgage 
acquisition. However, marital status seemed to differ 
between groups. Divorced people were relatively more 
prominent among VRM borrowers, whereas people who had never 
been married were more prominent among FRM borrowers. 
Both the income status and the total value of 
financial assets differed among borrowers. A significantly 
higher percentage of VRM borrowers had annual incomes of 
$15,000 or less, and the average value of the financial 
assets of VRM borrowers was roughly eighty-one percent that 
of FRM borrowers. Consistent with these results it was 
found that occupations differed between borrower groups and 
tha t vari ous mortgage terms differed between groups too. 
For example, VRM borrowers purchased homes whose prices 
were eighty-three percent those of FRM borrowers. 
Briefly, the remaining findings indicated that 
borrowers encountered no real problems in understanding or 
bei ng aware of the features of V RMs, that the tr adi ti ona 1 
fea t u:l'es of mortgages such as inter est rates and cl os 1 ng 
costs were considered more important to most borrowers than 
secondary features such as guaranteed transferability, that 
most borrowers viewed VRMs somewhat less favorably than 
FRMs, and that all groups of borrowers were inclined to 
shop for mortgages. 
The scarcity of autu~l data on bo~rower acceptance and 
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use of alternative mortgage instruments has led researchers 
to try to predict mortgage demand based on simulations of 
future conditions. In general, these studies are of 
limi te d val ue because of thei r dependence on restr i cti v e 
assumptions, such as that alternative moortgage instruments 
will repl ace rather than suppl ement FRMs, tha t mortgage 
terms are determined exogenously through se parate supply 
functions, and that the structural relationship between 
household income and expendi tures is not al tered wi th the 
introduction of new mortgage instruments (Vandell, 1978). 
Further, these studies rely on proj ections based on 
unchanging institutional constrai nts and simplified 
extrapolations of household income streams and mortgage 
payment bu rdens. They largely ignor e eq ui ty accumul a ti on, 
changes in household siz e and age compos i ti on, ear ni ngs 
mobility, and other socio-economic variables of likely 
importance in determining future tenure patterns and 
mortgage choices. 
Among the simulation stUdies of borrower acceptance, 
the two earliest were for the AMIRS project. In a study of 
the "potential" demand for alternative mortgage designs 
( Smi th, Wip.st, & Field, 1977), households sampl ed from a 
national survey 
characteristics. 
were grouped by 
After Simulating 
demographic 
the future 
and income 
household 
payment-to-income ratios for three types of alternative 
mortgage instruments estimates were made of the potential 
demand for these mortgages. Based on household ability to 
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carry the mortgages the findings indicated that alternative 
mortgage instruments could increase homeownership by 
somewhere between one-and-one half and five percent in the 
economic climate prevailing at that time. The likeliest of 
borrower s were young ren ter sand owne r s with lower th an 
median incomes. 
Whether the widespread use of alternative mortgage 
instruments can have a significant influence on the ability 
of moderate income families to own homes was one of the 
main questions posed by another study initiated by the 
FHLBB (Follain & Struyk, 1977). Here, the effects of 
several different alternative mortgage instruments were 
simulated using various region-specific assumptions 
regarding rates of income and population growtn, price 
increases, and property appreciation. The findings were of 
substantial increases in homeownership rates, particularly 
for low-inco~e households. Further, homeownership rates 
differed depending upon the mortgage instrument considered. 
A final simulation study (Vandell, 1978) again 
projected potential housing consumption and credit. usage 
given alternatives to FRMs. Exploiting the information 
contained in an empirical model estimated with FRM data, 
Vandell's simulations indicated that GPMs and PLAMs can 
significantly increase housing and mortgage credit usage 
without adverse distributional effects across households. 
VRMs, however, were predicted to perform worse than all 
other instruments, including FRMs, both with respect to 
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homeownership and credit usage and the distributional 
consequences for low-income, young, elderly, and black 
households. 
Willingness on the part of consumers to pay a premium 
for obtai ni ng a certai n type of mor tgage, and co nver se ly, 
willingness on the part of lenders to offer a premiuill to 
consumer s who opt for cer tai n ty pe s of mor tgages, refl ect s 
the relative desirability of the instruments to each party. 
Thi s desira bil i ty, expresse d as fi nancial concessions, is 
an important determinant of mortgage choice. 
As VRMs are instruments that shift interest rate risk 
from lenders to borrowers, more than any other alternative 
instrument they serve the needs of lenders best. Because 
of thi s, and because V RMs are the one i nstr ument fea turi ng 
a price, i.e., an interest rate, that can be adjusted 
periodically, they have been the focus of several studies 
exploring the issue of mortgage pricing and financial 
concessions. In essence, these stUdies explore how the 
pricing of the riskier VRMs relative to safer FRMs 
encourage borrowers to accept the one rather than the 
other. 
The most common analytical and simulation approaches 
to exploring VRM pricing employ the yield curve concept in 
explaining how relative interest rates are determined. The 
yield curve represents the relationship between interest 
rates and the remaining term to maturity of investments in 
the same 
the sha pe 
general ri sk ca te gory. Under normal 
of this curve is positively sloped, 
interest rate risks and expectations, and 
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conditions 
refl ecti ng 
liquidity 
preferences. 
Using the logic of the yield curve to explain how the 
interest rates on VRMs are related to those on FRMs, many 
researchers have concluded that VRMs, ceterus paribus, are 
likely to be priced below FRMs (Poole, Opper, & Taylor, 
1972; Kaufman, 1973; Cassidy & McElhone, 1975; Jaffee 1975; 
Jaffee & Kearl, 1975; Follain & Stryuk, 1977; Van Order, 
1982). Generally, the expected interest rate spread 
between the instruments will re~ult from FRMs being priced 
at the high or long-term end of the curve, while VRMs are 
be priced at the low or 
between the two interest 
shor t- term end. The i neq ual i ty 
rates, and correspo ndi ng 1 ender 
and borrower preferences, lead to the hypothesized price 
differential. 
Several closely related approaches to the yield curve 
co ncept of pri ci ng al so 1 ead to the concllls ion that V RMs 
would carry lower interest rates than FRMs. In an 
extensive AMIRS analysis of mortgage 
Field, 1977) four hypotheses besides 
concept are identified and discussed. 
pricing (Cassidy & 
the yield curve 
These are: 1) 
shifting of risk; 2) inflation hedge; 3) portfolio 
diversification; and, 4) normal profits hypotheses. 
The "shifting of risk" hypothesis is typified by two 
studies (Von Furstenberg, 1973; Findlay & Capozza, 1977) in 
24 
which it is argued that because VRMs transfer interest rate 
risk from lenders to borrowers, borrowers will require a 
di scoun t to be induced to accept V RMs. Sim1l arly, the 
"infl ation hedge" hypothesis focuses on inflation 
expectations and implies that because VRMs protect lenders 
against unanticipated inflation, they allow lenders to 
offer them at lower rates than FRMs. The third hypothesis, 
"portfolio diversification", argues that lenders' abilities 
to diversify their portfolios using VRMs will enable them 
to pass on effi ciency gai ns to borrower sin the form of 
lower interest rates. Finally, the "normal profits" 
hypothesis argues that VRMs will result in an increased 
supply of mortgage funds, thus driving its interest rate 
downward relative to FRMs. 
Data on the actual pricing of mortgage instruments is 
sketchy. Those studies reporting priCing diI'ferentials 
for FRMs and VRMs had little opportunity to observe 
interest rates under disparate economic conditions or to 
observe market responses to large rate adjustments. Nor 
had they the opportunity to relate these differentials to 
other price components of the mortgages. 
These caveats being noted, it is nevertheless 
interesting to find that the available evidence tends to 
confirm, if weakly, the conclUSions of the theoretical 
studies. In California, where VRMs had been offered since 
1975, indications were that initial l"::l.tes for VRMs were 
priced at or marginally below FRM rates (Riedy, 1976; 
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A1baum & Kaufman, 1977; Zabrewski, 1977). In sixteen 
states, including California, offering VRMs and other types 
of adjustable mortgages, a 1976-77 survey found that 
average discounts per state ranged from zero to thirty-five 
basis pOints, with an overall discount average of twenty 
basis pOints (Cassidy & Field, 1977). This survey also 
found aver age rate different ia1 s to vary wi th the rate 
adjustment frequency and the reference rate or index used 
to adjust rates. 
To briefly summarize, at the present time the 
literature on alternative mortgage instruments indicates 
that much has yet to be learned about the conditions 
surrounding borrower acceptance of VRMs. Based on a 
handful of surveys and simulation studies, 
VRMs have the potential to compete wi th 
it appears that 
the conventional 
fixed-rate mortgage instrument. However, the degree of 
borrower acceptance and the determinants of their 
acceptance remain open questions. Only one as pe ct of V RM 
acceptance appears evident. 
VRMs relative to FRMs is 
This is, 
cri ti cal 
tha t the pri ci ng of 
to its competitive 
position. Numerous analytical studies of VRM pricing agree 
that an interest rate spread between in3truments is 
expected. This conclusion is supported by wnat little 
actual data has been available. 
In the following chapters an 
arrive at more precise estimates 
attempt will be made to 
of the determinants of 
borrower mortgage i nstr ument choi ce. 
theoretical model of mortgage choice, 
four year period will be used to 
relationships between mortgage price 
26 
After developing a 
em piri cal data for a 
quantify behavioral 
components, borrower 
characteristics, economic expectations, and the probability 
of borrowers choosing VRMs rather than FRMs. This study is 
thus intended to fill in many of the gaps in our knowledge 
of VRM acceptance. 
CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL MODEL OF MORTGAGE CHOICE 
lD~-1D~Q~~_QI~111i1~=M~zim1z~11QD-IQr_Di~~r~1~_~bQi~g~ 
Economic theory provides a model of rational consumer 
behavior in which an individual decisionmaker maximizes 
personal satisfaction subject to a rule of tastes or 
"utility function". In general, this theory requires that 
for individual satisfaction or utility-maximization to be 
achieved the consumption choices faced by the individual 
must be part cf a continuum of alternatives. 
decisionmaker has a utility function 
ui= Ui(xi,ei) 
Formally, a 
where x is a vector representing the characteristics of a 
consumption good, and e is a vector containing unobserved 
attributes of the decisionmake... such as experience, 
intelligence, and other factors that may influence taste. 
Also, the vecto~ e may contain random factors that 
infl uence choice, as well as uno bserved characteri sti cs of 
the good itself, such as an implied guarantee of quality. 
Thi s ut il i ty functi on is maximiz ed su bj ect to an 
individual's limited income, the condition known as the 
budget constrai nt, B. With p representing prices, 
utility-maximization subject to the 
yields a demand function, h, such that 
budget constrai nt 
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Xi = hi(Bi,P,ei). 
Within this decision-making framework the demand for 
a particular good having two or more discrete sets of 
characteristics can not be handled easily. The 
conventional framework for explaining consumer demand deals 
primarly with homogeneous, divisible products. By 
aggrega ti ng i ndi v idual demand functi ons for a product of 
this type a market demand function is constructed. 
Variations in demand, when the quantity demanded is not 
zero, are then usually viewed as reflecting ei ther random 
error or variations in choices at the intensive margin, 
i.e., at the border between more or less of an alternative. 
In co ntrast, consumer choice pro bl ems in whi ch a good has 
two discrete sets of alternatives involve distinct yes/no 
decisions rather than incremental ones. These choices 
i nvol ve de ci sions made at what is termed the extens i v e 
margin. 
To cope with discrete choice problems, theoretical 
models have been developed whereby the probability of an 
individual choosing a discrete alternative is explicitly 
accounted for by the effects of differences in individual 
tastes or decision rules. McFadden (1974) adapted the 
classical model of utility-maximization for discrete or 
"qualitative" choices by describing the mathematical 
properties of a model in which an individual has a utility 
function such as u = U(x, z, e). The vector z in this 
formulation represents observable characteristics of a 
given decisionmakeI'. 
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Wi th the deci si onmaker or individual 
facing J discrete alternatives, indexed j = 1, .•. J and 
represented by vectors of attributes Xj' the individual's 
utility function is viewed as 
Ui = V(Xj,Zi) + ei(Xj,zi) 
where V stands for the "representative" tastes of the 
po pul ati on and is no nstochast i c, and e is st ochasti c and 
reflects the unique tastes of the individual for the 
alternative wit.h attribute x. Using this model McFadden 
shows that the probability that the individual will choose 
alternative i if this is the utility-maximizing choice, is 
given by 
Pi = Prob [e(xj,z) - e(xi,z) < 
V(xi,Z) - V(Xj'z) for ~i]. 
This choice "probability" (in which ties are not 
permitted) can be viewed mere simply by dropping the random 
effect e and defining the utility function as u = U(x,z). 
Then, the individual will maximize utility and choose 
alternative i if 
for all j= 1. 
In this formulation the utility values are stochastic, and 
the utility maximizing condition can be stated as a 
probability of occurence, or 
for J,ri]. 
In a later chapter on the empirical (logit) model of 
discrete choice, a description will be provided of how this 
model is adapted for statistical estimation. 
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The utility-maximizing theory of qualitative choice 
can be applied to the problem of mortgage choice by viewing 
it ei ther as a consumption or as an investment decision 
( C a po z z a & G au, 1 9 8 3 ) • In the consumption framework, a 
borrower's choice of mortgage instruments depends on 
maximizing the discounted utility of consumption subject to 
an income or wealth constraint. This involves finding a 
savings path that converts 
into an optimal consumption 
paths differ for different 
the borrower t s income 
pattern. Of course, 
mortgage instruments. 
stream 
savings 
When 
viewed from an investment perspective, the maximization 
problem involves choosing both a consumption/savings path 
and a portfolio mix containing assets of differing risk 
levels. 
For the purposes of this study mortgage instrument 
demand will be viewed as a consumption problem taking place 
at a given point in time rather than intertemporally. 
The se simpl i fy ing assumpt ions facil ita te the analy si sand 
do not detract from its generality. Given the choice 
between two mortgages, an FRM (f) and a VRM (v), a utility 
function can be specified in which there are two vectors of 
attributes. One contains the characteristics of a mortgage 
alternative (m), and one contains the characteristics of an 
individual borrower (z). The utility function, excluding 
the error term, is given by u = U(m,x), and the probability 
of an individual choosing a VRM is 
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Pv = Prob[U(mv,z) > U(mf,z)] 
In this context each of the two alternatives~ f and 
v, has a vector of observed mortgage characteristics. 
These characteristics are financial, and reflect the "price 
components" of the mortgage such as interest rates and loan 
fees. Designating the expected discounted total cost of a 
mortgage instrument Te, when 
Tef < TC v , Probf > Prob v . 
This conclusion follows from conventional cost savings 
principles. It assumes that FRMs are ei ther of the same 
risk class or less risky than VRMs. In the reverse, when 
Tef > T~v 
the probability of choosing a VRM will be greater than the 
probability of choosing an FRM when the borrower has made a 
trade-off between the increase d ri ski ness of the vari a bl e 
rate loan on the one hand, and its price discount on the 
other. 
The second vector, consisting of borrower attributes, 
contains observable data of a social and economic nature. 
In add i ti on, thi s vector i nel udes borrower expe ctions 0 f 
future economic conditions. These characteristi cs can be 
viewed as indicators of varying degrees of individual risk 
aversion, R. If 
and 
then 
TCf = TC v 
Rf < Rv 
Probf > Probv . 
Relative risk aversion may be influenced by personal 
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attributes such as age, as well as by net wealth, of which 
income and property are two components. Net benefits of a 
mortgage instrument, NB, inclusive of costs and risk 
premiums - is a comprehensive measure of utility. When 
NBf - NBv > 0, Probf > Probv • 
n~.m~.n1§-2f_ . t.b~--H.Q.r1gR:g!L.f.ri.Q~J~.Q1.Q.r 
The single most important price component of a 
mortgage is the interest rate. Economic analysis gives 
ample reason to anticipate that interest rates will differ 
significantly between mortgage alternatives. As noted in 
the literature review, each of the five analytic approaches 
pOint to the differential being in favor of VRMs. For 
example, one approach suggests that even if the present 
value of expected interest payments, PVI, over the life of 
two loans f and v are such that 
PVI v = PVIf, 
the fact that VRMs allow for fluctuating payments while FRM 
payments are fixed leads to 
Prob v < Probf· 
Referri ng to the ut ili ty-maximiz ing formul a ti ons of 
Samuelson (1969) and Hakansson (1970) in which savings and 
investment are viewed in discrete time frameworks under 
uncertainty, Capozza and Gau (1983) point out that unless 
variations in mortgage payments can be offset by variations 
in income, the consumption/savings path of the borrower 
will become erratic. Since, under standard assumptions 
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such as dimi ni shi ng mar gi na 1 ut ili ty of consumpt ion and 
risk aversion the optimal consumption path is smooth, the 
VRM is an inferior instrument for borrowers. All else 
bei ng eq ual, thi s implies that the siz e of the difference 
or "spread" between interest rates on the two mortgage 
instruments is critical in influencing choice 
probabilities. 
Another el ement of mortgage pri ce is the loa n fee. 
These fees, while primarily comp~nsation for lender 
services rendered in processing the loan application, are 
al so use d freq uen t 1y by the 1 ender as a compensa ti on for 
risk-taking. From the borrower's perspective, fees are 
merely additional costs. Hence, as the difference between 
mortgage fees increases, the instrument with the cheaper of 
the two fees becomes re1 ati v ely more at tracti v e, ceteri s 
pari bus. Thi s analy si s holds tr ue for other pri ce 
components too, such as the duration of the mortgage and 
the size of the downpayment. It is also relevant for the 
many possible non-price concessions or 
prepayment 
penal ties, 
fines. The 
such as 
greater an open line of credit or 
the difference in value of the mortgages, the more 
attractive is the cheaper alternative. 
A final element of the mortgage price vector is 
economic expectations. In general, anticipated interest 
rates and inflation rates play a large role in most 
decisions to invest. This should be especially true when 
the investment choice involves two mortgage instruments, 
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one of which features an interest rate which will remain 
fixed for the term of the contract and the other of which 
features an interest rate which can be adjusted 
periodically by the lender depending on economic 
conditions. It is thus important to include economic 
expectations in the mortgage choice model. Borrower 
acceptance of VRMs should be more likely when expectations 
are for infl ation and interest rates to fall, and less 
likely when the expectations are for the oPPosite to occur. 
El~m~n1~~f~~~~Q~£QH~~~n~~~~1~~l~1i~~-1~~1Q~ 
Demographic and economic data make up the vector of 
borrower attributes. These attributes convey information 
about the shape of borrower choice functions. Naturally, 
these choice functions are not directly observable. Some 
of their features, however, are implied by the general 
nature of discrete choice decisions, the most important of 
which is that they are non-linear. In decisions of this 
type it seems reasonable to expect that an incentive to 
change decisions will have a greater marginal impact on the 
probability of a decisionmaker choosing a given alte~native 
when the decisionmaker is nearly indifferent between 
choices, than 
preference for 
when 
one or 
the decisionmaker 
another choice. 
has a strong 
As the marginal 
impacts are expected to differ depending upon the strength 
of the decisionmaker's choice function, the probability 
function implied is one which is non-linea&-o While the 
shape of the probability 
empirically by examining the 
sta ti st i cal model, int ui tion 
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function can be determined 
error function of a given 
te 11 s us that the shape of 
this non-linear function should be such that it is steepest 
near the middl e and asy mptoti c near zero pro ba bil i ty and 
one hundred percent probability. 
The borrower at tr i bu te of greatest signifi cance in 
mortgage decisions is likely to be income or wealth. This 
is because consumption/savings behavior is determined by an 
individual'l:I ability to shift expenditures and diversify 
investments so as tv maximize utility. Wea 1 th cl ear ly 
plays an important role in this activity by increasing the 
degree to which shifting and diversifying can occur. 
Having greater abilities to adjust their consumption and 
savings to achieve an optimal mix, higher income 
individuals may be viewed as more inclined to accept VRMs, 
despite the uncertainties associated with adjustable 
interest rates. In other words, higher income individuals 
are more able to reduce overall risk by spreading out 
investments among many different risk categories. 
Therefore, they may be more likely than others to make 
certain types of risky investments. 
Recent tests of this principle have employed a 
measure of at ti tude toward ri sk whi ch Pratt (1964) and 
Arrow (1965) have termed "relative risk aversion" (RRA). 
This empirical approach tries to determine the demand for 
risky assets as a function of individual wealth. 
Unfortunately, despite the clarity of the 
overall findings of RRA studies are quite 
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theory, the 
inconclusive, 
e. g. , Siegal and Hoban (1982), and Morin and Suarez 
(1983). Whether risk aversion tends to decrease, increase, 
or remai n constant as a function of income appears to 
depena in large part on the definitions of risk, assets, 
and wealth employed by the particular studies. EVidence of 
RRA with respect to personal variables expected to interact 
with risk preferences, such as age, has also been 
inconsistent. 
Along with social factors such as a borrower's age, 
additional personal characteristics can be enumerated which 
might have an influence on mortgage choice. Factors such 
as race and sex, if they do have a systematic influence, 
can be viewed as resulting from dU"ferential risk 
preferences of particular groups of borrowers. It should 
be noted here that little in the way of theory or empirical 
evidence suggests that inter-group differences in risk 
preferences exist. To the extent that differential 
investment behavior is found among groups of mortgage 
borrowers, this behavior has been attributed to lender 
discrimination rather than borrower choice (King, 1980; 
Schafer & Ladd, 1981). As an adequate test of lender 
discrimation entails differentiating lending patterns with 
respect to individual mortgage terms, this phenomenon 
cannot be addressed within the context of this study. 
Hence, the interpretation of differential inter-group 
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choices will be confined to demand factors only. 
~M~~1~=~m~ng-E~Y111~~1Ym 
In addition to the demand components that affect 
selection, choice probabilities mortgage 
naturally 
instrument 
inc 0 r po rat e supply conditions. In general, an 
individual lender's decision to offer a mortgage loan is a 
function of the price and non-price terms of a mortgage. 
These terms are 
factors such as 
determi ned in part 
the market cost of 
by exogenous economic 
funds and gov er nment 
regulations. Addi tionally, offer terms typically refl ect 
loan-specific risk premiums or discounts inspired by the 
property for which the loan is sought, its location, age, 
and physical condition. Premiums or discounts may also be 
influenced by characteristics of the individual who is 
seeking the loan. 
In determining the choice of mortgage instrument to 
provide, borrower 
notwithstanding, lender 
and collateral 
behavior rests on 
characteristics 
the willingness 
to trade price concessions for decreased interest rate 
exposure and other types of risk, such as default risk. 
Thus, intere~t rate spreads between the two types of 
mortgages, adjustments to loan fees and loan amounts, the 
size of the downpayment, and other mortgage fea tures all 
may interact to affect lender preferences for a type of 
loan. 
Wi thi n the context of the mortgage choi ce model, 
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market equilibrium is determined by the process of 
borrowers and lenders negotiating a mutually satisfactory 
set of mortgage terms. As this process is a competi tive 
one, the supply of mortgage instruments can be viewed as 
perfectly elastic from the point of view of the individual 
borrower. For any mortgage instrument of a given price, an 
alternative instrument having a price of its own is 
available, where "price" includes the various sets 
characteristics of the instruments. It is assumed too, 
that lender underwri ting standards do not differ wi th the 
type of loan offered. 
From the perspective of lenders the preference for a 
given loan offer is a function of the total costs (TC) of a 
mortgage instruments. Controlling for borrower-related 
risk, when 
TCf = TC v , Probv ) Probf· 
This preference for VEMs stems from the more favorable 
asset/liability match lenders enjoy with this type of 
instrument (Poole, Opper, & Taylor, 1972; Gau & Goldberg, 
1983). Base d on the oppo si ng preference of borrower s, it 
is evident that under most circumstances lenders would be 
willing to provide borrowers with financial incentive to 
accept VEMs. However, as mortgage instrument costs are a 
composite of several price components, conditions may arise 
in which concessions offered for one component may be 
weighed against penalties for another. 
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In summary, this chapter has developed a theoretical 
model of mortgage choice in which borrower decisions to 
accept a VRM rather than an FRM are viewed as discrete 
choice problems. Several 
attributes are included in 
price factors and borrower 
this model, and the general 
conditions under which borrowers and lenders are likely to 
accept VRMs are discussed. In the following chapters the 
theoretical model will be used to develop and specify an 
empirical model for estimating the probability of borrowers 
choosing VRMs. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL MODEL OF MORTGAGE CHOICE 
.I.b~.-J.,.Q&.1..t-.M.Q!t~l 
Having described the theoretical model of mortgage 
choice it is now necessary to specify a statistical model 
that is appropriate for 
Recalling that the general 
choice takes the form 
analyzing 
theoretical 
Pi = Prob [e(xj'z) - e(xi,z) < 
V(xi,Z) - V(Xj'z) 
McFadden (1974) and others have shown 
~mpirical data. 
model of discrete 
for all j..-i] 
that when G is a 
cumulative distribution function of the difference between 
e(xi,z) - e(xj,z) then the model translates to 
G = g[V(xi,Z) - V(Xj,z)]. 
This model assumes that the error terms are not functions 
of the explanatory variables and are statistically 
independent from each other. For the model to be easily 
estimable and interpretable it is further assumed that V is 
a linear function of (xi,Z). In this way, the model can be 
restated as 
V(xi,Z) = B'xi,z 
where B' is a vector of unknown coefficients for a typical 
decisionmaker (Chow, 1983). 
Though there are a wide variety of functional forms 
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that can meet the requirements of the individual 
utility-maximizing model of discrete choice, this study 
f 0 c use son the l.Qg.1~..t.i£ cur v e • The cumulative logistic 
distribution gives rise to the "logit" model, 
Pi = 1 1[1 + exp [-[B'(xi,z) - Bl{xj,z)]]. 
Appl ied to the mortgage choi ce pro bl em, the 0 bserved val ue 
of P is equal to 1 if a given borrower chooses to accept a 
VRM (v) and 0 if an FRM (f) is chosen. The un del' ly i ng 
probability scale for P is viewed as a theoretical index 
which, because of the 0, 1 observed values, cannot be 
measured directly without repeated trials. The index is 
determined by the explanatory variables where the vector x 
is replaced by I m' to represent mortgage price components, 
and the vector z represents borrower attributes. The 
probability index is assumed to be a normally-distributed, 
continuous variable containing a random component. 
Consistent with the underlying logic of discrete 
choice decisionmaking, the logistic function is steepest 
near the center and asymptotic near 0 and 1. The 
probability distribution for ei and ej which is assumed in 
order to generate the logit model is the Weibull 
distribution. The cumulative Weibull distribution for ej 
takes the form 
Pi = Prob [ej < ei] = 
exp(_~-(e+aj» for all j..ri 
where ~ is the base of the na tural logari thm and .a is a 
parameter. This distribution has the appropriate 
mathematical property that the 
independent Wei bull distributed 
difference between 
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two 
random variables is a 
binary logit distribution. In other words, if the 
stochastic components of utility are independently Weibull, 
the cumul ati v e di str i bu ti on of the dlfference between the 
two gives rise to the logit model. 
The logit model is equivalen"i; in most respects to 
other types of discrete choice model s, such as the probi t 
model. Indee d, tests of the the 1 ogi t and pro bi t model s 
us i ng the same data reveal that the resul ts of these two 
models are nearly identical (McFadden, 1974). Choice of 
the logit technique thus rests on practical considerations. 
It is desirable to use because, having a closed form, it is 
computationally more tractable than probitj it is also 
quicker and easier to estimate and easier to manipulate. 
The logit model estimation procedure is a conventional one. 
A log-likelihood function is formed from which a maximum 
likelihood estimator of the logi t model coefficients is 
derived. To maximize the log-likelihood function the 
Newton-Raphson algori thim is generally used, though other 
algorithims are available. This iterative procedure takes 
as its starting point either zero or the initial estimates 
from a linear probability model. 
Initial linear estimates are unsatisfactory except 
under very restrictive assumptions. As stressed earlier, a 
large gap exists between the discrete choice decision 
pro bl em and the standard theoretical model used to 
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represent the economic demand process. Furthermore, the 
sta ndar d li near model use d to sta ti sti cally analyze that 
pro cess is 1 ikely to perform poor ly. The Ii near 
probability model suffers from three basic flaws when it is 
applied to discrete choices: 1) a linear model can take on 
values outside the range of 0 and 1; 2) the slope of a 
1 i near pro ba bili ty model can be biased by extreme val ue s 
anchored at 0 and 1; and, 
probability models will 
3) the estimators of 
be inefficient due 
a linear 
to the 
heteroscedastic error term (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1981). 
~~~~~~~~DQ~~m~11D8-i£~~~~M£~ 
The data used to analyze mortgage choices come from 
the Loan Register Report of the State of California, 
Department of Savings and Loan (for information regard.ing 
documentation and access to this data base see Appendix). 
The or i gi ns of thi s data base goe s back to the middl e 
seventies when it was conceived as a means of monitoring 
neighborhood red-lining allegations. By 1978 the Loan 
Register Report had evolved into a reporti ng program in 
w hi ch all sta te- chartered sa vi ngs and loan as so cia ti ons 
were required to submit, on a month-by-month basis, a 
record of all the mortgage applications they received. The 
total number of mortgage applications received by 
state-chartered S&Ls made up approximately 40 percent of 
the mortgag~ a~tivity in the state. 
The monthly input to the Loan Register Report was 
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aggregated into quarterly files with the names, exact 
add resse s, and dates on ea ch appl ica ti on suppresse d for 
confidentiality. 
detailed mortgage 
Each record 
application 
in the data 
information, 
base contai ned 
including the 
type of loan , its terms, and the characteri sti cs of the 
applicant, co-applicant, and property. Due to budget 
cutbacks this reporting program was terminated at the end 
of 1981-
California was among the first states to sanction the 
use of alternative mortgage instruments. As far back as 
the sixties some banks in California had been writing 
mortgages with adjustable rate clauses. Thus, by 1978 
variable rate mortgages of one form or another had been 
present in the "mortgage market for several years (see Table 
I) . As a resul t, the Loan Register Repor t contai ns re cord 
of both VRM borrowers and standard fixed-rate mortgage 
borrower s. 
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TABLE I 
MAJOR FEATURES OF CALIFORNIA VRM' 
,. Term of VRM may be extended to maximum of 40 years on 
mutual agreement between lender and borrower. 
2. Rate of interest shall change not more often than once 
during any semiannual period, and at least six month shall 
elapse between any two such changes. 
3. Change in interest rate shall not exceed one-fourth of 
one percent in any semiannual period, and shall not result 
in a rate more than 2.5 percentage points greater than the 
rate for the first loan payment. 
4. Rate of interest shall not change during the first 
semiannual period. 
5. Borrower is permitted to prepay the loan in whole or in 
part without prepayment charge within go days of 
notification of any increase in the rate of interest. 
6. When an increase in the interest rate is required or 
permitted by a movement in a particular direction of a 
prescribed standard, an identical decrease is required in 
the interest rate by a movement in the OPPOSite direction 
of the prescribed standard. 
Based on California Civil Code and GUide to Loan Limit-
ations for California State-Licensed Associations. 
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The initial sample selected for this study from the 
Loan Register Report for this study reflects several 
considerations. For practicality, the sample was limited 
to four quarters of the available sixteen. The specific 
quarters chosen were the third quarters of each year. This 
was done in order to compare changes over time for the four 
years 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981. To control for 
seasonality, the use of the same quarter of each year was 
since the reporting requirements necessary. 
spe cif ied 
Further, 
that pending applications were to be incl uded 
only with the June and December reports, the second and 
fourth quarters were eliminated from consideration. The 
third quarters was selected rather than the first because 
they were likely to contain the larger number of 
applications. 
Borrowers, or observations, were selected on the 
basis of several constrai nts. 
those loan applications for 
California that were "accepted" 
Within each 
properties 
by lendi ng 
quarter only 
located in 
institutions 
were se 1 ecte d. Further, only appli ca ti ons for loans whose 
amoun ts weI' e grea tel' than one- quarter bu t less than one 
hundred percent of the sale price of the property were 
selected; and only those loan applications for single unit, 
single-family, owner-occupied dwellings were selected. 
This process assured that each record 
positive outcome and that both the market 
goods studied were relatively homogeneous. 
represented 
areas and 
a 
the 
The operational 
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definition of "dwelling" included new and existing housing. 
After an initial analysis in which no major differences 
weI' e found in the borrowi ng patterns between si ngl e uni t 
houses and condcminiums and ~ooperatives, these properties, 
be they detached or in several story buildings, were 
included in the definition of "dwellings". However, mobile 
homes were excluded as they were viewed as products unlike 
the ones being studied. 
Another 
relates to 
originated. 
constraint imposed on 
the S&L institutions 
In order to control 
the selection process 
from which the loans 
for the possiblity of 
market imperfections, observations in each quarter were 
chosen only from those S&Ls that issued at least five loans 
of each type. This selection cri teria assured that both 
types of mortgage instruments were readily available at the 
institution from which the loan was issued. It provides 
plausible grounds for assuming that borrowers were not ham 
pered by a le.ck of access to, or information about, one 
type of loan or the other. 
After selecting observations fulfilling the above 
criteria and additional criteria related to specific 
variables (see next chapter for variable definitions) two 
random samples labelled 'A' and 'AA' were drawn from each 
quarter, save the 1981 quarter. In this year the loan 
mar ket experi enced alar ge drop in vol ume, hence one full 
sample was all that was available of the necessary size. 
Wi th the exception of the 1981 data whi ch is the full 
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sample, the remaining samples make up between ten and 
twenty-five percent of the available 
depending upon the year (see Table II). 
observations, 
TABLE II 
SAMPLING FRAME FOR LOAN REGISTER REPORT DATA BASE 
Full Sample 
FRM 
VRM 
Total 
% Random 
Sam pI e 
Sample 'A' 
Sample 'AA' 
Final Sample 'A'1 
Final Sample 'AA' 
% Random 
Sub-Sample 
Pooled 'A' 
Pooled 'AA' 
12,359 
3,703 
16 ,062 
15 
2,409 
2,376 
2,307 
2,305 
22 
557 
537 
11,319 
5,893 
17,212 
10 
1 ,714 
1 ,706 
1 ,638 
1 ,629 
30 
546 
510 
5,259 
2,064 
7,323 
25 
1 ,810 
1 ,821 
1 ,671 
1 ,701 
30 
541 
538 
49 
371 
152 
523 
100 
523 
498 
100 
498 
498 
These are actual sample sizes after final adjustments 
for inflation and variable selection criteria. 
CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS - MODEL SPECIFICATION 
~~Ysl~Dm~n1-2f_1D~~~Q~~:~~11Qn-HQ~1E2g~_~b~1~~-H~Q~1 
In the first stage of the statistical analysis 
i nd i vidual cross- se ction logi t model s were es tima ted for 
the third quarters (the months of July, August, and 
September) of each year. A specification search led to 
equations consisting of ten independent variables. Four of 
these variables relate to mortgage price components while 
the remaining represent borrower attributes (see Table 
III). 
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TABLE III 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
IBM (Dependent Variable). If mortgage choice is a VRM the 
value of the variable is 1. The value is 0 if 
mortgage choice is FRM. 
ln1§~§§1-B~1§. This continuous variable is the "stated 
rate" expressed in percentages. 
ln1§~§§.t.-B~1§~.I!~§~g. Computed as the average 
between FRM and VRM interest rates per 
S&L. It is expressed in percentages. 
difference 
i nd i v i dual 
r§§-..angJ§§-Il.1.f.f§~§.n.Q§. Fee is the loan fee charged for 
originating or processing loans. It is expressed in 
dollars. Fee difference is computed as the 
difference between estimated FRM loan fees and 
estimated VRM loan fees per loan per S&L (1978 
dollars) . 
.L.2.a.nJ.m.2-Y.n.t.. All loan amounts of greater than $425,000 
(1978 dollars) and less than $1,250 were eliminated. 
A.I!.I!1.1Q~n1~§-HQn.t.DIY-In£Q.m~. Limited to minimum of $400 and 
maximum of $7,000 (1978 dollars) . 
.f:.t..bn.1£.11.l. This variable was broken down into four dummy 
variables representing Spanish, Black, and Asian and 
White. 
AE§. If age was less than 18 or greater than 75, applicant 
was omitted; otherwise, variable represents 
applicant's age in years. 
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The specification search was part of an overall 
model-development strategy that is predicated on the use of 
two su bsampl es. The first sampl e served as a dev i ce fo~ 
selecting variables and functional forms, and generating 
testable hypotheses. The second served as a vehicle for 
accepting or rejecting these hypotheses. In other words, 
rather than use the same data both for finding the 
appropriate variables and functional 
for testi ng hypotheses on the model, 
form of a model 
this study uses 
and 
one 
sample for experimentation and another for drawing 
inferences. The search over a variety of variables and 
functional forms is made necessarry because of the lack of 
theory avail able to guide specification C)f t.h<.l mortgage 
choice model. The major advantage of this strategy is that 
it safeguards agai nst purely fortui tous resul ts. In doing 
so it increases the empirical model's credibility and gives 
heightened confidence in the model's explanatory or 
predictive power. Of course, it requires data sets large 
enough to be divided in two wi thout losing substantial 
estimation precision. 
H~~1&s&~_~~~£~~~m~~n~n1~ 
Base d on the theoreti cal model of mol" tgage choi ce 
several different mortgage pri ce components were incl uded 
in the initial empirical model for sample 'A'. Besides 
interest rate spreads, the level of interest rates, and fee 
differences, such variables as loan amounts, loan-to-value 
ratios, term to maturity, downpayments 
were also included in the 
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and housing 
preliminary characteristics 
models. These latter variables were tried despite the fact 
that either the theoretical grounds for including them were 
not nearly as strong or clearcut as with the former 
variable, or 
whole they 
coefficients 
they exhibited little variability. On the 
performed poorly, meaning that their model 
were not statistically significant for three 
of the four years and lor the Signs on their coefficients 
switched from year to year from plus to minus. The results 
thus justified excluding these variables from the later 
model s. The price component variables remaining 1n the 
model were generally significant in three of four years. 
They too suffer occasional inconsistencies. 
According to aconcmic theory, 
the spread between VRM and FRM interest rates should be the 
single most important price component variable so far as 
mortgage choice is concerned. The problem is, there is no 
direct way of measuring what this spread would be for an 
individu~l borrower since the available data provides only 
the interest rate of the borrower's ultimate mortgage 
chOice. What, it must be asked, 
been offered as an interest rate 
instrument, the one not chosen? 
might that borrower have 
for the other mortgage 
To answer this question it was necessary to construct 
a variable that would approximate the interest rate of the 
alternative choice. This variable, "interest rate spread" 
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or SPREAD, is an S&L-specific variable calculated from the 
non-sampled data set by subtracting the average VRM 
interest rate offered by a given S&L from the average FRM 
rate offered by the same institution. Implicit in this 
constructed variable is the assumption that, 
borrowers from specific S&Ls are offered 
on average, 
the same 
difference in interest rates and that these differences are 
stable over each time period. 
The SPREAD value for each S&L was attached to all 
borrower s from that S&L. Thi s val ue is i nter ~reta bl e as 
the average difference in interest rates between the two 
mortgage choices offered. As indicated earlier, theory 
predicts that the sign of the coefficient of this variable 
should be positive, ceteris paribus. In the context of the 
discrete choice empirical model, the pro ba bll i ty of 
choosing a VRM should increase as the interest rate 
differential between FRMs and VRMs increases. Model 
resul ts bear out the theoretical expectations in three of 
the four years. In these three years the signs of the 
coefficients are both positive and statistically 
significant. In the fourth year the estimated coefficient 
has a positive sign but is not statistically significant. 
A se cond variable requiring 
construction is the difference in S&L fees charged for the 
two types of mortgages. Like SPREAD, fee difference is an 
S&L-specific variable. Because of an absence of data, this 
variable is also "simulated" by calculating hypothetical 
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loan fees. As loan fees are dependent on the loan itself, 
fee differences were constructed for each individual loan 
by simulating the alternative loan choices, A simple 
linear regression model predicting loan fees as a function 
of loan amount was estimated for the non-sampled data set, 
institution by institution, for each type of mortgage 
instrument. Where y represents loan fees, x equals loan 
amounts, i represents each individual S&L, and v and f 
re present VRMs and FRMs respe cti v ely, these regress ions 
too k the form 
Yvi = a1 + B1xvi 
and 
Yfi = a2 + B2 x fi. 
Using the two model parameters the expected loan fees 
for every loan offered by the individual S&Ls was computed. 
The difference between the expected FRM loan fee and the 
expected VRM loan fee makes up the constructed variable. 
Ini ti al expe cta ti ons were for thi s varia bl e to be 
positively related to the probability of choosing a VRM. 
As the difference between fixed and variable rate loan fees 
increased, i.e., VRMs became relatively cheaper, VRMs would 
become more attractive to borrowers. However, across all 
four years the estimated coefficients of this variable are 
highly significant but not of the same signs. In 1979 and 
1981 they are positive, while in 1978 and 1980 they are 
negati v e. 
is that 
A possible explanation of these inconSistencies 
they reflect S&L behavior as well as borrower 
behavior. 
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A more complete treatment of this issue will be 
provided in a later discussions of the pooled time-series 
mortgage choice model. 
In1~.r~§1-B.S!.t~ Since the interest rates on mortgage 
instruments are their most important price feature, this 
variable was included in the specification of the mortgage 
price components to control for possible differential 
effects. However, as this variable does not reflect the 
relative price differences of the mortgage instruments, it 
is not expected to have a significant impact on the 
probability of choosing a VRM. 
Mean interest rates for VRMs and FRMs in sample 'A' 
were comparable in three of the four years studied, 
differi ng by 
1981 however, 
less 
mean 
than ten baSis points on average. In 
interest rates where ninety-seven basis 
pOints lower for VRMs than for FRMs. Initial results of 
the model estimation exhibit inconsistency. Interest rate 
coefficients are positive and not statistically significant 
in 1978 and 1980, positive and significant in 1979, and 
negative and significant in 1981. Overall. little more can 
be said other than that the effects of interest levels on 
mortgage choice are highly questionab~e. 
1~~n-Am~Yn1 Like the interest rate variable the 
theoretical expectation 1s for loan amounts in and of 
themselves to have no effect on borrower mortgage choices. 
Inter preta tion of thi s vari abl e from the borrower side is 
confounded, though, when the loan amount is viewed as a 
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proxy for borrower wealth. As a strong relationship exists 
between income and wealth, and between wealth and housing 
values, it is possible to view loan amount as a borrower 
characteristic as well as a mortgage price component. If 
so, it is to be expected that loan amount will be 
positively related to the probability of choosing a VRM. 
Coefficient estimates for loan amount are found to be 
positive and highly significant in three of the four years, 
and negative and not statisitically significant in the 
fourth year. 
Variables representing borrower income, age, race, 
and sex were selected for inclusion in the mortgage choice 
model. Along with these attributes, additional borrower 
variables were experimented with in the initial 
specification search. For example, the race and income of 
the co-applicants were tentatively included in the model as 
well as an income/age interaction term. Based on the 
cri teria of significance and consistency descrl bed above, 
the explanatory power of the model was not enhanced by the 
addi tion of these variables. Therefore, none of the 
additional variables were included in the late:-- mortgage 
choice model. 
~n~~m~ As discussed earlier, a negative association 
is expected between risk aversion and income. As VRMs are 
the riskier of the two mortgage choices from the borrower's 
perspective, it is hypothesized 
borrower 
that a 
income 
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posi ti ve 
and the relationship exists between 
probability of choosing a VRM. Empirical results of the 
cross-section mortgage choice model do not strongly support 
this hypothesis, however. 
With the exception of 1980, in which a statistically 
significant positive relationship is present, each of the 
three previous years' models result in positive but not 
statistically significant coefficients. A complication 
that may have affected the finding is the moderate 
colinearity found between loan amount and income in each 
year. Ordinarily, in non-linear 
estimates of the standard errors of 
sta ti sti cal models 
the coefficients are 
not seriously influenced by correlations between 
i nd ependent vari a bl es unl ess they are very hi gh. However, 
in specification tests in which loan amount was omitted 
from these cross-se ction model s, income was conSistently 
found to be statistically significant and positively 
related to VRM choice. These tests provide a clear 
indication of the interdependence of income and loan amount 
as proxies for net wealth. Despite this interdependence, 
for the integri ty of the overall model loan amount was 
retained in the equation. 
Ag~ In order to capture potential life-cycle effects 
on mortgage choices, borrower age is included in the model. 
Income being a static variable that represents a borrower's 
earnings only at that point in time in which the loan is 
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applied for, it may be argued that it alone is not the 
reI evant measure to exami ne. A more complete measure of 
income woul d account for expe cte d 1 ifetime earni ngs. In 
the absence of the information necessary to calculate such 
a variable, borrower age is entered into the model. If it 
is found to be statistically significant this would 
i ndi ca te that the stage of life of the borrower was an 
important determinant of relative risk aversion. 
The findings of the model reveal that age is a 
significant variable in 1981 only. Though it is positively 
related to choosing a VRM in two of the years, in the 
remaining two the sign of the coefficient is negative. 
Tentatively, the hypothesis that life-cycle status is a 
factor in the mortgage choice decision must be rejected. 
B~~~-sng~~Z The dummy variable representing 
borrower se x is found to be no t sta ti st i cally si gnifi cant 
and of inconsistent signs across the four years. 
Generally, the same holds true for dummy variables related 
to Asians, Blacks, and Spanish borrowers. In only one year 
is the variable representing Blacks significant in that 
year, 1978, Black borrowers were found to have a greater 
probability of choosing VRMs than Whites. In the remaining 
years the coefficients are positive, but of no statistical 
significance. The hypotheses that borrowers of different 
genders and races exhibit varying degrees of relative risk 
aversion may tentatively be rejected (See Tables IV for 
model estimates). 
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TABLE IV 
LOGIT ANALYSIS - SAMPLE 'A' 
~~~D~D~~~£!~~l~~-1iM 
l.n!1-,-Y~£.1~.Ql~.!. _____ ~9.U _____ 19.ll _____ 19.8.D. _____ 19.al 
INTRST 0.325533 1.061095 0.094950 -0.117463 
(1.47) ( 37 .99) • (1.38) (3.33) 
SPREAD 1.933160 0.413519 0.141594 5.070206 
(32.85)· (10.11)· (0.32) (59.26)· 
LOANAM 0.000014 0.000022 0.000013 -0.000010 
(22.50)· (72.86)· ( 27 .48) it (1.95) 
FDIF 
-0.004603 0.000958 -0.001259 0.001531 
(35.36) • (5.57)· (15.66)· (20.44)· 
INCOME 0.000018 0.000102 0.000114 -0.000142 
(0.09) ( 3.46 ) (4.32)· (1.08) 
AGE 0.000712 -0.000980 -0.002503 0.039272 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.16) (15.83)· 
SEX 
-0.172220 -0.327468 -0.260422 0.515578 
( 0 .94 ) (3.24) (1.78) (2.02) 
S PAN ISH 0.357671 -0.088487 -0.041753 0.784733 
(3.17) (0.18) (0.02) ( 2.95 ) 
BLACK 0.678993 0.199748 0.223952 0.263422 
( 8 .27) • (0.42) (0.44) (0.22) 
ASIAN 
-0.070925 -0.253227 0.057081 -0.072324 
(0.11) (2.00 ) (0.11) (0.03) 
CaNST. -5.422001 -14.25171 -3.181736 0.716648 
(4.12) (49.83)· (9.74)· (0.48) 
----------------------------------------------------------
Total N 2,307 1 ,638 1 ,671 49~ 
n of V RM 481 516 430 145 
n of FRM 1 ,826 1 ,122 1 ,241 353 
Model Chi-Square 
( 10 d. f. ) 284 • 227 • 181· 150· 
----------------------------------------------------------
• significance > .05 
Numbers in parentheses are Chi-Square ratioe having the 
same interpretation as for OLS. Significance test is 
two-tailed. 
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D~~~lQ~m~nl~1_1D~-fQQl~~-lim~:~~j~~~~Q§~:~Q1iQD-MQ~~1 
For the second stage of analysis a pooled time-series 
cross-section model was specified incorporating a new 
vector containing economic expectations. The need for this 
model arises because of the mis-specification inherent in a 
strictly cross-sectional analysis. It is well known that 
expectations about the future economic climate play an 
important role in investment decisions. In the absence of 
of these expectations, statistical explicit recognition 
model s are li kely to suffer from 
power. In addition, mis-specified 
the influence of those 
a I ack of expl ana tory 
models are bound to 
overstate variables that are 
somewhat related to economic expectations. 
As with the cross-section model, a search was made of 
relevant variables. Economic theory and evidence clearly 
point to two factors of prime importance in investment 
deci si ons. These are expe cted i nterest rates and expe cted 
inflation. As the investment decision investigated here is 
one in which interest rate movements are particularly 
relevant, it is bypothesized that mortgage choice will 
exhibit sensitivity to these two factors. AntiCipated 
rises in interest rates and inflation are likely to 
diminish the probability that a borrower will opt for a 
debt instrument such as a VRM which, as rates rise, will 
have its own interest rate adjusted upward. Variables 
tested included several measures of inflation and interest 
ra tes, and a measure of consumer se ntiment. Ultimately, 
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the two variables chosen for the pooled model were those 
which t.heory predicts will perform best. In inter preti ng 
these two variables it is important to stress that one and 
the same value was attached to every observation of a given 
year. This makes them similar to dummy variables in the 
se nse that the cal cuI ate d impa ct of mar gi nal changes in 
these variables is only meaningful from year to year; 
within each individual year the impact is necessarily zero. 
The pooled model was estimated on a sample of 
observations drawn from the yearly models. Approximately 
one-fifth to one-third of the observations from 1978, 1979, 
and 1980 were included in the pooled model, along with the 
entire sample of observations for 1981. This stratified 
sampling procedure was designed to produce roughly equal 
representation of each year in the time-series model. This 
scheme was chosen, as opposed to pure random sampling, to 
assure that sufficient observations for 1981 would be 
available, and to help minimize the variances of the 
estimated coefficients. According to Maddala and Trost 
(1982), exogenous stratified sampling, in which sampling is 
performed with respect to explanatory variables, yields 
logit coefficients that are almost the same as if the 
sampling were random. It is only when sampling is 
endogenous, that is, when the sampling is based on the 
criterion whose determinants are being studied, (in this 
study the proportion of borrowers accepting one instrument 
or the other), that estimates will tend to be biased. 
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Variables present in the cross-section model after 
the initial specification search were included in the 
time-series model. Calculation of the average probability 
of choosing a VRM is based on the equation 
p = 1 I [1 + exp(-XB)] 
where X is the vector of mean values for each independent 
variable and B is the veotor of coefficients for the model, 
i ncl udi ng the inter cept term. For the pool ed model of 
sample 'A' this equation yielded an average probability of 
choosing a VRM of approximately twenty-five percent. 
~~QDQml~~x~~~l~liQD§ 
~X~~1~Q-ID1~~~§1-B~!~§ A variable representing 
expe cta ti ons of fut ure shor t term inter est ra tes, TBD! F, 
was constructed from information gathered from the 
financial futures market for Treasury notes. As Treasury 
bills of thirteen week maturities are traded with delivery 
dates as far in advance as twenty months, the difference 
between present yields and future yields represents market 
expectations about the magnitude and direction of interest 
rates changes. 
After calculating the difference between expected and 
present Treasury bill rates from closing prices of the d~y 
at the mid-poi nt of the third quarter of each year, val ues 
were attached to all observations from the respective 
quarter. These values ranged from +2.09 percent in 1978 to 
-2.06 percent in 1981. To check that the values chosen in 
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thi s manner were re prese nta ti v e of ea ch q uar tel", interest 
rates were sampled throughout each quarter. No 
inconsistencies in magnitude or direction were observed for 
any of the four quarters. Estimation of the model yielded 
a statistically significant coefficient whose sign was 
ne ga ti v e. 
In order to measure the impact of a small change in 
expected interest 
variables, on the 
rates, or 
pro ba bil i ty 
first-order derivative of the 
any of' the cor.ti nuous 
of choosing a VRM, the 
dependent variable is 
calculated with respect to the independent variable. For 
the logit model this is implemented separately for each 
independent variable by evaluating the derivative with 
respect to the mean values of all the independent variables 
in the equation. The equation for the logit derivative is: 
dY/dX, = B1(exp(-XB» I [, + exp(-XB)]2 
where B, is the logit coefficient of independent variable 
X" and B and X are all the logit coefficients and the 
respective mean values of the independent variables. 
Using this equation for estimating the impact of 
a marginal cllange in the expected interest variable, an 
increase of one percent (one hundred basis points) in the 
rate difference is calculated, on average, to decrease the 
probability of choosing a VRM from one year to the next by 
about four percent. 
Ez~~l~~-1Df~~l~QD On a regular quarterly basis the 
University of Michigan Survey Research Center reports 
consumer 
per so nal 
expectations about a 
economic conditions. 
variety of 
Along with 
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general and 
such data as 
expected change in income, the household survey provides 
useful information about household expectations of the 
national rate of inflation in the coming twelve months. 
Using responses from the third quarter of each year, 
the average expected inflation rate from the Survey 
Research Center was attached to each observation of the 
pooled model for each year, respectively. The coefficient 
of this variable, SRIAEI, like that of the former variable, 
is statistically significant and reflects an inverse 
relatonship between expec~ations and the probability of 
choosing a 
pro ba bil i ty 
VRM. A 
of choosing 
three percent decrease 
a VRM is estimated to 
in 
be 
the 
the 
average response to a one hundred basis pOints increase in 
the expected inflation rate. 
economic expe cta-
tions controlled for, it is now necessary to reinterperet 
the cross-section variables. In accor d with the year ly 
models, the fully specified model reveals a highly 
significant relationship between SPREAD and VRM choice, and 
a nega ti v e and no t sta ti sti cal significant rel ati onshi p 
between VRM choice and interest rate levels. Also 
consistent with earlier findings, higher loan amounts are 
strongly related to choosing VRMs. 
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A seemingly surprising finding is a strong negative 
relationship between fee differences and the probability of 
choosing a VRM. According to the model, an increase in the 
difference between FRM and VRM loan fees of ten doll ars 
will lead, on average, to a one-tenth of a percent decline 
in the probability of VRM choice. It must be remembered 
though, that the mor tgage cho ice model re fl ect slender as 
well as borrower behavior. While discounted loan fees are 
likely to attract borrowers to VRMa, higher fees for FRMs 
are also an S&L response to relatively high demand for 
FRMs. That the statistical relationship found in this 
equation may be a supply side reaction is suggested by the 
descriptive statistics. They reveal that VRM loan fees 
were, on average, one hundered and sixty dollars less than 
FRM loan fees, despite the fact that VRM loan amounts were 
over fourteen thousand dollars higher, on average. What 
this shows is that VRM loan fees are generally more 
favorable than FRM loan fees. The negative coefficient may 
thus be capturing an S&L response to relatively high demand 
for FRMs at particular institutions. Alternatively, as 
this variable was constructed from OLS regressions, it is 
possible that the coefficient really is measuring part of 
the effe ct of loan amoun t, the key vari a bl e in es tima ti ng 
fee differences. 
Est ima tion of 
time-series model shows considerable agreement 
the pooled 
with the 
cross-section models. Variables related to race and gender 
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demonstrate consistency with the yearly models in that they 
are not significantly related to VRM choice. The same can 
be said for the income and age varia bl es. In th e poo 1 ed 
model it is found that income and age are not statistically 
significant. Calculation of the impacts of marginal 
changes on the probability of choosing a VRM indicate that 
a one hundred dollar change in income increases the 
probability of choosing a VRM by approximately one-twelfth 
of a percent; and a one year increase in age increases the 
probability by one-and-one quarter percent. The income 
finding supports, if weakly, the conventional hypothesis of 
decreasing relative risk aversion as a function of income. 
Similarly, the age finding lends weak support to the 
life-cycle hypothesis. Once again it should be noted that 
to the degree that loan amount is a reflection of income (r 
= .598), the strong positive association between it and the 
probability of choosing a VRM could have masked the full 
income effects (see Table V). 
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TABLE V 
LOGIT ANALYSIS OF POOLED TIME-SERIES AND 
AVERAGE CHANGE IN THE PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING A VRM -
SAMPLE 'A' 
~~~ng~n~-xs~l~~l~~-YBM! 
% Chg. in Prob.(VRM) Due To 
lng~1~~ls~1~ _______ iQQ1~g _____ H~rE1nsl_~bsnE~_ln-1n£~1~r~ 
INTRST 
SPREAD 
LOANAM 
FDIF 
INCOME 
AGE 
SEX 
S PAN ISH 
BLACK 
ASIAN 
-0.035313 
(0.63) 
0.853975 
(30.84)* 
0.000015 
(49.44)* 
-0.000551 
(17.89)* 
0.000062 
( 1. 44 ) 
0.006563 
(1.79) 
-0.120788 
(0.55 ) 
-0.144886 
(0.41 ) 
-0.168387 
(0.35) 
-0.248402 
(2.23) 
-0.66 
+15.97 
+0.29 
-0.10 
+0.12 
+1 .23 
(per increase of 
100 basis points) 
(per increase of 
100 basis points) 
per increase of 
$1000) 
(per increase of 
$10) 
(per increase of 
$100 per month) 
(per increase of 
1 year) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
SRIAEI -0.143008 -2.67 (per increase of 
bas i s po i n t s ) 
i ncrea se of 
basis pOints) 
(7.30)* 100 
TBDIF -0.218295 -4.08 (per 
(35.71)* 100 
CONST. -0.462472 NA 
____________________ lQ~~l _______________________________ _ 
Total N 2,050 
n of VRM 553 
n of FRM 1,497 
Model Chi-Square 
(12 d.f.) 207* 
~~sn-i~Q~~lYBM1-----Z~~Ql-------------------------------
significance > .05 
Numbers in parentheses are Chi-Square ratios having the 
same interpretation as for OLS. Significance test is 
two- tail ed. 
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In summarizing the findings thus far it is important 
to note that the separate yearly cross-section models, 
though exhi bi ting general consistency in their resul ts, 
also vary from each other in important ways. Were the 
analysis to conclude before estimating the time-serie~ 
model, these variations would be difficult to interpret. 
Development of the poo I ed cross- se cti on time- seri es model 
accomplishes two things. Fi rst , it hel ps expl ai n why 
cross-sectional results may differ from year to year. 
Second, it is necessary for deriving stable and reliable 
estimates of the model's coefficients. 
The key resul t of the pool ed model is the em piri cal 
confirmation that expectations of future economic 
condi ti ons are signficantly reI a ted to the pro ba bil i ty of 
borrowers chooosing VRMs. In demonstrating the importance 
of economic expectations as determinants of mortgage 
choice, it becomes clear that inconsistencies in 
mortgage price component variables found in the four 
cross-section models most probably result from unaccounted 
expectations. Differing expectations across each year lead 
to changes in the magnitude and direction of the mortgage 
price component variables. In short, the cross-section 
results must be viewed with caution. They are important in 
o}ear chi ng for the corre ct spe cifi ca ti ons of the mor tgage 
choice model, leading to development of the pooled 
cross-section time-series model. It is this final model's 
results, however, which are of greatest relevance. 
CHAPTER VII 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS - MODEL VALIDATION 
Having used the initial yearly samples to specify the 
mortgage choice model, caution must be exercised in placing 
too much confidence in the resulting sample estimates. In 
order to test the robustness of these findings it is useful 
to estimate the model on a separate sample (Draper & Smith, 
1981). If results of the second set of samples are found 
to match the first set consistently, the model may then be 
deemed generally valid, and its estimates may be evaluated 
with greater assurance that they are not statistical 
artifacts. 
To test the validi ty of the model a second random 
sample of mortgage applicants, labelled 'AA', was drawn 
from the original pool of observations. Due to 
insufficient data for 1981 the full data set for this year 
was used in the initial estimation stage, therefore 
validation tests were performed only on the three prior 
year s. 
~rQ§§~~~1iQn-HQ£~gag~~bQl~~-HQQ~l 
~Qm~a£j§Qn~~-MQ£~gag~~£l~~~Qm~QD~~§ Both the 
interest rate spread and the interest level variables are 
found to be fully consistent across samples. In sample 
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'AA' the SPREAD coefficients are po~itive and significant 
in 1978 and 1979 and positive but not statistically 
significant in 1980. This agrees closely with tne initial 
sample 'A'. Likewise, the interest rate variable in sample 
'AA' variable is positive in all three years and 
significant in 1979 only, matching sample' A'. 
Coefficients of the fee differences, FDIF, exhibit a 
pattern in sample 'AA' which is similar to the previous 
sample. In 1978 and 1980 the coefficients are 
statistically significant and negative, while in 1979 the 
FDIF coefficient is positive but lacks significance. 
amount coefficients mirror the initial results, too. 
Loan 
They 
are positive and significant for all three years as in the 
former sampl e. 
~~m~~£1~Qn_~f_~Q~IQ~~~_~h~£sQ1~~1~11Q~ To the extent 
that the regression coefficients for borrower 
characteristics are generally found not to be statistically 
significant in all three years for sample' A' and' AA', the 
findings can be viewed as very Similar across samples. 
Specific borrower characteristic coefficients exhibit 
unstable patterns. For example, the variables representing 
income, sex, Spanish origins, and Asian origins shift signs 
from sample 'A' to 'AA' in two of the three years. 
Variables representing age and Black origins shift signs 
once each. No discernible pattern emerges from these 
changes, lending support to the overall conclusion that 
borrower attributes do not significantly affect mortgage 
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choice in the cross section model~ (see Tables VI). 
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TABLE VI 
LOGIT ANALYSIS - SAMPLE 'AA' 
~~~nQ~n!~~~i~~l~~-YBM 
lnQ~1s~js~1~1 ___________ 1~la ________ l~1~ _______ -1~a~ ___ _ 
INTRST 0.429153 1.054324 0.027436 
(2.83) (40.12)- (0.12) 
SPREAD 2.321253 0.250388 0.127453 
(47.39)- (4.18)- (0.27) 
LOANAM 0.000013 0.000019 0.000016 
( 19 .37 ) - (53.60)- (34.16)-
FDIF 
-0.004662 0.000587 -0.000766 
( 36 .62) - (2.34) (5.12)-
INCOME 0.000074 -0.000006 -0.000007 
(1.68) (0.01) (0.02) 
AGE 0.010519 0.010249 0.007631 
(3.52) (3.40) (1.65) 
SEX 
-0.246423 -0.458824 0.149456 
(2.04) (6.96)- (0.60) 
S PAN ISH 0.245259 0.413392 -0.187891 
(1.47) (4.47)- (0.54) 
BLACK 0.612554 0.201127 0.301511 
(5.82)* (0.37) (0.74) 
ASIAN 
-0.175607 0.088902 -0.035995 
(0.69) (0.25) (0.04) 
CONST. 
-6.753023 -14.10631 -3.009711 
(7.03)- (52.18;° (9.19)* 
----------------------------------------------------------
Total N 2,305 1 ,629 1 ,701 
n of VRM 494 517 434 
n of FRM 1 ,811 1 , 11 2 1 ,267 
Model Chi-Square 
( 10 d. f. ) 341- 179- 146 • 
~--------------------------------------------------------
significance > .05 
Numbers in parentheses are Chi-Square ratios having the 
same interpretation as for OLS. Significance test is 
two-tailed. 
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~Ql~~-Ilm~=~rl~~-HQr1g~g~~tQ1Q~-HQg~1 
The pooled model for sample IAAI was constructed in 
the same manner as the original. Random su b-sampl es for 
each year were concatenated along with the full sample for 
1981 • Identi cal val ues were use d to represent expe cted 
differences between future and present interest rates and 
expected annual inflation. 
Coefficients of 
the two time-series variables remained consistent with the 
first sample. Expected interest rate differences were 
inversely and significantly related to the probability of 
choosing a VRM, and a marginal increase in this difference 
of one hundred basis points is estimated to decrease this 
probability by approximately five percent. Likewise, the 
expected inflation rate coefficient was statistically 
significant 
change in 
and, 
this 
on average, 
rate is 
a one hundred 
calculated to 
probability of choosing a VRM by two percent. 
~Qm~~rl~QD-2!~rQ~~=~QliQD-1~ri~~l~~ 
basis pOints 
decrease the 
Among the 
mortgage price components all four variables performed 
consistently between samples. The variables INTRST, 
SPREAD, FDIF, and LOANAM exhibit the same coefficient signs 
and magnitudes, as well as roughly the same marginal 
impacts as in sample I AI. In sample I AAI a one hundred 
basis points change in SPREAD increases the probability of 
choosing a VRM by twenty-one percent, as opposed to sixteen 
per cent in the ini ti al sampl e. The mar gi nal impa ct of a 
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ten dollar change in FDIF is roughly the same between 
samples, as is a marginal change of one thousand dollars of 
loan amount. 
Coefficients of borrower characteristics in the 
pooled model of sample 'AA' were highly consistent with 
those of the initial pooled sample in that all variables 
1 acked sta ti sti cal signi ficance. Differences did appear, 
he-wever, in the signs of certain variables. For income~ 
the impact of choosing a VRM with a one hundred dollar 
i ncrea se changed from roughly a one- twel fth of a per ce nt 
increase in the probability of choosing a VRM, to a 
one-hundredth of a percent decrease in the probability. 
For age, the marginal impacts remained about the same, 
again lending weak support to the life-cycle hypothesis 
(see Table VII). 
76 
TABLE VII 
LOGIT ANALYSIS OF POOLED TIME-SERIES AND 
AVERAGE CHANGE IN THE PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING A VRM -
SAMPLE 'AA' 
~~n~~n1-3~£l~~1~i-YBMl 
% Chg. in Prob.(VRM) Due To 
ln~~1~£l~~1~ _______ ~QQ1~g _____ M~£8~~1_~b~n8~-1D-1Dg~1~£~ 
INTRST -0.068141 -1.26 (per increase of 
SPREAD 
LOANAM 
FDIF 
INCOME 
AGE 
SEX 
SPANISH 
BLACK 
ASIAN 
SRIAEI 
TBDIF 
(2.26) 100 basis points) 
1.124461 +20.77 (per increase of 
(42.32)* 100 basis points) 
0.000016 +0.30 (per increase of 
(53.41)* $1000) 
-0.000384 -0.07 (per increase of 
(8.22)* $10) 
-0.000066 -0.01 (per increase of 
(0.01) $100 per month) 
0.007662 +1.42 (per increase of 
(2,26) 1 year) 
0.080990 NA 
(0.23 ) 
0.034421 
(0.03) 
0.112446 
(0.15) 
-0.308590 
(2.87) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
-0.116901 -2.16 (per 
(4.80)* 100 
-0.271835 -5.02 (per 
(53.17)* 100 
increase of 
bas is po i n t s ) 
increase of 
bas i 5 po i n t s ) 
CONST. -0.436278 NA 
____________________ lQ~al _______________________________ _ 
Total N 2,009 
n of V RM 535 
n of FRM 1,474 
Model Chi-Square 
(12 d.f.) 210· 
~~!~g!~~f~~~!M;--.05-Z~~~1-------------------------------
1 Numbers in parentheses are Chi-Square ratios having the 
same interpretation as for OLS. Significance test is 
two- tail ed. 
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Comparisons of the results of the two samples reveal a 
high degree of agreement both for the cross-section models 
and the pooled time-series cross-section models. Of 
primary interest are the pooled models. In both samples 
the average probability of choosing a VRM are very similar 
at twenty-five percent for sample 'A' and twenty-four 
percent for sample 'AA'. Although the signs of the 
coefficients of the borrower characteristic variables 
differ for four of the eight variables, in no case were any 
of these variables found to be statistically significant. 
These findings confirm that borrower characteristics, with 
the possible exception of net wealth, do not play an 
important role in the decision to choose a given type of 
mortgage instrument. 
Regarding the remaining variables, comparisons of the 
results for each sample show the importance of price 
components and economic expectations. While the level of 
interest rates appears to be unimportant, both the interest 
rate spread and expected level of interest rates are highly 
significant, as is the expected inflation rate. Fee 
differences, on average one-hundred-and-fifty dollars lower 
for VRMs, are also statistically significant determinants, 
albeit negatively related to the probability of choosing a 
VRM. Lastly, loan amount is a consistently important 
variable. Although it is likely related to net wealth, the 
possibility of lenders preferring to provide VRMs for 
higher loan amounts cannot be completely ruled out. 
18 
~~11§lj~~1_]~11~~11jl~ 
Having demonstrated the robustness of the mortgage 
choice model for the samples analyzed, there remains to be 
di scusse d se veral issues regar di ng the relia bil i ty of the 
modal's estimates. The first of these issues relates to 
the unavoidable use of the 1981 data set for both the 
exploratory and the validated pooled models. As this 
sample represented one quarter of the data set for each 
time-series model, the question arises as to whether the 
similarity of the results of these models is an artifact of 
sample duplication. Though some contamination is obviously 
present, the size of the overall samples for each model and 
the proportion of "new" observations tends to suggest that 
the general conformity of the models' estimates are a 
result, not of contamination, but of the overall predictive 
power of the specified model. 
Another issue regards the confidence that can be 
placed in the estimates of the pooled models. In order for 
these estimates to be reliable, the assumptions for the 
model require that the structure of the cross-section 
models be similar from one year to next. An examination of 
the signs, magni tudes, and level s of signi ficance of the 
varia bl es from year to year reveal th at for sampl e 'A' the 
structure of the cross-section models for years 1978, 1979, 
and 1980 appear quite similar. However, there is somewhat 
of a discrepancy between the coefficient estimates for 
these years and 1981. In particular, the coefficients for 
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the intercept term and the variables representing interest 
rate spread and loan amount exhibit large differences 
either in magnitude or direction. Examination of the 
second sample 'AA' finds similar discrepencies. 
To check for structural changes from 1978-1980 to 
1981 the poo 1 ed time- seri es cross~ se cti on model s were run 
again for both samples with the addition of a dummy 
variable to represent 1981. The estimation yielded results 
indicating that no abrupt change had occurred in 1981. Not 
only did the coefficient for the dummy variable fail to 
achieve statistical significance in either sample, but the 
inclusion of this variable provided no additional 
explanatory power to the models. The latter finding was 
determined by the Chi-Square test of statistical 
significance of the ratio of the difference between the 
restricted and unrestricted models' "-2 log likelihood" 
sta ti st i cs. The resul ts for both sampl es proved not to be 
statistically significant at the five percent level. This 
test provides strong evidence that the variations in 
cross-section results are explained by variations in 
economic expectations rather than structural shifts in the 
demand for mortgage instruments. 
A final issue related to the statistical reliability 
of the mortgage choice model regards one of the unique 
fea tures of the logi t regression model, the axiom known as 
the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (IIA). 
McFadden (1974) and other s have shown that one of the 
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assumptions which underlie the statistical properties of 
the logit model is that no loss of generality is entailed 
when excluding an alternative from the choice model. In 
other words, the relative probabilities of the choices 
analyzed do not depend on the presence of another existing 
alternative. For example, if the choices specified in a 
logit model of transportation choice are mass transit 
versus automobile, an excluded alternative such as 
"walking" will not distort the estimation of the relative 
proba bil i ty of choosing mass transi t versus automobil e. 
The 1 ogi c behi nd the IIA proper ty is that al terna ti v es 
which are distinctly different from the ones in question, 
~hough they ai'e a pa:-t of the overall choice set, do not 
influence the choice between the two alternatives that are 
observed. 
Discussion of the IIA assumption is especially 
relevant when analyzing the mortgage choice model findings. 
To the extent that alternative mortgage instruments 
excluded from the study 
different from FRMs and 
statistically independent 
reliable probabilities. 
can be 
VRMs, the 
of those 
Omission 
viewed as distinctly 
model estimates are 
alternatives and are 
of other forms of 
financing, such as seller-financed or "creative" mortgages 
and FHA financing, may be t:-eated likewise. Though these 
ty pes of mor tgages are sometimes subs t i tu te s for FRMs and 
VRMs, they are no better substitutes for one type of 
mor tgage than another. Thus, they cannot be viewed as 
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influencing the choice between the two. 
The major shortcoming of the IIA axiom is in 
situations where alternatives which are close substitutes 
for each other are incorporated into the same model. If, 
for example, two alternative mortgage instruments whose 
features differ only slightly are included in a model 
alongside the conventional FRM, estimates of the 
probability of choosing an FRM will be driven downward. In 
essence, if the two alternative instruments are nearly 
identical, the effect of treating them as distinct choices 
is equivalent to double counting. Though in reality their 
combined probability should be equal to the probability of 
choosing just one of them, the logit model treats the two 
choices as distinct. It thus assigns the two a larger share 
of the probability than is warranted (McFadden, 1974; 
Maddala, 1983). 
In this study, the IIA shortcoming does not present a 
problem. There was one year, 1981, in which, unlike the 
previous years, FRMs and VRMs were not the only major 
mortgage choices. In that year another type of mortgage 
instrument, the flexible payment mortgage (FLEX), rivaled 
the VRM in popularity. This instrument is like the VRM in 
some ways, yet in addi ti on to interest rate changes, the 
monthly payment on the loan principal may be adjusted, too. 
Thi s difference is cri ti cal, because it means that unl ike 
VRMs, FLEX payment schedule adjustments can result in 
negative amortization. As such, FLEXs cannot be viewed as 
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very close substitutes for VRMs. For practi cal reasons, 
and because their exclusion posed no threat to the 
reliability of this study, analysis of FLEX choice was not 
pursued. 
In summary, tests of the validity of the mortgage 
choice model based on a second set of Loan Register Report 
samples reveal that the models' estimates are highly 
consistent both for the yearly samples and for the pooled 
time-series cross-section samples. The findings 
demonstrate that the results are unlikely to be statistical 
artifacts arising from the initial specification search. 
In the pooled model which is of primary interest, borrower 
oharacteri st i cs were found to be of li ttl e impor ta nce in 
the decision to accept VRMs. It is argued, however, that 
borrower wealth, to the extent that it is reflected in loan 
amounts,is an important determinant of VRM acceptance. 
Lastly, mortgage price components and economic expectations 
were found to be highly related to mortgage choice. These 
results are unlikely to have been influenced by the 
inclusion of the 1981 observations in both pooled samples, 
nor by the exclusion of other types of mortgage instruments 
from th e choi ce model. Further, 
the possibility that a structural 
place between 1978-1980 and 1981. 
no suppor tis found for 
change in demand too k 
CHAPTER VIII 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MORTGAGE MARKET 
This study uses mortgage application information to 
examine the economic determinants of borrower mortgage 
choice decisions. The findings of this study support two 
major hypotheses that flow directly from the economic 
literature. These hypotheses are: 1) relative mortgage 
prices have a significant impact on borrower decisions; 
and, 2) economic expectations playa large role in choosing 
mortgage instruments. 
These findings lead to a better understanding of the 
factor s i nfl uencing borrower s to se 1 ect fixed or varia bl e 
rate mortgages. Thus, they have broad implications for the 
cort gage market. They serve to provide insight into the 
influence of economic conditions on borrower demand for 
VRMs, as well as serving as a means of evaluating the 
impact of regulatory changes on bOr'i"owel' demand. Finally, 
the findings help put into perspective a critical issue 
about which little is yet known, VRM default risk. 
Before engaging these topics, a discussion of the 
limi ta ti ons of the generaliz a bll i ty of thi s st udy to the 
mortgage market is in order. As such, the 
representativeness of this study's sample is considered 
from several different perspectives. 
~~~&£~ll~~~ilj~~~f~n&_~~~~~ 
The su bj ect of thi s resear ch is 
to accept FRMs or VRMs for the 
s1 ngl e- family owner-occupied homes. 
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borrower s' de oi sions 
purpose of buying 
To focus in on thi s 
subject and concentrate on "average" borrowers, the 
sampling excluded government-sponsored FHA and VA mortgage 
loan borrowers. The sample frame also limited the 
observations studied to borrowers whose income and home 
pri ces fell wi thi n a broad range that el imi na te d very low 
and very high levels of wealth. In addition, exceptionally 
young or old borrowers were excl uded from the study, as 
were the few borrowers whose reported racial backgrounds 
were other than the four main groups of Whi te, Asian, 
Spanish, and Bl ack. These constrai nts, whil e ti ghteni ng 
the regression model estimates for the selected 
observations and helping to avoid the problems posed by 
statistical outliers, limit the extent to which the 
findings of this study can be carried over to all members 
of the borrower population. 
Further limitations on the generalizability of this 
study's findings may be thought to arise from the source of 
the data itself, i.e., state-chartered S&Ls, in the form of 
self-selection bias. Self-selection, meaning that the 
population studied systematically differs from the general 
population of .borrowers, can cast doubts about the 
applicability of the model estimates to those borrowers who 
did not patronize these lending institutions. As indicated 
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earlier, the Loan Register Report is a data base which only 
state-regulated savings and loan associations in California 
were required to maintain. As such, all lending 
transactions by federally-chartered institutions and other 
commercial and private lenders are unavailable for study. 
Also, seller or "creative" financing transaction data are 
not contained in the Loan Register Report. 
Though self-selection bias usually cannot be ruled out 
of most studies, the issue is really one of how serious its 
effects may be on the study's results. In the case of this 
study, it seems reasonable to expect that its effects are 
slight. This is because state-chartered S&Ls handled 
between one-third and one-half of all residential mortgage 
transactions conducted by lending institutions in 
California. This proportion is sufficiently large to 
assure that S&L borrowers are representative of the overall 
borrower population in California. 
H2£tE~E~-1xi~inE~D~-1D1~£~§1-B~1~X~&Q~~1~D§ 
The major component of mortgage prices examined in 
this study is interest rate spreads. As indicated earlier, 
estimates derived from the pooled models reveal that a one 
hundred basis point increase in this variable leads to an 
increase in the probability of choosing a VRM from between 
sixteen and twenty-one percent, depending on the sample. 
As the mortgage choice model demonstrates, the 
impacts of mortgage price components must be interpreted 
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with respect to expectations of future economic conditions. 
This suggests that estimates of the impacts of given levels 
of independent variab11s are sensitive to changes in 
economic expectations. 
pro ba bil i ty of choosi ng 
It also suggests that 
a VRM is affected 
the aver age 
by different 
interest rate expectations. In order to test these 
hypotheses, the impacts of marginal changes in interest 
rate spreads on the probability of borrowers choosing VRMs, 
and the effects of changes in the mean pro ba bil i ty, were 
estimated at expectation levels other than the mean 
expectation. In the original calculations, the mean 
difference between future and present interest rates was 
nine-thousandths (.009) of a percent, or nine-tenths of a 
basis pOint, reflecting the average of both positive and 
negative expectations. 
First-order derivatives (dY/dX) were recalculated for 
SPREAD at the minimum and maximum values of the expected 
interest rate variable (TBDIF), keeping all other variables 
at thei r means as in the former cal cul ati ons. When TBDI F 
was at its maximum, 1. e., interest rates were expected to 
rise in the future by +2.09 percent, the following effects 
are noted. 
In sample 'A' the impact of a one hundred basis 
points increase in SPREAD changes from an increased 
probability of sixteen percent to an increased probability 
of only twel ve percent. In sample 'AA', the impact of a 
marginal change in SPREAD declines from twenty-one percent 
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to fifteen percent. In other words, expectations of higher 
interest rates decrease the effects of a marginal increase 
in the interest rate spread by approximately one-fourth. 
Hence, a larger inducement by way of interest rate 
differentials would be required to achieve a given 
probability of borrower acceptance when expectations of 
higher interest ra te s ar e present. The effect of higher 
interest rate expectations is reflected also in the mean 
probability of choosing a VRM. At the higher expectation 
level the overall probability of choosing a VRM shrinks 
from twenty-five percent to seventeen percent in sample 
'A', and from twenty-four percent to sixteen percent in 
sample 'AA'. 
Looking at the effects when expectations are for 
interest rates to decline, that is, when TBDIF is at its 
minimum of -2.06 percent, the reverse is found. Now, a one 
hundred basis points increase in SPREAD increases the 
probability of choosing a VRM from sixteen percent to 
nineteen percent in sample 'A', and from twenty-one percent 
to twenty-six percent in sample , AA' . Average 
probabilities of choosing a VRM rise from twenty-five 
percent to thirty-four percent in the former sample, --'" ClUU.
from twenty-four percent to thirty-six percent in the 
latter (see Tables VIII). 
TABLE VIII 
EFFECTS OF INTEREST RATE EXPECTATION LEVELS 
ON THE PROBABILITY OF CHOOSING A VRM 
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Percent Change in Prob.(VRM) Due To Marginal Changes -
~1~Y~!~~~~-1h£~~_L~~~1§~r_1Dt~£~~!-B~!~~~~~£!~!~D~! 
Mean High Low 
__________________ l±~~~~11 ______ 1±a~~11__ _____ 1~a~~1 __ 
SPREAD2 
Sam pl e 'A' 
Sample 'AA' 
Mean Probe (VRM) 
Sample 'A' 
__ ~~m~l~ __ 'AA' ____ _ 
+15.91 
+20.11 
+12.28 
+14.82 
+19.23 
+26.03 
24.90 17.39 32.24 
a~~~ _________ _12~a __________ 3~~~ __ 
Levels of interest rate expectations represent the mean, 
minimum, and maximum values of the variable TBDIF. It is 
computed as future interest rates for 91-day Treasury bills 
mi nus prese nt interest ra tes, for ea ch of the four peri ods 
studied. 
2 The variable SPREAD is evaluated at its mean along with 
the means of all the remaining independent variables. The 
same holds true for the calculation of the average 
probability of choosing a VRM. 
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These estimates support the theoretical model of 
mortgage choice in that they demonstrate that interest rate 
expectations have a large impact on mortgage pricing 
decisions. Expectations of higher interest rates lower the 
probability of borrowers choosing VRMs, and lower the 
impact of a marginal change in interest rate spreads. 
Parallel but opposite conclusions follow from lowered 
interest rate expectations. 
These findings are very meaningful for the mortgage 
market, particularly for S&Ls wishing to maintain a given 
proportion of VRMs in their portfolios. They indicate that 
the pricing of VRMs to achieve a given level of acceptance 
must take into account the magni tude of expectations of 
future interest rates. With regard to the overall 
probability of borrowers choosing VRMs and the impact of 
interest rate spreads, this exercise demonstrates that two 
hundred basi s poi nt changes in interest rate expe cta ti ons 
in either direction can lead to relatively large changes in 
VRM acceptance. 
lm~~£1~n~~~!-1b~-B~gYl~~~£~~~n1~z1 
This study provides empirical evidence in support of 
the many theoretical analyses which suggest that the 
relative difference in the initial interest rates of 
mortgage instruments offered to borrowers is a cri tical 
factor in borrowers' decisions to accept VRMs. However, in 
the theoretical studies, in order to focus on interest rate 
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differentials, all other price and non-price components of 
mortgage instruments are ignored. This study differs in 
that the findings are embedded in the context of several 
pricing features. Equally important, the findings are set 
in a specific regulatory context in which non-price 
mortgage features are mandated by government. These 
non-price features include various restrictions on VRM 
interest rate adjustment, and tax regulations. 
As may be re call ed, the Civil Code of the Sta te of 
California limited the magnitude and timing of adjustments 
to VRM interest rates. Among other things it also placed a 
ceiling of two-hundred-and-fifty basis pOints on the 
absolute amount the interest rate could rise for any given 
loan. In addi ti on, prepayment penal ti es to borrower s wer e 
disallowed provided certain conditions were met. Clearly, 
these elements may be expected to have a significant impact 
on VRM acceptance. 
While this study cannot address the question of how 
much the various aspects of the regulatory framework 
contributed to the obse~ved effects of relative prices, it 
contains important implications regarding this issue. 
Specifically, the findings suggest that VRM regulations 
that are less favorable to borrowers will tend to make them 
require more favorable pricing terms to accept VRMs. Thus, 
higher ceilings and shorter adjustment periods may be 
expected to cause interest rate spreads and other forms of 
pricing discounts to grow. 
Another important 
environment may affect 
way 
the 
in which the 
relative price 
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regulatory 
of mortgage 
instruments and borrower demand is through tax laws. For 
example, tax reform which affects borrower's tax 
liabilities may be expected to have an impact on the level 
of borrower acceptance of VRMs. If ini tial and average 
lifetime interest rates on VRMs are lower than FRMs, then 
the higher the marginal tax rates of borrowers, the greater 
the interest payment deductability enjoyed by FRM 
borrower s. Under these cir cumstances, VRMs borrower s 
require greater price discounts to offset the fact that 
they must cl aim a small er tax shel tel'. 
tax rates reduces the level of tax 
Lowering marginal 
benefits borrowers 
recei ve via interest rate payment deducta bil i ty, and thus 
reduces the edge that FRMs enj oy. Di scoun t s for V RMs may 
then be expected to decline as borrowers find less tax 
advantage in the higher interest rates of FRMs. 
These examples illustrate two important ways in which 
the regulatory environment can affect the demand for VRMs 
and their prices relative to FRHs. They highlight the 
importance of the legal and policy contexts in which VRMs 
are offered. As the regulatory framework for mortgages can 
vary from year to year and from ~'}.rid!.ct!.on to 
jurisdiction, this aspect of mortgage instrument pricing is 
an important one for policymakers and lenders to consider. 
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A fi nal issue related to the determi na nt s 0 f 
residential mortgage choice is the degree to which VRM 
borrowers are more likely to defaul t on their loans than 
FRM borrowers. The magnitude of this risk is critical both 
to borrower and lender accept~~c~ of VRMs. 
Like interest rate risk which lenders seek protection 
against by offering VRMs, the risks of delinquency, 
default, and foreclosure constitute a major class of 
investment risks. In a study of potential alternative 
mor tgage instrument defaul t and foreclosure rates (Swan, 
1977) the pro bl ems i nvol ved in wei ghi ng defaul t ri sks and 
balancing them against interest rate risk is articulated: 
The abundance of possible factors that might 
affect delinquency and foreclosure experience make 
(sic) it difficult to neatly summarize the impact 
of alternative mortgage instruments on mortgage 
defaul t. Some factor s w or k one way whil e other s 
work in the oPPosite direction ...• If thrifts want 
to reduce their exposure to one form of risk (e.g., 
interest rates), they may have to increase their 
exposure to other forms of risk (e.g., defaults) 
and accept reduced profits .••• To seek to protect 
earnings and eliminate all risks is asking too 
much. (Chapter IX, pp. 28-29) 
On the other hand, Swan pOints out that the mere existence 
of additional choices in the market would, by itself, 
create benefits. He also speculates that self-selection of 
borrowers and lenders may tend to sort loans out in such a 
way that default risk would be minimized. 
Defaults on mortgages are generally viewed as related 
to three major factors. These are: loan 
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characteristics, such as the term of the mortgage and the 
eq ui ty- to- val ue I'a t i 0; 2) house hoI d characteri sti cs, such 
as income, number of dependents, and marital status; and 3) 
property characteristics, such as the condition of the 
house and the type of neigborhood. As yet, little is known 
about the way in which these factors affect defaul t risks 
for VRMs. As this issue is critical to VRM acceptance, it 
is instructive to survey the accumulated research on this 
subject. 
In an early simulation study of credi t risk, 
state-level aggregation of mortgage payment-to-income 
ratios were computed for a nationwide loan program 
sponsored by the Farm Credit System (Stansell & Millar, 
1976) • Using borrower income proj ections and the actual 
interest rates on Federal Land Bank VRMs for rural homes 
between 1972 and 1974, this study found that the adjusted 
mortgage payment-to-net-income ratio did not constitute an 
undu e bu rden on households. That V RMs had a benign effect 
on projected defaults was also found in a study using 
loan-to-value ratios as its major measure of risk (Follain 
& Struyk, 1977). 
Similar results to those obtained in the latter two 
studies were found in a more extensive simulation (Vandell, 
1978) in which the default model contained variables 
representing payment burden over time, equity accumulation 
over time, and increased initial borrower effort to meet 
mortgage payments. VRMs and FRMs performed similarly under 
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most conditions. Vandell's default model was replicated in 
two further simulations (Crawford, 1981i Crawford & Harper, 
1982). Their conclusions support those of the original 
study. 
Finally, the most recent default-related study (Webb, 
1982) is a wide departure from the previous ones. Using 
actual survey data on borrower characteristics over an 
eight year period, 1968-75, this study seeks to determine 
potential mortgage deli nq uencies based upon 
payment-to-income ratios and differences in mortgage 
instrument terms. Though like the former studies this one 
includes income among its explanatory variables, it ignores 
eq ui ty as a factor, enteri ng instead into the analy si s 
specific borrower variables such as household income 
sources, income variability and trend, and sex, age, and 
race of household head. The general finding of this study 
was that all varieties of alternative mortgage instruments 
studied had greater risks of mortgage delinquencies 
associated with them than did the FRMs. Specific findings 
i ncl ude d differential 1"1 sk and dif ferential severi ty of 
risk in particular circumstances for occupational groups, 
racial groups, age groups, and households according to 
sources of income. 
It is clear from these studies that there is much 
that remains to be learned about the differential default 
risks associated with VRMs. To date, few if any studies 
have used actual borrower or S&L data to empirically 
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estimate the determinants of default. 
Despite the seemingly contradictory findings of the 
simul ation st udies, there are reasons to believe that in 
general, default risk may be no different for VRMs than for 
FRMs. Studies dealing with alternative mortgage instrument 
acceptance by private mortgage insurance companies (Swan, 
1977) and the secondary mortgage market (Plant & Jannuzzi, 
1977) reveal that the financial institutions that are 
involved in mortgage negotiations other than primary 
lenders tend to view the instruments similarly to the way 
they view FRMs. Particularly where they carry restrictions 
moderating borrower risks, such as limits on payment 
increases req uired by California regul ati ons, thei r 
treatment by private mortgage insurance companies was 
unexceptional. In general, it was found that secondary 
lenders employed the same 
"quality" for all mortgages 
included in their criteria 
underwri ti ng cri teria of 
trajed, but in addition 
future borrower income 
expectations along with present borrower income. 
Although the present study does not address the issue 
of default, two implications regarding default risk follow 
from the fi ndi ngs. Fir st, to the extent that the 
probability of choosing a VRM has been found to be 
i nfl uenced by expe cta ti ons of fut ure economi c condi ti ons, 
and that these expectations in turn influence the interest 
ra te spreads on V RHo:!, it is evident that borrower s are 
sensitive to the risks associated with VRMs and attempt to 
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a ffse t them accor di ngly wi th re duced interest rates. Thi s 
suggests that if borrowers are correct in their 
expectations, default risk may be no different for VRM 
borrowers than for FRM borrowers. On the hand, if borrower 
expectations are in error, default risk may be heightened. 
Second, to the degree that borrower wealth is an important 
factor in default risk, VRM borrowers may be at no greater 
ri sk of defaul t than FRM borrower s. This is because, as 
may be recalled, the findings indicate that the probability 
of choosing a VRM increases as borrower weal th increases. 
As weal thy borrowers have the financial wherewi thall to 
face increased mortgage payment burdens, defaul t risk may 
not be a serious concern. To some degree this confirms the 
notion that borrower self-selection mitigates increased 
defaul t ri sk. 
In summary, thi s chapter has focused on li nki ng the 
findings of this study to general mortgage market issues. 
The study samples' limitations being noted, quantitative 
estimates of the relationships between interest rate 
expectations, interest rate spreads, and the probabilities 
of choosing a VRM were reported. Following this, the 
impact of the regulatory environment on VRM acceptance was 
discussed. Lastly, a review of the research related to VRM 
defaul t risk was offered, along wi th a discussion of the 
how the implications of this study's findings relate to 
differential default risk for VRM borrowers. 
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
To study the determinants of borrower demand for VRMs 
this research uses a data base consisting of loan 
appl ica ti on i nforma ti on 0 btai ne d from Cal ifor n:ia S&L 
associations between the years 1978 and 1981. After 
selecting observations based on a number of criteria 
intended to make the study representative of a large 
segment of the borrower population, a discrete choice 
(logit) model was specified in order to estimate the 
probability of borrowers choosing VRMs as opposed to FRMs. 
This mortgage choice model was made up of mortgage price 
components, 
expectations. 
borrower characteristics, and economic 
Validating the mortgage choice model entailed 
comparing the statistical estimates of both a yearly 
cross-se cti on model and pool ad ti me- series cross- se cti on 
model for two sets of stratified samples. The model s' 
estimates were found to be highly consistent across 
samples. Within the regulatory context of the California 
mortgage market, the pooled time-series model ~evealed that 
borrower characteristics other than weal th are not 
important determinants of mortgage choice, whereas mortgage 
price components and economic expectations are important 
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determi nants. 
One of the principle findings of this study is that 
borrower willingness to accept VRMs is directly related to 
the margin of difference between FRM interest rates and VRM 
interest rates, and not at all related to the absolute 
level of interest rates. Evidence supporting the interest 
margin finding is consistent both in the cross-section and 
the pooled time-series models, and across the two sets of 
samples. Based on the fully-specified time-series model, a 
one hundred basis points increase in FRM rates relative to 
V RM rates increases the pro ba bil i ty of choosing VRMs by 
between approximately sixteen and twenty-one percent. 
The distinction made in this study between relative 
interest rates and absolute interest rate levels is an 
important one. The lack of statistically significant 
findings for the variable representing interest rate levels 
in the pooled time-series model makes it is evident that 
interest rate level s do not affect strongly the 
probabability of borrowers choosing VRMs. Support is thus 
lacking for' the position taken by many mortgage finance 
analysts that, by carrying lower interest costs at the 
start of the contract term, VRMs make housing more 
"affordable" during periods of high interest rates. 
Alternatively, though the findings of this study indicate 
that VRMs do not have a direct affect on affordability, the 
presence of VRMs in the mortgage market does have an 
indirect effect. This is because VRMs provide borrowers 
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with another means of adjusting their investment portfolios 
to changing economic conditions. 
Another finding supported by the statistical evidence 
is that economic expectations of rising inflation and 
rising interest rates tend to draw borrowers away from the 
VRMs towards the conventional FRM i:letruments. As 
indicated by the time-series model, marginal changes in 
each of these expectations are likely to decrease the 
probability of choosing VRMs from one year to the next by 
roughly two to five percent. These resul ts find agreement 
with the Al baum and Kaufman survey resul ts for Califor nia 
borrowers (1977), in which they found that the higher 
interest rate were expected to be, the more negative the 
attitude towards VRMs. 
Of the several borrower characteri sti cs i ncl ude din 
these model s, two maj or concl uslons emerge. First, the 
data consistently reveals that borrower characteristics 
related to race and gender do not systematically affect 
borrower probabilities of selecting mortgage instruments. 
This lends additional credence to the notion that borrowers 
of various social groups do not exhibit differential risk 
aversion. In general, it suppor ts the economi c paradigm 
that individuals make consumption and investment deciSions 
based on price Signals, irrespective of their social 
groupings. These fi ndi ngs al so tend to agree with the 
findings of the Albaum and Kaufman survey in which no 
differences were found between VRM and FRM borrowers wi th 
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respect to sex and ethnic groups. 
Conversely, the findings lend partial support for the 
notion that wealth is an important determinants of mortgage 
choice. Though the cross- se cti on model s show li tt I e or no 
effect for income, when considering the highly significant 
effects of the mortgage loan amount for each set of samples 
and models, the evidence til ts in the dii"ection of an 
increasing probability of choosing VRMs as wealth increase. 
As loan amount is a broader indicator of wealth, it is 
argued here that this is a more relevant measure than is 
income. These findings are in direct contrast to those of 
Al baum and Kaufman, who found that it was borrower s wi th 
relatively less income and net wealth who tended to have 
VRMs. 
Interpretation of the findings for loan amount 
necessarily bri ngs up the issue of supply-side influences 
on the mortgage choice probabilities. While it is argued 
that the loan amount findings are indicative of borrower 
wealth status - and thus consistent with the hypothesis of 
decreasing borrower risk aversioil as wealth i"ises the 
alternative hypothesis that loan amount is a manifestation 
of lender preferences cannot be ruled out. 
Supply condi ti ons al so cannot be rul ed out as an 
explanation of the effects of differences between loan fees 
levied on FRMs and VRMs. Though the cross-section 
estimates vary, the pooled time-series estimates 
consistently indicate a significantly negative relationship 
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between fee differences and the probabil ity of choosing 
V RMs. Thi s fi ndi ng may be a resul t of differenti al ri sk 
premiums for FRMs. Alternatively, it could be a 
statistical artifact resulting from construction of the 
variable. 
In addition to these findings the sensitivity of 
borrower mortgage choice was estimated for given levels of 
interest rate expectations. It was found that expectations 
of increasing interest rates decrease the probabil i ty of 
choos i ng a VRM from approximately twenty- fi v e per cent to 
approximately sixteen percent. Conversely, expectations 
of decrea si ng interest rates increase th e pro ba bil i ty of 
choosing a VRM to approximately thirty-four percent. 
Similarly, expectations of increasing interest rates affect 
the i nfl uence of interest rate spreads on the pro ba bil i ty 
of choo si ng a V RM. Whil e a mar gi nal change of one hundre d 
basis points increases the probability of choosing a VRM by 
approximately eighteen percent when calculated at th~ mean 
level of interest rate expectations, an increase in these 
expectations lowers the interest rate spread impact to 
approximately fourteen percent. On the other hand, 
de crease d expe cta ti ons increase the impa ct of a mar gi nal 
change in interest rate spreads to approximately twenty-two 
percent. 
Encouraging homeownership has been one of the major 
goals of developing and marketing alternative mortgage 
loans. In inflatIonary periods such as 
experienced over the past fifteen 
prohibitive nominal interest rates raise 
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this country has 
years, seewingly 
the spectre of an 
"affordabi1ity" crisis in housing. VRMs, the instrument 
examined in this research, and other types of alternative 
mortgage instruments as well, have thus been viewed by 
regul a tor sand lendi ng i nsti tuti ons as a means of easi ng 
the mortgage payment burdens of borrowers. In the case of 
VRMs, the main advantage to borrowers is in allowing them 
to enj oy an i ni ti ally lower interest rate on thei r new 
mortgages than a conventional FRM offers. 
From the per spe cti v e of the S&L indus try, VRMs have 
been viewed as a necessary tool for portfolio 
restructuring. Seeking relief from their position in the 
1970's of being heavily exposed to interest rate risk, S&Ls 
have sought viable ways to insulate themselves from 
i nterest rate fl uc ta ti ons whil estill providi ng 1 ong- term 
mortgage loans. VRMs, which shift much of the interest 
rate risk burden to borrowers, are one such solution. 
In the course of establishing a large and 
long-lasting presence in the mortgage market VRMs had first 
to gain the approval of the many government agencies which 
regul ate lending insti tutions. These agencies are charged 
wi th protecting the public from undue financial costs and 
dangers. Until recently, the actions of these public 
institutions and agencies indicated that they believed VRMs 
to be unacceptable to the housing finance market. 
Reform has come about, however. 
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In 1982 Congress 
acted to declare VRMs and many other types of mortgage 
instruments expedient and necessary for the mortgage 
market. Addi tionally, many of the broader regulations not 
directly meant to affect the housing market, yet having a 
large impact on it, such as interest rate ceilings, are 
being rapidly eliminated. What remains to be seen is how 
individual states, which are free to impose their own 
unique regulations on mortgage lending, are responding. 
Thus far it appears that they are res pondi ng with guar ded 
approval. 
Having overcome the major hurdles of government 
regulations, VRMs must continue to pass the more critical 
test of the housing market itself. Ultimately, the fate of 
all alternative mortgage instruments depends on whether or 
not borrowers and lenders believe that it is in their own 
best interests to use them. What is required then, is for 
borrowers and lenders to agree on mutually sa tisfactory 
mortgage terms. By doing so the interests of both parties, 
and the mortgage market in general, will be served. The 
findings of this study provide evidence in support of the 
fact that this process is indeed taking place. It further 
identifies those factors which, from the borrower 
perspective, are most important to the mortgage choice 
decision. 
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APPEHDII 
Loan Register Report data used for this study are 
available at the Center for Urban Studies, Portland State 
Uni v er si ty. Along with storage ta pes of compl ete third 
quarter data for the years 1978 through 1981, the Center 
mai ntai ns containing code books and documentation 
for the 
a file 
Loan Register Report. For more complete 
the Los i nforma tion or further data base rental requests, 
Angeles branch of the California Department of Savings and 
Loan can be contacted. 
The following tables contain statistics generated for 
all the estimated cross-section and pooled time-series 
cross- se cti on model s di scussed in thi s st udy. Da ta 
analysis for this study was performed using Statistical 
Analysis Systems (SAS). 
Logistic Regression 
Sample 'Po' 
1978 
O(P[N{'ENT VAR I ABL(: VRM 
2307 On~(RVATIONS 
18'G VRM - 0 
~Ol VRM ., 
o OB5<RVATJONS DeLETED DUE TO MISSING VALUES 
VARI ABLE MEAN MIN'MUM "AX,MUM RANGE 
INTRST 9. B~GJ' 7.5 10.75 J.25 
SI='REAO -0.OJ85861 -0.3971 0.6G3<1 1.0611 
lOI\NAM G40R3. I fi~OO 2~(X)(JO 20ROO 
FOIF 17.6!'",O2 -103B.71 710.0R 17~O.79 
INCOME 2219. BI 400 7000 6600 
AGE 37.2579 20 75 55 
SEX 0.805132 0 I 
SPANI SH 0.OB6(;927 0 
BLACK 0.044G467 0 I' 
A'jlAN 0.OB4~58B 0 
WARNING: VARIABLE IYS LIMITED DISPERSION. 
IT MAY DE A £lAD CANDIDAtE rOR THE MODEL. 
-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD rOR MODEL CONTAINING INTERCEPt ONLY- 2J62. 17 
MODEL CHI-SOUARE- 295.68 WITH lOO.F. 
CO~VeRGENCE OOTAIN(O IN 6 ITeRATIONS. 
"AX MISOLUH OHlIVIITlVE=0.G3200-0G. 
"OllrL CHI-SOUARf.- 7B~.I" WITH lOO.F. 
VIIRIAIlLE BerA STD. ERROR 
I'nrnCEPT 
-5.""001 I~ 2 _1;7092576 
lrn~"'.t () ;l;,r'!J:1:",Rn O. 7rIA',]"'~JO 
~,I'"1 fd J 1.~·t:J H.o:!() O.J:l'/JOtOr, 
10"""'" I) OO()() 1'7·, O.(1()I)()O,QO 
r ('II r 
-0. ()lJ"r,n'II,'l O.()tx)'/ /4,:1 
IN',OM, O.(")(YIIH10 O. ()ll(J(Jr.(l~ 7 
"r,r O. I')(tf) 1 1'07 O.OO"',r;711:!f) 
'.11. -f) "'J;',(JI, t n, I /1?,o1 I,~ 
',1'10"'''',11 
" 
"',",/1,',', f), Jot) 1'1.",', 
1'.1""" () " /11 ,,'!~' '/'1 
" 
)"1'. '<1 1111 
/, ~, I ,.., .. 
" , f) 'I( ,"~' ,"1'1 U.:· 1";:(,(." 
(SCORE STAT.) 1"0.0 
R' 0.3:1<1. 
-, LOG L= 207R.OJ. 
(-2 LOr. LR.) P=O.O 
CIII-SOlJARC P 
".12 0.0"2. 
'.47 0.""9 0.000 
:1?,n!> o. ()()()O O. I'll 
,='. ~,O O.OO()O o.oq:1 
Jr,. :Jr, O.OOfJ{) -0. t ".1 
O.O~I O.7G·17 Q.OO" 
O.()? O,flOOI 0. (11)0 
0.1')<1 o.:nl:l 0.000 
:1 1'/ 0 01,1'1 n,O:" 
II ~. / II (}O<1q 11 0',:' 
0, It 0,'1:11,1' CI,()(X) 
11)1\1 t Iliff III f IUlf CII.'III\~JI "1\,11', III "'.'f f'l r "IJ !'IJlII!"'! II I I If .... Mlfl III --,!'IIN',I " 
1·'/,frV 1.11"1:1 I 1\ 1 I WI 1'.1 IWI 1" 1'1111111.1111 I'I.'II'·/IJ: 11 I l't "'''', III ',I·nt ... 1 
f1 Inl 
1111.1/ 
117 
CORRELATION COfrrlCIENTS / PROB > :R: UNDER itO 11110 0 0 / N • 2307 
'.'RM INTRST SPREAD LOANM.4 INCOME AGE SEX rOI F SPANISIt BLACK ASIAN 
VRM 1.00000 O.077RI 0.07760 0.31R03 0.20367 0.01751 0.010B8 -0.~A~.9 -0.01403 0.04921 -0.OU79 
0.0000 0.]734 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.4005 0.6014 0.0001 0.5007 O.OIBI 0.4776 
INTRST 0.02281 1.00000 -0.00055 '0.01[,11 0.00396 -0.00993 -0.01656 0.01823 0.00278 0.05393 -0.04097 
0.273. 0.0000 0.9789 0.4389 0.8494 0.6335 0.4266 0.3815 0.8938 0.0096 0.0491 
n 
SPREAD 0.07760 -0.00055 1.00000 -0.01~R3 -0.03239 -0.00362 -0.04554 0.10595 0.04615 -0.00008 -0.01663 0 
0.0002 0.9789 0.0000 o. t~70 0.1199 0.8621 0.0287 0.0001 0.0267 0.9970 0.4247 
., 
., 
LOANA"" 0.31A03 -0.01612 -0.029A3 1.00000 0.63246 0.04032 o. 11504 -0.65005 -0.16288 -0 03774 0.03157 CD 
0.0001 0.4399 0.1520 0.0000 0.0001 0.0528 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0699 0.1296 ~ 
I» 
INCOME 0.20367 0.00396 -0.03239 0.63~4r. 1.00000 0.17828 0.11566 -0.41645 -0.16906 -0.03738 -0.06036 cf" 
0.0001 0.R494 0.1199 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0726 0.0037 en .... 
I» 0 
AGE 0.01751 -0.00993 -0.00362 0.04032 0.17828 1.00000 -0.07911 -0.01475 -0.06822 0.01124 -0.04752 a ::s 
0.4005 0.6335 0.8621 0.0528 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.4787 0.0010 0.5896 0.0225 '0 
~:J: 
SEX 0.01088 -0.01656 -0.04554 0.11504 0.11566 -0.07911 1.00000 -0.09889 0.05301 -0.07351 0.04151 CD I» 
0.6014 0.4266 0.0287 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0109 0.0004 0.0462 cf" 
., 
FOIF -0.28549 0.01B23 ·:>.10595 -0.65005 -0.41645 -0.01475 -0.09889 1.00000 0.09532 0.01503 0.01013 > .... 
0.0001 0.3915 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.4797 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.4705 0.6267 >< 
SPANISH -0.01403 0.00278 0.04615 -0. 162A8 -0.16906 -0.06822 0.0530 t 0.095J2 1.00000 -0.06660 -0.093R8 
0.5007 0.8938 0.0267 0.0001 0.0001 0.0010 0.0109 0.0001 0.0000 0.0014 0.0001 
BLACK 0.04921 0.05393 -0.00008 -0.03114 -0.03138 0.01124 -0.01351 0.01503 -0.06660 1.00000 -0.06581 \0 0.0181 0.0096 0.9910 0.0699 0.0126 0.5896 0.0004 0.4705 0.0014 0.0000 0.0015 
-.:j 
ASIAN 
-0.01479 -0.04097 -0.01663 0.OJ151 -0.06036 -0.04152 004151 0.01013 -0.09388 -0.06587 1.00000 00 
0.4776 O.04!J1 0.4247 0.1;;96 0.0037 0.0225 0.0462 0.6267 0.0001 0.0015 0.0000 
00 
VARIABLE N MEAN STANDARD MINIMUM MAXIMUM STO fRROR SUM VARIANCE C.V. 
DEVIATION VALUE VALUE OF MEAN 
-------.--.----------.--.-------.--._------------.--------.--- VRM-O ----.-----------------------.-----------------------------.----
INTRST 1826 9.8936522 0.236B206 7.500000 10.75000 0.00554103 lR065.Bl 0.06 2.394 
~PR[AD 1826 -0.0445173 0.1631'191 -0.397700 0.6G]40 D.OO:tR:? 1.48 - A1.'9 0.03 -366.820 
LOANAM IB26 59204.07~B609 21539.198A7BB 13BOO.OO{)OOO 1117000.00000 504.0~&4JO~5 101l10lili48.00 4639370BII.34 31i.381 
INCOME IB16 2099.37951BI 102:'.04070J5 400.000000 fill27.00000 23.941001S3 3B33-67.00 1046611.26 4B.731 
AGE IB26 37 _ 16411412 10.498516 I 20.000000 75.00000 O.24~G8437 67B63.00 110.22 28.249 
SEx 11126 0.B833516 0.321ORAII O.()(){)()OO 1.00000 O.OO7~'406 IliI3.00 0.10 36.349 
fOIF 1816 :)7. 2036.Q I I 13.7927007 -650.910000 710.0Booo 2.66295617 67933.116 1294B _ 78 305.B64 
SPANISH 1826 0.08B7185 0.2844149 0.000000 1.00000 0.006655B3 162.00 0.08 320.581 
BLACK 1826 0.0394304 0.1946701 0.000000 1.00000 0.00455563 72.00 0.04 493.705 
ASIAN 1826 0.0870756 0.2820230 0.000000 1.00000 0.00659985 159.00 0.08 J23.BB3 
-------------------------------------------------------------- VIIM'1 ---------------------------------------------------------------
INTRST OBI 9.9064449 O. 189963 I 9.0000000 10.50000 0.0086616 4765.000 0.0 1.918 
SPREAD 4BI -0.0160726 0.0673156 -0. ~977000 O.05~JO 0.0030693 -7.731 0.0 -41B.B23 
LOANA'" 481 82604.9109979 45782.5972577 6200. 0000000 250000. 00000 20B7.5067501 39732967.000 20960462 t 1.7 55.4'0 
INCOME 481 2676.98336BO 146 t. 206717 I .73.0000000 7000.00000 66.625~942 1281629.000 2135125.2 54.584 
AGE ABI 37.6112266 9.B073420 21).0000000 67.00000 0.4471763 la091.000 96.2 26_076 
SEX .S1 0.1I91B919 0.310R402 0.0000000 1.00000 0.0141731 429.000 O. I 34.B52 
FDIF .BI -56.5796513 171.414B071 - 103B. 7100000 530.57600 7.B15B424 -27214.BI2 293B3.0 -302.962 
SPANISH 4BI 0.0790021 0.27oo22B 0.0000000 1.00000 0.0123110 3B .000 O. I 3' I .792 
BLACK 4BI 0.0644491 0.245B06B 0.0000000 1.00000 0.01 1207B 31.000 O. I 3B I. 397 
ASIAN "8 I 0.01G9231 0.2667'6B 0.0000000 1.00000 0.0121626 37.000 0.1 346.171 
t::I 
<b 
[0 
() 
., 
..... 
'0 
rt 
..... 
< 
CiJ <b 
I» 
EI CIl 
't:Irt 
~I» 
<b rt 
..... 
[0 
~rt 
..... 
.~ 
CD 
-' 
'.0 
~ 
(» 
\0 
Logistic Regression 
Sample 'A' 
1979 
OEPENOENT VARIABLE: VRM 
1638 OBSERVATIONS 
, '22 VRM • 0 
516 VRM • I 
o OBSERVATIONS DELETED DUE TO MISSING VALUES 
VARIABLE MEAN fotlNt""JWI MAXI"UM RANGE 
INTRST I 1.381 7.75 11.25 4.5 
SPREAD 
-0.073809 -0.6931 2.10') I 2. B022 
lOhNA" fi6971.6 13416.8 26A3~6 2!>49,0 
FOI F 
-52.9718 -1777.25 383.6'1 2160.94 
INCOME 2298.39 439.177 6932.02 6492.84 
AGE 36.9127 19 74 55 
SEX 0.891941 0 I 
SPANISH 0.0~6459· 0 
BLACK 0.0347985 0 I' 
ASIAN 0.128B16 0 
• WARNING: VARIABLE HAS LIMITED DISPERSION. 
IT MAY BE A BAD CANDIDATE rOR THE MODEL. 
-2 lOG LIKELIHOOD FOR MODEL CONTAINING INT(RCE~r ONLY' ~041. 14 
MODEL CHI'SOUARE, 20B.50 WITH loo.r. 
CONVERGENCE 06111NEO IN 6 ITERATIONS. 
MhX ABSOLUTE DfRIVATIVE'0.27940-03. 
MODEL CHI-SOUARE- 227 40 WITH 100.F. 
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR 
INTERCEPT 
-14.25170945 1.01890326 
INTRST 1.06109462 0.17216129 
SPREAO 0.·13!>1915 0.1300':1380 
LOhNAM 0.00007197 0.00000757 
rOlr 0.00095782 0.QO('>40!>!l4 
INCOME 0.00010733 0.0000':>501 
~GE 
-0.000'37')7B O.OO56:t465 
SE' -0. 3:n467~1 0.IRIR.431 
<;PA'IISH -0.OA84Rflfi2 0 :?(,)61Rf,flO 
BLACK O. 1~'l74772 O. JOAF,T7Ao1 
A~lhN 
·0.:l53n·IH 0.17B9G695 
(SCDRE STAT.) r·o.o 
R· 0.319. 
'2 lOG L' IBI3.73. 
(-2 LOG L.R.) p·O.O 
CHI'SQUARE P R 
49.83 0.0000 
37.99 0.0000 O. 133 
10 1\ o COl!> O. 0~3 
n.R6 00000 O. tR6 
5.57 0.(>183 0.042 
:1.46 o.nfi77 0.027 
0.01 o R670 0.000 
3. 7. 0 0717 '0 ();tS 
0 18 O. (,(lAO () ClOO 
0 47 O. r, t 7(. 0 000 
.00 O. 1~7 I -0. UOI 
fR~CT10~ OF CONCQROhN,T PAIR';, or PR~OICT(n f'QOnAp.llITJ{(, "NO Q(5 P ONS£S 
RANK CURRlLAllUN U(lW(IN PWI0IC1(U r~on.nILI" hNO WIS.UN~E 
:0.7U'1 
.0.435 
120 
CORR[LATIO'~ COEFFICIENTS / PROB > ;R: UNO[II HO RHO"O N = 1638 
VII" INTR5T SPRE AD lDANAM INCOME AGE SE~ fDI F SPANISH RLACK ASIAN 
VIIM 1.00000 O. t8958 0.1:100'1 O. '7!"lS7 0.19009 0.01128 -0.O:l6~2 -0.02133 -0.03905 o 00032 -0.03715 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 O. 6~83 0.2852 0.38A3 0.1141 0.9898 0.1329 
INTRS1 0.18958 1.00000 0.2~769 O. 03~(;0 0.0~2J~ -0.OJJ~7 -0.02R79 0.11038 0.0 •• A4 -0.02107 -0.03214 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.1616 0.0342 0.1694 0.2443 0.0001 0.0696 0.3942 0.1935 n 
0 
SPREAD 0.12009 0.24769 1.00000 -0.07526 -0.04r.09 -0 00~61 -0.006IJ O. 2~'l18 0.09058 0.05510 0.01946 ., 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0023 0.0622 0.8501 O. 80~J 0.0001 0.0002 0.0257 0.4312 ., 
(\) 
LOANAM 0.n557 0.034GO -0.075:16 1.00000 0.52237 0.0.'09 0.07591 -0.40424 -0.15223 -0.09609 0.0273 I I-' 
0.0001 0.1616 0.0023 0.0000 0.0001 0.0964 0.0021 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2693 III 
("t" 
INCOME 0.19009 0.05234 ~O.O4609 0.52237 1.00000 0.15471 0.06365 -0.20083 -0.15724 -0.0(;805 -0.07735 C/:l ..... 
0.0001 0.OJ42 0.0622 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0100 0.0001 0.0001 0.0059 0.0017 III 0 
a p 
AGE 0.01128 -0.OJJ97 -0.00467 0.04109 0.15471 1.00000 -0.05593 -0.02967 -0.04675 -0.00604 -0.02059 'C 
0.6483 0.1694 0.8501 0.0964 0.0001 0.0000 0.0236 0.2300 0.0586 0.8011 0.4049 1-'3: 
(\) III 
SEX -0.02(;42 -0.02879 -0.00613 0.07591 0.0(;J65 -0.05593 1.00000 -0.03416 0.04712 -0.06267 0.022:11 ("t" 
0.2852 0.2443 0.8043 0.0021 0.0100 0.0236 0.0000 0.1670 0.0566 0.0112 0.3669 ~ ., 
> ..... 
FDIF -0.02133 0.11038 0.24918 '0.40424 -0.20083 -0.02967 -0.03416 1.00000 0.05670 0.03849 -0.00712 ~ X 
D.38B3 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2300 0.1670 0.0000 0.0217 0.1195 0.1133 
SPAN I SH -0.03905 0.044A4 0.0')05R -0.15223 -0.15124 -0.04(;75 0.04712 0.05670 I. 00000 -0. 06204 -0. 1256~ 
0.1141 0.0696 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0586 0.0566 0.0211 0.0000 0.0120 0.0001 
BLACK \0 0.00032 -0.02107 0.05510 -0.0')609 -0.06n05 -0.00604 -0.06267 0.03849 -0.0620. 1.00000 -0.07301 
-:j 
0.9898 0.3942 0.0257 0.0001 0.0059 0.80H 0.0112 0.1195 0.0120 0.0000 0.0031 \0 
ASIAN -0.03715 -0.03214 0.01946 0.02731 -0.07735 -0.02059 0.02231 -0.00712 -0.12564 -0.07301 1.00000 
0.1329 0.1935 0.4312 0.2693 0.0017 0.4049 0.3669 0.7733 0.0001 0.0031 0.0000 
I\) 
VARIABLE N MlAN STANDARD MINI,"UM "'AX (MUM SID [IIROII SUM VARIANCE C. V. 
Il[VIAT ION VALUE VALUE OF M[ AN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - • _. - • - - - - - - - - - - - - _. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - VR,..·O - - - - - - - - - - - _. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • - - - - - - - - - - - --
!NTRST 1122 11.3105169 0.62458')7 1.7!'",OOOO 17.25000 0.01864655 126')0 400 0.3!! 5.512 
SPR( AD 1122 -0. t lO(iOOR O. 5:l9~6~2 -0. [.<13 100 2. 109 10 O. 0 1~00,)80 - 174.0')4 0.28 -47R. R t, 
lUANflM 1122 6145R.J3931:!J 22560. 4,)4 ./~, 2 7 lJ4 H'. f\ I~J14] 17S31:l.0~90J 673.522(}]7()7 6895G2~6. 70A 508'.175'.123.4'.1 36.70'1 
l~lCmlE 1122 2142.2557151 I lOr, • 12904A4 43'1.177102 689'.1.87111 33.<.'7245<;'.17 2403610 912 1223521.47 51.63' 
A6E 1112 36.8324421 10.7823533 19.000000 74.00000 O. J2 109715 41:12G.000 IIG.26 29.274 
srx \122 0.8'.115045 O. 30~4341 0.0<>0000 1.00000 0.00905874 1007.000 0.0'.1 33.80') 
FO! F 1122 -50. 49Bfi~4J tS!j.Ofi:lA1fi5 -818 _ 1663&9 383.69052 •. 62'12<;6H -5665'3.4'10 24044.48 -307.063 
SPANI SH 1122 0.1047781 0.3057572 0.000000 1.00000 0.00'312Bl0 117.000 0.0'1 2'13.213 
BLACK 1122 0.03475'14 0.1832514 0.000000 1.00000 0.00547080 39.000 0.03 527.200 
ASIAN 1122 O. 1372549 0.34'2(;97 0.000000 1.00000 0.01027785 154.000 (\. 12 250.8:!5 
VR"" or t ...................... ............................................................................................................ 
IHTIIS r 516 II. 534~992 0.2713518 9.750000 12.25000 0.0119456 5951.750 O. I 2.353 
SPREAD 516 0.00Iil'319 0.1713178 -0.693100 0.118'.10 0.00754 IS 3.195 0.0 2766. B22 
LOANA" 516 78959.B 154234 3BOf! I. IB lOB 50 17689.007657 26B336. 3 14115 167f..4305200 40743264.7<;B 1450176352.8 48.22'.1 
INCOME 516 2637 .BB 11632 1354.2194430 447.227191 6932 .02147 59.6161868 1361146.691 1833910.3 51.337 
AGE 516 37.08720'13 9.85477At 20.000000 69.00000 0.433B324 19137.000 97. I 16.51' 
SE)( 516 O. B7!lA4 50 0.3254583 0.000000 1.00000 0.0143275 454.000 0.1 36.990 
rolF 516 -5B.3495664 201.4746937 - 1777 . 254075 16B.30640 B. B6942BB -30108.3B7 40592. I -345.2B9 
SPAN I SH 516 0.0791'1574 0.2707137 0.000000 1.00000 O.O~ ICJI75 .It.OOO 0.1 340.703 
BLACK 516 0.034riA37 0.IB366JJ 0.000000 1.00000 0.0080853 18.000 0.0 526.502 
ASIAN 516 0.1104651 0.313712B 0.000000 1.00000 0.013B 13 I 57.000 0.1 2B4.047 
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Logistic Regression 
Sample 'A' 
1980 
DEPENOEIIIT \lA~ IAOLE: V~M 
'67' 
124 I 
430 
OBSERVATIONS 
VIIM r ° 
VRM c 1 
o OBSERVATION~ DELETED OUE TO MISSING VALUES 
VARIA6LE MEAN MINIMUM 
I NTRS T '2. '587 8.35 
SPR[AO 
-0.073" -0.362' 
L OANM" 779'8 , 1'.l04.8 
F D I F "4.699 -'271.57 
I"COME ~580. '9 "36.508 
AGE 36.9'08 20 
SEX 0.894674 0 
SPANISH 0.0771993 0 
BLACK 0.036505' 0 
ASIAN 0.143627 0 
• WARNING: VARIABLE HAS LIMITED OISPERSION. 
MAXIMUM 
14.5 
0.5224 
:!J~095 
670. '67 
6995. n 
73 
RANGE 
6. '5 
0.8845 
2:?6190 
'94'.7. 
6558.73 
53 
I' 
, 
IT MAY BE A 8AD CANOIDATE fOR THE MOOEL. 
-2 LUG LIKELIHOOD FO~ MODEL CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLyr '905.76 
MOOEL CHI-SOUAREr '88.98 WITH 10 D.F. 
CONVERGENCE DeTAINEO IN 5 IT(RATIONS. 
"hX ABSOLUTE OERIVATIVE'D.h9,RD-03. 
MODEL CHI-SOUARE- '80.97 WITH '0 D.F. 
VARIABLE BETA STO. ERROR 
INTERCEPT 
-3. 'Rt73597 1.0'946'0' 
HURST 0.09"9~039 0.08088479 
SPREAO 0.1<11':.19410 0.25I7n572 
lOAt~4M o 0000':128 0.()(J0(lO~53 
10 I r 
-0.00'250GO O.OOOJI808 
INCOME 0.000' \:lR7 o ()(1("){l~,4AO 
AGE 
-0.00250'73 0.00';20"7' 
srx 
-0. ,l,n"nJ7 0 't)~I' 793 I 
SPAN1';H -O.O<117~'R2 O. '(JAr" 179 
CLACK (\. :'1J eJ'j':14 0.3:1<1:174'.)0 
A~JAN 0.057080':>9 O. '7205044 
(SCORE STAT. I P-O.O 
R· 0.291. 
-2 Lnr. L" 17?4.80. 
(-2 LOG L.R.) P'O.O 
CHI'SOUARE P ~ 
9.7' O.oo'R 
'. ~R O. ?404 O. 000 
0.31 D.S737 O. 000 
?7 . 4R 0.0000 O. 116 
15. 6G 0.0001 '0.085 
• .32 0.on7 0.Cl:15 
0 '6 0 GR67 O. 000 
I . 'fR U. IA='2 O. OUO 
a .07 0 IPr,,:> () 0(>0 
0. 
." 0 ~.09J Cl 
0<lQ 
U.' I O. 740 I 0 .000 
r(;lhCT tUN or COf'Jr:OUI)"NT PAl R:; Of r"rnICt[ () I"RflB"nllll t I r, htJlJ RI.5PON~lS 0 
RhNK CO~R[LAT ION n! lWHN flUfOICTfD rROflMl1 LIT Y hNI) 1:(<;rON~[ :0. 
123 
fi1U 
JGJ 
CORRELATION COHrlCIEN1S I I'ROll > :R: UNO(R IIO:RHO-O N - 1671 
VRM INIRST SPRE AD LOANA'" INCOME AGE SEx rDI r SPANI Sit BLACK A51"N 
VIIM 1.00000 O.OJ DO -0.00IA7 0.:11203 0.'4 I'll 0.03D49 0.00575 -0.270R4 -0.0,,768 -0.01969 -000687 
0.0000 0.1024 O.93~1 0.0001 0.0001 0.7129 O. R 142 0.0001 0.0056 0.4212 0.779 I 
INTRST o 03120 1.00000 -0.475r.3 0.06l>67 0.09771 -0.01450 0.05155 0.10'115 O.OSO:}1 0.00492 -0.01583 
0.2014 O.oouo 0.0001 0.0064 O.()()(JI O.5!lJ5 0.0351 0.0001 0.0398 0.e408 0.5179 
SPREAD -0.00187 -0.47~63 1.000()0 -0.10112 -0.102R6 -0.00'162 -0.03892 -0.18607 -0.07356 0.09383 0.03R"7 
0.939 I 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.6944 0.1117 0.0001 0.3358 0.0001 O. 1159 
LOANA"" 0.31203 0.06£;67 -0. t0712 1.00000 o. (;3'106 0.08157 0.10789 -0.60178 -0.21183 -0.12466 -0.01fi8. 
0.0001 0.DOG4 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.4916 
INCDME 0_2419 I 0.0917 I -0.102H6 0.63906 1.00000 0.70"83 0.08646 -0.40761 -0.I8'!03 -0.09305 -0 09555 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
AGE 0.03049 -0.01450 -0.00967 0.08257 0.20483 1.00000 0.07039 -0.081.9 -0.04864 -005167 -0.00027 
0.2129 0.5535 O. (;944 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 0.4049 0.0009 0.04G8 0.0347 0.99 t2 
SEX 0.00575 0.05155 -0.038<)2 0.10789 0.ORfi4£1 0.02039 1.00000 -0.OR479 0.06172 -0.031'6 0.02378 
0.8142 0.0351 0.1117 0.0001 O.OOO~ 0.4049 0.0000 0.0005 0.0103 0.1289 0.3313 
FOIF -0.270R4 0.10915 -0. 18G01 -0.60778 -0.40761 -0.08149 -0.08479 1.00000 0.15149 0.09763 0.01501 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0009 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.5398 
SPANI Sit -0.0,,168 0.05031 -0.023~,6 -0.21183 -0.18983 -0.048,,4 0.06272 O. ~!d49 1.00000 -0.05630 -0. 11845 
0.0056 0.OJ9O O.:)J~IA 0.0001 0.0001 0.0468 0.010J 0.0001 0.0000 0.02 I. 0.0001 
BLACK -0.01969 0.1)0492 0.0'1383 -0. 12"r,6 ·0.09~05 -0.051G7 -0.03716 O. ')<)7,,3 -0.05630 1. 00000 -0.07')7 1 
0.4212 O. a40a 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0347 0.1289 0.0001 0.0214 0.0000 0.001 I 
ASIAN -0.OOGR1 -0.015R3 0.03847 -0.0160" -0.0'1555 -0 00021 0.02378 -0.01501 -0. IIR45 -0.0791 I 1.00000 
0.7791 0.5179 O. '1~9 0.4916 0.0001 0.9912 0.3313 0.5398 0.0001 0.0011 O.cooo 
n 
0 
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P> 
cT 
C/l ..... 
P> 0 
S ::s 
'0 
...... :3: 
(I) P> 
cT 
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> ..... 
X 
\0 
CD 
0 
I\) 
.f=" 
VARIABLE N MEAN S lAN[)'R[) M1N1MI/M "'AX IMUM 5T1l rRROR 5UM VAR 1 'NCE C. V. 
O[VIATION Vltl U£ VALUl OF M(AN 
- - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - VUM-=-O - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. --
tNTRST t:;t4 , 12. i.4'~"1A55 O. A5Q'lI"6 A. :lr,onoo 11t 50000 0.070.'0'5 tSOfi'1.4.dS O.H 7 .0~2 
SPR[ AO t:lo1' -O.0721~7:J 0 .. ]fl.flr./:j'JJ -0. Jr.] IOU o. !",]]40 O.OOH 1'143~ -qo. 34 I 0.08 -3l}(j 531) 
lOhNl\"4 174 • 71743.R957318 7A25q.OO(JAn~,' t t~OJl. 7(, I flO':> 2380')~. 2JA 10 802. 17A5GO~) t R9034 174 .. r.03 79857'639.69 3". JSCl 
luCO",t: 124 t 23A5.7f\4r.:J31j 1710. 144!",A(,R 4 J( .. ~07(n 7 (1)001 .. 7fl190 34 . 3~~OflOO9 2(jG07~,n. 1]0 14G44/;2.02 50.723 
AGE 1241 36.728444B to. 2847 '1,4 20.VOOOUO 73.00000 0.29,,)40G2 45580.000 105.7B 2B.002 
Sf < 124 I O. R!J~G34 7 0.30R4796 O. ()(lrJOOO I.CXlO{){) O.{}OA·I~J~I'B 1109.000 O. '0 34. 'j I~ 
FOIF .24 I 150.99""':106 187.0'712R7 -637.01!'.H73 670.1"fi67 5. JOAfi474J 1873A4. "J 34913.54 123.854 
SPhNI5H 1241 0.OR78J24 O.7RJI6SI 0.(J{l(1(100 1.00000 0.0080J8 " '0'1.000 O.OB 322.393 
BLACK 1241 0.OJ86765 0.1929053 0.000[)00 1.00000 O.OO~4759J 4B.000 0.04 49B.741 
ASIAN 1241 O. '45(1443 0.3S22875 0.000000 1.00000 0.0'000026 'AO.ooo 0.12 242.883 
- - - - - - - - - - VR"" 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
INTRST 430 12.2040698 0.8442'85 9.750000 '4.00000 0.0407"8 52.7.750 0.7 &.918 
SPR[ AD 4JO -0.07401'8 0.771790 I ·O.3G7100 0.51240 O.O'J '0&9 - 3'.825 0.1 -367.220 
lOANA,.. 430 95736.9416759 40800. AABOG7B 2S390;.8?53'l7 23A09~,. 23f1'0 1967.5935406 411(jGeB-1.921 '6647'2466.7 42.6'8 
INCOME "JO 3141.2384644 11;'3.00-'034' ~'J2. 0634')2 6995. 23f1'0 77.786 'OG4 1350732.540 2601791. 7 51.349 
AroE 430 37. 43720!l3 9.8110119 20.000000 66.00000 0.4731290 160,)R.000 96. J 26.207 
SEX 4JO 0.8'l7liH4 0.3034790 0.000000 1.000c0 0.0146326 3A6.ooo O. , 3J. A02 
FOI F 430 9.g4J0852 293,25'(,383 - '27' .57 .079 &47. AA095 .4.14.A498 4275.871 85996.5 2949. Ol;~ 
SPANI5H 430 0.046S116 0.2108J1J7 0.000000 1.00000 0.0 tr) 1(;74 20.000 0.0 453.297 
E!LACK 430 0.0302326 O .• 71420;' 0.000000 •. ooono 0.OOA7669 '3.000 0.0 567.025 
ASIAN 430 0.1395349 0.34G90H 0.00000.) 1.00000 0.0'67294 60.000 0.1 248.617 
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Logistic Regression 
Sampl e 'A' 
1981 
DEPENDENT VA~ UBU: VR!-l 
~~8 OBSERVATIONS 
353 V~!-l • 0 
145 VR!-l : I 
o OrlSERVATIDNS DELETED DUE TO MISSING VALUES 
VARIABLE MEAN 
INTRST 14.2896 
S~READ -0.421669 
LUANAM 5R952.6 
FOI F 563.377 
INCOME '325. f\4 
AGl 37.4478 
Sf x 0.AG1446 
SPANI SH 0.OG4257 
CLACK O.O~42169 
ASIAN 0.11245 
MINI!-lUM 
9.75 
-0.99 
14306. I 
-1039.94 
500.715 
19 
0 
0 
0 
0 
MAX I !-lUM 
18 
0.487 
~ t 4~92 
3674.44 
6937.77 
72 
RANGE 
8.25 
1.477 
200786 
4664.38 
6437.05 
5] 
-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD FO~ MODEL CONTAINING INTE~CEPT ONLY' 600.78 
MODEL CHI-SQUAI<E- 139.74 WITH 100.F_ 
CO'lVE~GrNCE DBThlNED IN I'> IH~ATlONS. 
lolA< A8snLUTE OERIVhTIVE-O. 14750-03. 
MODEL CHI-SQUAI<l= 149.83 WITH 100.F. 
VAllI ABLE BETA STD. ERROR 
INTERCEPT 0.71664778 1.03149079 
INTRST -0. I 17462BO 0.01;43'1752 
SPRr AD 5.07020G07 0. 65~G''1 19 
LOAN"'" -0.000009'/8 0.Qt)()()07oo 
FOIF 0.00153055 0.OOOJ3R51) 
INCOME -0.00014:147 0.000':1697 
hr.E 0.OJQn740 0.00987090 
SEX O. ~ 1SS7RJO O. :Hi2!l6730 
SPANISH 0.711473702 0.4SSS8296 
BLACK 0.26:1(;17 'P.7 0.5G70447G 
ASIAN 
-0.07'32JR6 0.40753475 
(SCORE STAT.) ~·O.O 
R= 0.465_ 
-2 LOG L' 450.95. 
(-2 LOG L.R.l P=O.O 
CHI-SQUARE P R 
0.48 0 4A77 
3.33 O. OflR 1 -0 047 
59.2G 0.0noo 0.30') 
1.95 O.1G::!:1 o .0Cl0 
'0.4~ o 0000 0.175 
I.OB 0.2'lB3 0.000 
15.83 0.0001 0.152 
7.02 O.1!i'-,0 0.006 
2.95 O.OR59 0.040 
0.22 O. rj423 0.000 
O.OJ 0.8591 0.000 
FRACTI(lN or CDIKDRDhNT PhIP~ OF PRrnlCHO PROHARllITlfS ANn RE,~DN$E5 
R'"K tO~QLLA II (1" nUW[EN I'R[OICTlO PROElAOI L1 Tv hNL' III ',cON'>E 
126 
COl>I>fLATION COFrFICIINTS / PI>OS > :~: UNOE~ HO ~HO=O N = 4'18 
VI>M INTRST $PR[ AO lOhNA'" INCOME AGE SEX FOI F SPAN I SH BLACK ASI AN 
V"M 1.00000 -0 '0421 o ~ T'1I5 -0 029·1'1 -0. lIli75 0.114H 0.05733 -0.n048 0.03033 -0 036 J3 0.00'172 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 O. ~ 114 0.0091 0.0106 0.]437 0.0001 0.4995 0.4'85 0.8]87 
INTRST -0.2042 I I 00000 -0.37146 0.0'[,57 O. J 1015 0.00845 0.02665 0.29050 0.05101 0.0438 I 0.04280 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.2996 0.0001 0.6506 0.5530 0.0001 0.2553 0.3192 0.3405 
SPIIEAO 0.41915 -0.32741i 1.00000 -0.07J45 -0.1<1105 -0.10162 -0.02513 -0.62630 -0.01292 -0.08560 0.04120 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.1016 0.0001 0.0233 0.5158 0.0001 0.7737 0.0563 0.3589 
LOANA" -0.02949 0.04li51 -0.07345 1.00000 0.57180 0.03226 O. I t701 0.4061 I -0.12321 -0.102" 0.02694 
0.5 I I. 0.2996 0.1016 0.0000 0.0001 0.4126 0.0090 0.0001 0.0059 0.0222 0.5487 
INCOME -0. 11615 0.:11015 -0.19705 0.51180 1.00000 0.13635 0.12510 0.35243 -0.08508 -0.08434 -0.02 Iii. 
0.0091 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0023 0.0052 0.0001 0.0578 0.0600 0.6300 
AGE o. "4401 0.00845 -0.10162 0.03216 0.13635 1.00000 -0.09003 0.10169 -0.04453 -0.01630 -0.06257 
0.0106 0.8508 0.0233 0.47:':6 ( .0023 0.0000 0.0446 0.0232 0.3214 0.7166 0.0656 
SEX 0.05233 0.0,6[;5 -0.02513 0.11701 0.12510 -0.09003 1.00000 0.09615 0.0339B -0.0519A -0.02283 
0.2437 0.5530 0.5758 0.0090 0.0052 0.0446 0.0000 0.0309 0.449] 0.1964 0.6113 
rOlf -0.2304B 0.29050 -0.62630 0.4067 I 0.35]43 0.10169 0.09615 1.00000 -0.05353 0.03216 0.01210 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 O.COOI 0.0001 0.0232 0.0309 0.0000 0.233 I 0.4651 0.7174 
SPANISH 0.03033 0.05107 -0.01292 -0.17321 -0.OR:'08 -0.044SJ 0.03398 -0.05353 1.00000 -0.06714 -0.0'1321 
0.4995 0.2553 0.1131 0.0059 0.0518 0.3214 0.4492 0.233 I 0.0000 0.1621 0.0375 
BLACK -0.03633 0.04381 -0.08560 -0.1024' -0.OR434 -0.01630 -0.05198 0.03216 -0.062H 1.00000 -0. OR522 
0.4185 0.3292 0.0563 0.0221 0.0600 0.7166 0.1964 0.4651 0.1621 0.0000 0.0514 
ASIAN 0.00917 0.042AO 0.04120 0.026'1~ -0.02164 -0.08151 -0.022A3 0.01210 -0.0'1321 -0.06512 1.00000 
0.8281 0.3405 0.3589 0.5467 0.6300 0.0656 0.6113 0.1714 0.0315 0.0574 0.0000 
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VARIABLE N "'[AN SUNOAR() "'INI"'UM MAXIMUM SIO FRRnR SUM VARIANCE C. V. 
OEVlhl10~ VJ\LlJ[ VALUE Dr MEAN 
------ -------.- ----------- .-- ---- - --- - --. - - .-- ---- --- ---- ---.- VRM·O ---------------------------------------------------------------
INTRST 353 '4.5n5637 2.2444702 9.750000 'R.oooOO O. t 1'l.t61 t 5'H.II5 5.0~ .5.402 
SP'HAO J53 -0.5404701 O.41!)St57 -O.fJ!lO()OO 0.40700 0.0711151 . l'JO. 7r,8 0.17 -7fi RA7 
lOANAM 353 594GO. Gr.1 IJ',7 2947R. R4 t1~,,0 14JOG. I~, 11'45 214591.17«,8 1569.0004014 209R9(' 13.1]4 8690010R4.33 .lSS.S77 
I'KO"'[ 353 24;'0. 4A':J35~4 1354.'68J612 500 . 7 I ~ :109 G9J7.7r.A,-1 7'2,0'1(1'1:118 8544:11 3JO IA34041.79 !J!"I. YSO 
AGE 353 36.5665722 I I .0762704 19.ooooC)0 71.00000 0.589!>304 12908.000 122.68 30.29 I 
Sf X 3~JJ O.B49H!:JR4 0.3577177 0.000000 1.00000 O.Ot'JOJ~14 300.000 O. '3 47.0'11 
FOI F 353 69 I .697084 I 965.3154299 -742.6(.7403 3624.44206 5._ 37R5~G I 24416'1.011 931833.88 139.S1j8 
SPAN I SH 353 0.0594901 0.23GR754 0.000000 1.00000 0.0'16076 21.000 O.OG 3'18. 176 
BLACK 353 0.0594901 O.:!JGR751t 0.000000 1.00000 0.Ol2G016 21.000 0.06 398. 176 
ASIAN 353 O. ,.048'6 0.313934 I 0.000000 1.00000 0.0167090 39.000 0.10 284. 15 I 
-------------------------------------------------------------- VRM=I ----------.--.--.--.- .. ------------------_.----.----------.----
INTRST '45 13.6008G21 1.7912376 I, .500000 17.25000 O. I 179237 1972 .• 250 3.17 13.097 
SPREAD .45 -0.1325703 0.3674742 -0.9'10000 0.4R7oo 0.0 J0517 I -'9.2727 o. ,.s -277.192 
lO4NU4 145 57715.1022341 19300.5.4~8A5 18597.997 .39 144206.00R58 1602.81297a5 8366776.8740 372511017.55 33.441 
INCOME 145 2095.441164 I 986.1800744 515. 107296 6096.56652 B I. 9l7&248 303839.0S58 913134.92 41.092 
AGE 145 3<1. 5qJ 10:14 13.8951972 72.Qt)OOOO 72.00()OO t. 15:)10'5 5741. 0000 192.60 3!",.O70 
SEX 145 0.8896552 0.3".051 0.000000 1.00000 0.0)61099 129.0000 0.10 35.340 
FOI F 145 250.9A49909 439.6419190 - lOJ9. 93'ifi12 2222 .08 '55 36.510274 , 36392.8237 193285.02 175. \67 
SPANISH 145 0.075862' 0.265695 , 0.000000 1.00000 0.0220648 '1.0000 0.07 350.234 
BLACK 1.5 0.0413793 O. 1999563 0.000000 1.00000 0.0165972 6.0000 0.00 482.986 
ASIAN 1.5 0.1172414 0.3228228 0.000000 1.00000 0.0268090 17.0000 0.10 275.349 
t::I 
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Logistic Regression 
Sample 'AA' 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VR~ 
2305 OBSERVATIONS 
18 II VR~ = 0 
494 vc~ ~ t 
1978 
o OBS[RVATIONS DELETED DUE TO MISSING VALUES 
VARIABLE "EAN "INI"U~ ~A~I~U" 
INTRST 9.B9043 7.5 10.5 
SPREAD -0.0413ESS -0.3977 0.6634 
lOANhM 64B!,,!.3 9000 '50000 
FDI F 16.90B4 -235B.27 1017.43 
INCOME n37.03 425 7000 
AGE 37.22B2 19 75 
SEX 0.B79B26 0 
SPANISH 0.0941432 0 
BlhCK 0.0420B~4 0 
ASIAN 0.0841649 0 
- WARNING: VARIABLE HAS lIMITED DISPERSION. 
IT ~A1 BE A BAD CANDIDATE FOR THE MODEL. 
RANGE 
3 
1.061 I 
'41000 
3375.7 
6575 
56 
I 
I-
-2 LOG LIKELIHOO~ FOR "OOEl CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLY· 2395.45 
MODEL CHI-SOUARE- 352.74 WITH 100.F. 
CONVERGENCE OBTAINED IN 6 ITERATIONS. 
MhX ABSOLUTE OERIVATIVE.0.6727D-04. 
MODEL CHI-SOUARE= 341.30 WITH 100.F. 
VARIABLE BEU ST(!. ERROR 
INTfRCEPT -6.75302254 2.54717807 
INT~~T 0.429152B6 0.2S50~9~8 
SPREAD 2.32'2~47J 0.33n031B 
lOANhM 0.00001264 0.OOOOO~B7 
-Olr -(1. ()()466209 O. ()()()7"1040 
INCO"E o Cl(J()Q7412 O.OOOOS11~ 
Ar.E 0.010<;1'115 O. OO~,60797 
':,[){ ~o. ~4f.4:"97 0.17'6(1002 
SPhNI SH O. '4~]~8~1f) 0.2023h7R2 
FlLACK O. G I 'S~,1~q O.l'S:lRR7Q7 
A '>I AN . O. 115(;0738 O. 211~6382 
(SCORE STAT.) P=O.O 
R- 0.366. 
-2·l0G l= :'(154.15. 
(-2 LOG L.R.) P=O.O 
CHI,SOUARE P R 
7.03 O.OORO 
'.R3 0.0'174 0.019 
4"1.39 0.0000 0.138 
19.37 0.0000 0.OB5 
36.62 O.(1()()O -0.120 
t. fiR 0.1'1'" O.C1OO 
:1.~' 0 OnOS 0 0=':' 
2 04 (1 ,'d4 .(1 .004 
I .41 O. :l:?'.J5 0 ,lJi..)() 
r, 
"7 O.OI~R (1 (1·'0 
0.61 0.4061 0.000 
rRACTION or CONCO~OANT PAIRS or PR(OICI[Il PRODAr.1 l 11 I {'i ANIl REsrUNSES :0 
DANK COR~EIA'ION BrTWlEN PREOICTEU rROSARILIT. ANI! R{ ~I'ON';( : (\. 
129 
727 
476 
CORR[LATION COfrrICI[NT~ / PROB > :R: UNO(R ttQ.RHO,.,O N • 2305 
V 11.1 INIRST SPREAO LOANAM INCOME AGf SEX rOlf SPANISH BLACK ASIAN 
VRM •• OOQ(>O o.on., 0 10RRR O.~HI'O 0.24707 0.06 "9 o 00444 -0.294QI' -0.027'8 0.02744 -0.0"2. 
0.0000 O .• RB2 0.0001 0.(>001 0.000' 0.0033 0.8313 0.000' 0.1921 0.1878 0.3081 
INTRST 0.02742 1.00000 -0.011~6 0.00JA2 0.02[, 11 ·O.075"J7 0.OOR82 0.01554 0.04146 0.067R8 -0.02585 
0.1882 0.0000 0.5792 0.D~47 0.2092 0.2198 0.6723 0.4558 0.0466 0.0025 0.2148 
SPREAD O.IORRO -0.01156 1.00000 -0.01~47 -0.00]67 -0.01041 -0.02181 0.06579 0.03277 -0.01694 0.00585 
0.000' 0.5792 0.0000 0.5180 0.8602 0.6176 0.2952 0.0013 0.1157 0.4'62 0.7789 
LOANAM 0.')4760 0.00382 -0.01347 I . O(l{)()() 0.64035 0.05634 o .• 0352 -0.63589 -0.15047 -0.06692 0.02.45 
0.0001 ().8~.7 0.5180 0.0000 0.0001 0.0068 0.000' 0.000' 0.0001 0.0013 0.2406 
INCOME 0.2"07 0.02617 -0.00367 0.64035 •. 00000 0.2".5 O. 'OR •• -0.37fiij4 -0.15512 -0.06312 -0.06421 
0.0001 D.2092 0.8602 0.0001 0.0000 0.000' 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.002. 0.0020 
AGE 0.06119 -0.02557 -0.0104' 0.0563' O. ';} t 145 '.00000 -0.07548 -0.00579 -0.05603 0.00456 -0.OOR49 
0.OOJ3 0.2198 0.6176 0.0068 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 O. '/81J 0.0071 0_8;67 0.6837 
SEll. 0.00444 0.00882 -0.02181 0.10352 O. lOR" -0.0754R 1.00000 -0.08950 0.06889 -0.04215 0.07073 
0.8313 0.6723 0.2952 0.000' 0.0001 O.oooJ 0.0000 0.0001 0.0009 0.0430 0.3'98 
FD IF -0.29496 0.0'554 0.06679 -0.63589 -0.37684 -0.00579 -0.08950 1.00000 0.09186 0.01794 -0.01901 
0.0001 0.4558 0.0013 0.0001 0.0001 0.7813 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.3894 0.3615 
SPANISH -0.02718 0.041.6 0.03277 -0.IS041 -0.15SI2 -0.05603 0.OfiRA9 0.09'''6 1.00000 -0.06157 -0.09773 
0.192 I 0.04G6 O. 1151 0.0001 0.0001 0.0071 0.0009 0.0001 0.0000 0.0012 0.0001 
BLACK 0.02144 0.06788 -0.01694 -0.OG692 -0.OG312 0.00456 -0.0'215 0.01794 -0.06757 1.00000 -0.06354 
0.1818 0.0025 0.4162 0.0013 0.002' 0.82G7 0.0430 0.3694 0.0012 0.0000 0.0023 
ASIAN -0.02124 -0.025n5 0.005R5 0.024A5 -0.Ofi4,' -O.OOR.!} 0.0201~ -0.0190' -0.09113 -0.06354 , .00000 
0.3081 0.21~8 0.7189 0.2406 0.0020 0.6837 0.3198 0.3615 0.0001 0.0023 0.0000 
(1 
0 
"1 
"1 
(1) 
I-' 
III 
C/.lcf' 
III ..... 
S 0 
"C ::s 
I-' 
(1) 3: 
III 
cT 
>"1 
> ..... 
X 
..... 
\0 
-.;j 
ex> 
w 
o 
VAR I ABLE N "fAN STANDARD 
OfVIATION 
"I'll MUM 
VALUf 
frAl\XIMUM 
VALUE 
STO [IlROR 
Dr "[AN 
SliM VA~IANCE C V. 
-----.-----------------------.-----------------------.-------- VRM·O --------------------.--------.--.------------------------------
INTRST 1811 9.860R029 0.2670513 7.500000 10.25000 0.00618941 '7Q05.00 0.07 2.707 
SPREAD 18 II ·O.O"4G~11:1 O.1517A:'B ·0.J'l1"1(l{) O. (IL:;ldO 0.00)107&7 ,8<) '19 0.02 -317.!>26 
LOANAM 18' I S9 16 t .OJ':JJJQ6 2134:1.01121]0 117oo.000UOO 1110000. 00000 501.~]qfJ~15J 1071dOft35.00 45552496 I . :12 3&.016 
INCOME 1811 2080. 05<)&3~'6 10J~. 1955572 4~5.000()0() 7000 00000 24.15508273 3766<)86.00 1065427. G1 49.G23 
AGE 1811 3G. 897294 3 10.4&'123&6 19.000Cloo 75.00000 0.24G01112 6GB21.00 1U9.GO 20.374 
Sf ~ 1811 0.87!10723 O. 32fi 1332 0.000000 I . ()(l{)()() 0.0016;;365 '!)~2.00 0.11 37.100 
FDI F 181t 39.C'J6AfJ4R7 t 19.9<)95070 -639.noooo 1017.43500 '.819RI253 72383.59 14399.88 300.233 
SPANISH 18' 1 0.0<)n7882 O. 2<)17~&2 0.000000 1.00000 O.OOGg')7S4 178.00 0.09 302. 972 
BLACK 1811 0.0391049 0.1941156 0.000000 1.00000 0.00'~fiI90 71.00 0.04 495.IB3 
ASIAN 1811 0.OB71446 0.28221 I I 0.000000 1.00000 0.006&3296 156.00 0.06 323.540 
----------------------- _______________________________ -------- VRMrl 
-----------------------~---------------------------------------
INTRST 494 9.9037449 0.1932762 8.7500000 10.50000 0.OOB6937 4692.450 0.0 1.951 
SPREAO 494 -0.01093G2 0.0845<)16 -0.3977000 0.6(,3110 0.0038060 -5.402 0.0 -773.498 
lOANU4 494 B5935.fi255061 49337. 1075763 9000.0000000 250000.00000 2219.7814132 ~2452199.ooo 2434150184.0 57.412 
INCOME 494 2812.4939271 1607.753)740 4~3.00000oo 7000.00000 72.3362441 1369372.000 25B4B70.9 57.IG5 
AGE 494 3B.4412955 9.B503R15 22.0000000 75.00000 0.4431896 18990.000 97.0 25.624 
SEl( 494 0.RS25911 0.3222332 o . OO()()(l(){) 1.00000 0.0!649BO 436.000 0.1 36.510 
rOlF 494 -67.6310195 206.B4B2161 -235R.2700000 570.20000 9.3065412 -33409.774 42786.2 -305.B4B 
SPANISH 494 0.078947' 0.2699299 0.0000000 1.00000 0.0121447 39.000 O. I 341.911 
BLACK ~9' 0.0526316 0.2235232 0.0000000 1.00000 0.0100568 26.000 0.0 42'.694 
ASIAN 494 0.0728745 0.2601939 0.0000000 1.00000 0.0117067 36.000 0.1 357.0H 
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Logistic Regression 
Sample 'AA' 
1919 
DEPENDENr VA~IABLE: V~M 
OBSE ~VAT IONS 
VRM • 0 
VQ~~ :: t 
1629 
I I 12 
517' 
o O[lS[~VATIONS DELETED DUE TO MISSING VALUES 
VA"IABlf MEAN "INIMUM 
INT"ST I 1. 3fi3 7.75 
SPREAD -0.0513307 -0.6931 
LOANAM 68247.4 12969.6 
FOIF -56.6373 -1959.94 
INCO"E 2367.17 447.227 
AGE 37.5967 19 
SEX 0.884592 0 
SPANIS" 0.0939227 0 
E:LACK 0.0325353 0 
ASIAN O. 116022 0 
• WA~NING' V~UIABLE HAS LIMITED OISPE"SION. 
MAXIMUM 
12.5 
2.109 I 
7fiR~36 
730.2'15 
6976.74 
74 
"ANGE 
4.75 
2.8022 
'55:'H;7 
2~'l0.2J 
65:19.52 
55 
l' 
If MAt BE A BAD CANDIDATE FOR THE MOOEL. 
-2 tOG LIKELIHOO~ FOR MODEL CONTAINING INTE"Cr.PT ONLY' 2035.84 
MODEl. CHI-SOUARE- 16~.47 WITH 100.F. 
CONV[V~ENCE OBTAINED IN 6 ITE~ATIONS. 
MAX AH~OLUTE OERIVATIVE-O. 10320-03. 
MODEl CHI-SOUA~E' 179.39 WITH 100_F. 
VARI.lBLC BETA STD. ERROR 
INTfPCEI' , -1 •. 10630526 1.952AA121 
INlRSl 1.0~43'374 0.16&4.,612 
SP"EAO 0.2~038A43 0.1,,4'091 
LOAN .. " 0.OQO()IA62 O.CXlOOO?54 
ro I r 0.00051l731 0.00030394 
lNt;OM£ -0.00000589 0.onOO5720 
AGE 0.010,4'133 O.OOS'j57~7 
srA '0 .• 5AB2~G4 O.173<tOB85 
SPU'IS" 0.41339155 O. 19~<;4.01 
BLI\CK 0.2011?rI 6;- O.31f)"1t17~ 
ASIAN 0.0~8911225 0.179C5215 
(SCO~E STAT.) p·O.O 
". O. :lBO. 
-2 LOG IT 185G.45. 
(-2 LOG L.R.) P<O.O 
CHI . SOUA~E P ~ 
52. t8 O. ()()OO 
·0.12 0. 0000 0.137 
4.18 O.O.OR 0.033 
53.r,0 0.0000 0 1~9 
2.34 o. I~G I 0.013 
0.01 0.~17') 0.000 
J 40 o. or.~ 1 o.o?~ 
fi.qr. (I \)ORJ -0 .()I1~ 
., . .,7 O. O:14~ O. 0;15 
(1.:17 o. ~1"':tO 0 {)()() 
O.21j O. (;1')5 0 .001l 
r"ACT I ON III r:ONI":OPOANT PAl"" or P"UJ1 C If 0 PRORI\l\ II 111 [ .. , /\tJU R( SPONSf.!", 0 
RAN~ CO~~II AI IUN llF.hl!EN P~ID1CT[O PIlOBAfi I Ll 1 Y .NU Rl ~,I·ON·.JE :0. 
132 
r,R-1 
71Hf) 
CO~RllATION COlfrlCIENrs I PROD> :R: UNO[ II HO IIHO"O I N " IG]'J 
v~104 INIIlSI SPR[ft.O lOANhJ.4 I NCOIo4£ AG£ SEX rOI F sr~NISH BLACK ASIAN 
VIlIo4 1.00000 0.18'105 0 10J5c:1 0.1335" 0.15271 0.03953 -0.03027 -0.0258~ 0.01104 -0.01353 o 00007 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 00001 0.0001 O.IIOR 0.2220 0.1972 0.&561 0.5851 0.9978 
INTRST O. 18~05 1.00000 0.22717 O.O':,4Q7 0.09392 -0.06992 0.00971 0.13951 0.02R43 -0.07725 -0.03335 
0.0001 0.0000 '0.0001 0.0265 0.0001 0.0047 0.6955 0.0001 0.2514 0.0018 0.1785 
SPRfAO 0.10359 O. 2~277 1.00000 -0.03.78 -0.003,}~ 0.02110 0.01020 0.30923 0.03160 C·.O<OC·22 -0.00986 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.1606 0.8736 0.3947 0.6808 0.0001 0.2024 O. !'930 0.6\109 
LOANA'" 0.2335' 0.05497 -0.03478 1.00000 0.59851 0.04854 0.12570 -0.43393 -0.152,}3 -0 Of'R91 0.01754 
0.0001 0.0265 0.1606 0.0000 0.0001 0.0501 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.(1003 0.4793 
I NCO"'E 0.15271 o 09392 -0.00394 0.59851 1.00000 0.18689 0.12500 -0.19409 -0.11150 -0.01,570 -0.05438 
0.0001 0.0001 0.8136 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.OC05 0.0282 
AGE 0.03953 -0.06992 0.02110 O.04B!)4 0.18689 I.CIOOOO 0.03320 -0.01444 -0.04869 -0.ca253 0.01861 
0.1108 0.0047 0.3941 0.0501 0.0001 0.0000 0.1805 0.5604 0.0494 0.'3181 0.4529 
SEX -0.03021 0.00971 0.01010 0.1:1570 0.17500 0.033:10 1.00000 -0.0564S 0.05043 -O.01~5~ 0.034A7 
0.2220 0.6955 0.6808 0.0001 0.0001 0.180.5 0.0000 0.0226 0.0418 0 .• )026 0.1595 
rOlF 
-0.015"4 0.13'151 0.30913 -0.43393 -0.19409 -0.01444 -0.05640 1.00000 0.05145 0.01672 -0.03157 
0.2972 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.5604 0.0226 0.0000 0.0343 0.)019 0.2028 
SI'ANISH 0.0110. 0.02843 0.03160 -0.16293 -0.17150 -0.04f169 0.05043 0.05245 1.00000 -0.05904 -0.11664 
0.6561 0.2514 0.2024 0.0001 0.0001 0.0494 0.0418 0.0343 0.0000 0.0172 0.0001 
BLACK -0.01353 -0.07715 0.00022 -0.08RQ2 -0.08570 -0.00253 -0.07454 0.07672 -0.05904 I. 00000 -0.06h44 
0.5851 0.0018 0.9930 0.0003 0.0005 0.9187 0.0026 0.0019 0.0172 0.0000 0.0073 
ASIAN 0.00007 -0.03335 -0.00')86 0.0175. -0.05438 0.01861 0.03487 -0.03151 -0.1166. -0.06&" 1.00000 
0.9978 O.11AS 0.6909 0.4793 0.0282 0.4529 0.1595 0.2028 0.0001 0.0073 0.0000 
n 
0 
"1 
"1 
It) 
...... 
III 
CIJ("I' 
III .... 
B 0 
't! ::I 
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It) ~ 
III 
("I' 
~"1 
> .... 
>< 
\0 
~ 
\0 
w 
w 
VARIABLE N MEAN Sl ANDhRD MINI "III" ",AXI"UM 5 TO ERROR SUM VAR lANCE C V. 
O[VIAIION VALUE VALUE or IoILAN 
- .. - - ............. - - .... -.. ...... .... .. ......... .. .... ........ .. ...... .. ........ ........ ...... .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. ...... VRPot,.O ........................................................................................................................ - .... 
INl RST 1112 ".1901l<14A 0.6279357 7.750000 12.15000 0.01AA3054 12S55 415 0.39 5.56 t 
SPREAD t, '2 -0.OR5:17IJ9 O.~73lno -0.£>'13100 2.10910 O.Ot7I1Hi7r:l -q.., 1'142 0.33 -67 I. 2G t 
lOhNII.M 
"'2 63226. BAB'!7 I A 24410.9R05583 1144 I. f\bO"(l':> 213 '()G. :lGA51 731.33G54070 7030B~00. 5]7 5963A429 1.43 3S.624 
'''CO'''( I I 12 2137.3'1G3977 tl1fLl~'72f11 447.7']711)' 6R7~,. (i1QA" 33.B('101015 14B7~H". Jet4 12149B:1.63 50 4G1 
AGE 1112 37.3156415 10.376712 I 20.000000 74.00000 0.311 17(;92 "'495.000 107.68 27. 008 
SEX It '2 0.89 I IA7. 0.3 t 15445 0.(J(l{}(]()0 1.00000 O. 00~n41(i0 9~ 1.000 0.10 34.95R 
FOIF It .2 -53.4076870 .63.0621338 -796.853309 730.29517 4.AA«JD"4A -59JA9.34A 26589.29 -305.Jln 
SPANISH 1112 0.0917266 0.2887695 0.000000 1.00000 0.ooRfi5962 102.000 0.08 314.815 
BLACK I I 12 0.0341727 0.1817547 0.000000 1.00000 0.00545045 38.000 0.03 531.870 
ASIAN ,. '2 0.1160072 0.3203716 0.000000 1.00000 0.009&0749 129.000 0.10 276.170 
.. -- .. -- ...... -- .. ---- .. --- -_ .. ------------ .... -- -- -- .. --- -- -- ...... - .... -- ...... VR,",'S' 1 ...... ---- .. -_ ........ ---- .. - ... - .... --- .. -- ---- -- -- -- -_ .. ------- .. --- .... -- .... - ..... 
INTIlST 517 ''-5181238 0.3221&59 9.470000 12.50000 0.01' 1688 5954.870 O. I 2.797 
SPRE AD 517 0.0219050 O. 1360r.65 -0.693100 0.1 'R9O 0.0059842 I I .325 0.0 6". 166 
lOANAM 517 79046.0220 I 36 41024.437!;762 12"69. 5A055 I 268336.31485 1804.2!;27016 4"08&6793.381 1683004478.4 51. 8-J9 
INCOME 517 2646.2U394A6 1429.5699048 441.'227'9' 6976.74419 62.8724125 1368128.BO' 2043670. I 54.022 
AGE 517 38.2011605 10.5100492 19.000000 70.00000 0.4631'110 19750.000 110.9 21.5115 
SEX 511 O. 870~OG2 0.336 IA 13 0.000000 1.00000 0.0147852 450.000 O. I 38.623 
FDI F 517 -63.5831643 220.7231 It I - 1959.937388 395.9r.fiOI 9.7074177 -32872.806 48719.0 -341.13S 
SPAf"HSH 517 0.0986~&0 0.29B4750 0.000000 1.00000 0.0131;;>69 51.000 0.1 302.572 
BLACK 511 0.0290135 O. 16A0010 0.000000 •. 00000 0.0073889 15.000 0.0 579.064 
ASIAN 517 O .• ,60542 0.3206001 0.000000 1.00000 0.0141000 60.000 0.\ 276.250 
t1 
II> 
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Logistic Regression 
Sample 'AA' 
1980 
OEPENOENT VARlAaLE: VRM 
1701 oaSERVATIONS 
1267 vu... - 0 
434 VRM .. 1 
o OBSERVATIONS DELETED DUE 10 "'ISSING VALUES 
VARIABLE MEAN MINIMUM 
INTRST 12.1478 8.35 
SPRE AD -0.0653815 -0.3(;21 
LOAN~M 766'0.6 ,nl~a. 7 
FOI F 118.04 -893.293 
INCOME 2575.39 436.508 
AGE 3(;.6796 19 
SEX 0.8B1746 0 
SPANISH 0.0787772 0 
BLACK 0.0799B7' 0 
ASIAN 0.12522 0 
• WARNING: VARIABLE HAS liMITED DISPERSION. 
MA~I MUM 
14.25 
0.5174 
"AOQ5 
670.167 
698 •. ·,3 
70 
1 
RANGE 
5.9 
0.8845 
'77936 
1563. _6 
6547.62 
51 
I 
It MAY BE A 3AO CANDIDATE FOR tHE MODEL. 
-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD FOR MOOEl CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLY- 1932.05 
MODEL CHI-SOU~RE- 151.29 WITH 100.F. 
CONVERGENCE DETAINED IN 5 ITERATlONS_ 
M~x ABSOLUTE DElli VAT I VE'O. 1'13BO-03_ 
MODEL CHI-SOUARE- 145.54 WITH 10 O_F. 
VAR I AOLE BETA STO_ ERROR 
INTERCEPT -3.0097 I 107. O.9'J,1j44Lt 
INHlC;T 0.0;>743569 0.077(;4472 
SPRE AD O. 17745293 0.24674303 
LOANAM O.()O()OISO':J 0.00000275 
rOlF -0. 0Q076S80 0.0003383G 
1t;r.OME -0.0000067'1 o . OOOO~l505 
H.E O. Q07h:1I7'l O. 00~,)3~04 
5rx o. 1.1'J.s~Sq6 0.I'l3JR775 
C;PANISH 
·0. 'n7R~'''~ O. ,!,fi7 "1)0 
I:L ACK 0.30'51122 0.:1_'l7HIIOB 
A:,IAN -0.03599476 0.I7B262LB 
(5CORE STAT.) P-O.O 
R- 0.255_ 
-2 LOG L" 17Afi.SL 
(-2 LOG L.R.) P'O.O 
Otl-$OUARE P R 
9.1'1 0.007. 
0.12 0.7740 0.000 
0.27 0.6047 0.000 
34.16 00000 0.17'1 
5.12 0.0~J6 -0_040 
0.02 O_901A 0.000 
1.6S 0.19AR 0.000 
0.60 O. 43~6 0.000 
O. !'"l4 () -1fi:..l4 0.000 
O.H 0 :lAB7 0.000 
(J. 04 0.11400 O.O<X) 
rRACTIONor COt;C:OROAtH PAtQ'j or rRfO'C"lrn PQ{)rtl\nll 1111 ... ANl} Rf~PONSrS 
RANK CO~RLLA110N (I(!WUN r~rOICTEI\ I'~OI\AU I l I I Y MJIl RI srONSE 
135 
(l ()~I 1 
O. J7R 
VR" INIRST SPREAD LOANA .. INCO"E AGE SE ~ FOI F SPANISH BLACK AStAN 
VR" 1.00000 o.oon~ 0.00'307 0.2B765 0.I7A54 0.05AO!! o 043'13 -0.2~087 -0.OfiIi02 -000010 -0.OOS4S 
0.0000 0.9247 0.70R5 0.0001 0.0001 0.01&6 0.0701 0.0001 0.00&4 0.996B O. B212 
INTI/Sf 0.00229 1.00000 -0.50Qn 0.OJ~52 o IO~ 18 0.01B13 -0.0IA53 0.12089 0.031'lA 0.06636 -0.02541 
0.9247 0.0000 0.0001 0.143 I 0.0001 0.4~46 0.4'~0 0.0001 0.1873 0.0062 0.2949 
SPRE AO O. 00~07 -0.50')22 1.00000 -O.OROSA -0.0'1355 0.00')05 0.00210 -0.20369 0.00072 0.00559 0.04450 
0.7085 0.0001 O. ()()(YJ 0.0009 0.0001 0.7092 0.931 I 0.0001 0.9764 0.8118 0.OG65 
LOAN." 0.28765 0.03552 -0.OB05B I.()(10OD 0.60BB3 0.OA735 0.09981 -0.67249 -0. f969R -0.07(;26 0.00221 
0.0001 0.143 I 0.0009 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 0.000: 0.0001 0.0016 0.9275 
INCO"E 0.1785. 0.I051A -0.0'1355 0.60AA3 1.00000 0.I863!! 0.0')779 -O_.I;-~q -0.16104 -0.07062 -0.05162 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0036 0.0333 
AGE 0.05609 0.01313 0.00905 0.08235 0.IAG39 1.00000 0.03523 -0.OAI77 0.00035 -0.01031 0.0017. 
0.0166 0 .• 548 0.7092 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 0.1464 0.0007 0.9664 0.6709 0.9427 
SEX 0.04393 -0.OlB53 0.00210 0.0!l'lB7 0.0!!71!! 0.03523 1.00000 -0.096'39 0.02fi40 -0.04202 0.OlB09 
0.0701 0.4450 0.931 I 0.0001 0.0001 O. 1464 0.0000 0.0001 0.2766 0.0832 0.455'1 
FOIF -0.24067 0.12089 -0.20369 -0.67249 -0.4136~ -0.06177 -0.09699 1.00000 0.13699 0.07619 -0.00199 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0017 0.9346 
SPANISH -0.06fi02 0.0319A 0.00072 -0. 19(;'1B -0.1610~ 0.00035 0.026~0 0.13599 1.00000 -0.05141 -0.11064 
0.006. 0.1873 0.9764 0.0001 0.0001 0.98B4 0.2766 0.0001 0.0000 0.0340 0.0001 
BLACK -0.00010 0.06636 0.00559 -0.07(;26 -0.07062 -0.01031 -0.04202 0.07619 -0.05141 1.00000 -0.06652 
0_ 996B 0.00G2 0.8176 O.OOIG 0.003G 0.6709 0.0632 0.0017 0.0340 0.0000 0.0061 
ASIAN -0.00548 -0.025~I O. 04~50 0.00221 -0.05162 0.00174 0.01B09 -0.00199 -0.11064 -0.06652 1.00000 
0.B212 0.2949 O.06f)S 0.9275 0.0333 0.9427 0.4559 0.9346 0.0001 0.0061 0.0000 
n 
0 
'"S 
'"S 
CD 
r-' 
III 
t/lc-t-
Ill~ 
a 0 
'0:3 
r-' 
CD :s:: 
III 
-c-t-
>'"S 
>~ 
- >< 
\0 
co 
0 
W 
0\ 
VARIA[JLE N "'EAN 5lAtJDARD MINIMUM MAXIMUM STn fRROR SUM VAR lANCE C.V. 
DEVIAtiON VALUE VALUE or MEAN 
-------------------------------------------------------------- VRM·O ---------------------------------------------------------------
IIllRST 1767 t'. t"6f-86' .).R<;46R39 R. 'SCOOO 1010.2!"IOOO 0.02.01IJR t5JR9.77S 0.73 7.036 
SPREAD 1767 -0.066'1212 0.290D40 '0.362100 O. ~2740 0.ooAI~661 -R4.7A9 0.08 -433.R44 
lUJ\NAM 1267 71196.40B2134 26'J03.4'J34IR7 IOI~B. 73(l1~9 23A09S.::!3A10 755. Rn06262 90705R49.70<; 723797958. I J 37.7BR 
INCOME 1:'67 24J8.0R:'21~7 120q.3H29~7 436.507937 6Q04. 76 PIO 33. 97GO I 395 308flO5J.CJ~B 1462~BG. 19 49.G03 
AGE 1261 36.2[J1292B 1O.04277GB 19.000000 70.00000 0.2B2140~5 <15976.000 100.B6 27.676 
SEX 121i1 O.R7~'.J'82 0.333IR4'1 0.0<10000 1.00000 O.OOCJJ(j04(i 1106.000 O. II 3R.169 
FOIF 1267 150. 19~7005 191. !l6R8723 -592.06:14'12 670. 16667 5.39315003 190297.953 :16852.05 121.012 
SPANISH 1267 0.OB91871 0.2R5121>1 0.0000lJ0 1.00000 0.OOA01030 113.000 O.OB 319.69. 
BLACK 1267 0.02'J~921 0.170GnB 0.000000 1.00000 0.00079374 3B.000 0.03 568.926 
ASIAN 1267 0.1262826 0.3322987 0.000000 1.00000 0.00933556 160.000 O. II 263.139 
-------------------------------------------------------------- VR"'-I ----.-.-.-------------------------------------------.-.-.-.-.--
INTRST .34 12.1511521 0.9089.25 9.750000 14.00000 0.0436306 5273.600 0.8 7.480 
SPREAD 43. -0.060RA6. 0.2898A45 -0.362100 0.52240 0.0139149 -26.425 0.1 -476.107 
LDANAN 434 92494.8796723 .0474.6974597 16666.666667 238095.23810 1942.8.14 102 40142777.778 163B200729.7 43.159 
INCOME 434 2976.2416795 1513.3766218 596.8253')1 6984.12698 72.6444025 1291688.889 2290308.8 50. B49 
AGE 434 37_6290323 10. 1OJ16~R 1'l.OO{)OOO 69.00000 0.4R49'163 16331.000 102. I 26.851 
SEX 43~ 0.905~300 0.2'J28191 0.000000 1.00000 0.01.10558 393.000 0.1 32.337 
FDI F 434 24.1660193 291.114"35 -B9J.29Jf;':>' 670.16067 13.976A047 10488.052 84782.4 120~.891 
SPAfllSH 434 0.0483871 0.214RJ05 0.000000 1.00000 0.0103122 21.000 0.0 443.983 
BLACK 43. 0.0299539 O.170Gljr,g 0.000000 1.00000 0.ooA1918 IJ.OOO 0.0 5&9.732 
ASIAN ~J4 0.1221198 0.3278020 0.000000 1.00000 0.015;'350 53.000 0.1 26B.427 
t::::I 
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Logistic Regression 
Pooled Time-Series 
Sam pIe 
(Restricted) 
ero ss- Secti on 
, A' 
DrPENDENT VAR I ABLE: VRM 
2050 DElSERVAT IONS 
1497 VRM :a 0 
553 VRM " 
o OUSERVATIONS DELCTEO DUE TO MISSING VALUES 
VARIABLE MEAN MINIMUM 
IPHRS T l1.aBl2 7.5 
SPRE AD -0.149322 -0.99 
LOANAM G7362.4 1:1416. B 
FDT F 151.2 '6 -1579.35 
INCOME 2345.'3 400 
AGE 37.2556 19 
SEX 0.B79024 0 
SPANI SH 0.0731707 0 
BLACK 0.0409756 0 
ASIAN 0.12439 0 
SR I AEI B.933~5 6.9 
TBDIF I .00905342 -2.06 
- WARNING: VARIABLr HAS LIMITED DISPf.RSIDN. 
MAXIMUM 
IB 
2.109 I 
'50000 
3~24. 44 
6937.77 
75 
I 
1 
1 
10.4 
2.09 
RANGE 
10.5 
J .099' 
2:16SRJ 
5203.79 
653'/ . 77 
56 
I-
I 
3.5 
4.15 
IT MAY BE A BAD CANDIDATE FOR THE MODEL_ 
-2 LOr. LIKELIHOOD FOR MODEL CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLY. 2390.37 
MnnEL CHI-SOUARE- 206.70 WITH 12D.F_ 
CONVERGENCE OBTAINEO IN 5 ITERATIONS. 
MU AHSOLUl[ orRIVATlvF=0.37320-02. 
MODEL CHI-SOUARE- 207.09 WITH 12D.F. 
VAR I ABLE BEU STD. ERROR 
INl[~CEPT -0. 4G~4724B 0.9.a~ .a69 
tNT PST 
-O.O:1!"IJ1J21 O.O"SAGa. 
SFRl AD O. a~39747' O. '!>377991 
LOANAM 0.OOOOl~32 r) . ()O(l()(l7 • R 
rOI r ~ O. 0v05!jrHi6 O.oooIJO'B 
I 'KO"'E O.OOOO6"J44 O.OOOO5:!t' 
AI,I o.oor.~r.~(j1 O.OOo1 cHJ753 
<,(1 
-0. ';>0 '~~Jfi 0.,fj34:10':".6 
";1'At"ll c::,li 
-0. '411UHfi20 0.22533300 
HI Ar,K -0. H,H"lfn .. ri O. 'Mf.4rt:ICJ2 
"''';.1''''' -0. ''''R''O=-O~ O. 'fif;='4~~A 
",&JIM I -0 '4 .JOlIR:JB O,O':.'·.";?:-flJ 
11<0 I r 
-0. 2 'R29~~5 O. 036~,;>90 I 
(SCORE STAT _) p-O.O 
R= 0.277. 
-2 LOG Lo 2'B3.2B. 
(-2 LOG L.R. I p·o.O 
CHI - SQUARE P 
0.:25 Q 6.4a 
0.63 0 ~7A' 0.000 
3IJ.84 0.0000 O. "0 
4~, 401 0.0000 O. .~ I 
17. B~ 00000 -O.OR? 
'.44 IJ. 'JOR 0.000 
• 
79 0 If\' 1 0.0<)0 
O.S~ O. 4~11'l'1 0.000 
0.41 C). ?:"O2 O.l><>O 
O.:l!J ('I,',J',Cor. O.O()O 
,." 0 ':l!j1 -0 0'0 
1. :10 n lK'r,~ -O.(lI1l 
3~ ." 0.10(1(.\0 '0. ,.<) 
138 
Logistic 
Pooled 
Regression (Unrestricted) 
Time-Series Cross-Section 
Sample A' 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VRM 
2050 OfiSERVATIONS 
1497 VR~ - 0 
553 VR"4 .. t 
o ODSERV'TIONS DELETtD DUE TO MISSING VALUES 
VARIABLE MEAN MINIMUM 
INTRST 11.8012 7.S 
Sf.'READ -0.149322 -0.99 
LOMMM 67362 .• 13.'6.R 
FDIF 151.216 -1579.35 
INCOME :2345.13 400 
AGE 37.2556 19 
SEX 0.B79024 0 
SPANISH 0.0731707 0 
BLACK 0.0409756 a 
ASIAN 0."439 a 
SRIAEI B.93395 6.9 
TBOIF 0.00905342 -2.06 
YBI 0.2~2927 a 
• WARNING: VARIABLE HAS LIMITED DISPERSION. 
MAXIMUM 
lB 
2.109 I 
2!iOOOO 
3624 .•• 
6937.77 
75 
I 
10.4 
2.09 
I 
RANGE 
10.5 
3.0991 
?:165R:1 
5703.79 
6537.77 
56 
I 
,. 
I 
3.5 
•. 15 
I 
IT MAY BE • BAD CANDIDATE FOR THE MODEL. 
-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD FOR MODEL CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLY- 2390.37 
MODEL CHI-SOUARE- 206.7. WITH 13 O.F. 
CONVERGENCE OBTAINED IN 5 ITERATIONS. 
MAK ABSOLUTE OERIVATlvr-0.54090·02. 
MODEL CIlI-SOUARE- 207.16 WITH 13 D.F. 
VARIABLE 
INTERCEPT 
INTI'ST 
SPREA~ 
LOANAM 
FDI F 
INCOME 
AGE 
SE~ 
SPANISH 
BUCK 
ASIAN 
S~ IAEi 
T~DI F 
YBI 
BETA 
-0. I 175~,470 
-0. 03R99S" 
0.R~941922 
0.00001521 
·0.OOO~·P62 
0.0000G344 
0.ooG';.79B 
-0. II!lt:1!;S4 
-0. ,. •• 73 IS 
-0.I67536BB 
-O.~506J.RJ 
-0.17310729 
-0.7317~B92 
-D. I 1854550 
STD. EIIROR 
I. 534 1464~ 
0.0464B462 
0.I5447B72 
0.00000222 
0.000130~2 
0.00005222 
0.OO4906~8 
0.16353135 
0.22531768 
0.28651578 
0.11;63B738 
O. 1I956B27 
a 01;035944 
0.42230573 
(SCORE STAT.) P-O.O 
R' 0.275. 
'2 LOG L- 2183.20. 
('2 LOG L.R. I p·O.O 
CHI'SOUAIIE 
0.01 
0.70 
30.23 
46.99 
17 .67 
1.4B 
1.78 
0.53 
0.4 I 
0.34 
2.77 
2.10 
14,74 
O.OB 
P 
0.93B'I 
O. '015 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2244 
0.IB20 
0.4663 
0.~214 
0.55B7 
0.1:120 
0.1477 
0.0001 
0.77B9 
11 
0.000 
0.109 
o 137 
-O.OBI 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
'0.01 I 
-0.006 
-0.073 
0.000 
FRACTION OF CONCORDANT PAIRS OF PREDICTED PROBABILITIES AND RESPONSES 
RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN PREDICTED PROBABILI1Y AND RESPONSE 
:0.69. 
:0.407' 
139 
VIIM 
COI?I?(LATION COEFFIClENJ5 / PI?OO > :I?: UNOEI? HO.I?m~O / N' 2050 
VR/ol INTRST SPR[ AD LOANA/ol INCOM[ AG[ SEX SRIAEI TBnlF FDIF SPANISH BLACK ASIAN 
1.00000 0.02390 0.13275 0.20~n9 0.1-1795 0.03506 0.00103 -0.01450 -0.08Q05 -0.13,,40 -0.04416 -0.075ijJ -0.01'117 
0.0000 0.2794 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.1125 0.0909 0.5119 0.0001 0.0001 0.0456 0.242J 0.38JI 
INTRST 0.02390 1.00000 -0.38745 -0.0Iij6B 0.12973 -0.00376 -0.00776 -').69557 -0.566.8 0.45971 0.00556 0.03095· 0.01454 
0.2794 0.0000 0.0001 0.3978 0.0001 0.8Ci49 0.7426 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.B014 0.16;:J 0.5105 
SPREAD 0.13275 -0.38745 1.00000 -0.01536 -0.OA006 -0.04454 -0.00.54 0.33R25 0.267BB -0.53419 004212 -0.00482 o.o.eOI 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.4870 0.0003 0.0438 0.8371 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0565 0.B272 0.0297 
LOAN'" 0.209G9 -0.01868 -0.01536 1.00000 0.598.7 0.07515 0.13105 0.05331 O. 11636 -0.07183 -0.16119 -0.07633 0.04957 
0.0001 0.3918 0.4870 0.0000 0.0001 0.2551 0.0001 0.0158 0.0001 0.0011 0.0001 0.0005 0.0248 
INCOME 0.1.795 0.12973 -0.OB006 0.~'lB47 1.00000 0.13111 0.0')0<]7 -0.03312 0.00725 0.051<;1 -0.1:1849 -0.06870 -0.06875 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.1339 0.7427 0.0195 0.0001 0.0020 0.0018 
AGE 0.03506 -0.00376 -0.04454 0.02515 0.13111 1.00000 -0.07441 0.00087 -0.01753 0.03BOI -0.0382B -0.00101 -0.05034 
0.112S 0.8649 0.0438 0.2551 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.9705 0.4277 0.0853 0.0831 0.9637 0.0227 
SEJt 0.00303 -0.00726 -0.00454 0.13105 0.0'1097 -0.0744 I 1.00000 0.07636 0.030.9 0.00949 0.0.679 -0.07424 0.00385 
0.a909 0.7426 0.8371 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0000 0.2328 0.1677 0.6677 0.0341 0.0000 0.a618 
SRIAEI -0.01450 -0.69557 0.33B75 0.05331 -0.03317 0.00082 0.02636 1.00000 0.32909 -0.4.091 0.02713 -0.0J9n:! -0.00811 
0.5119 0.00010.00010.01580.1339 0.9705 0.2328 0.0000 0.00010.00010.21960.07730.7135 
T80lF -0.08905 -0.56648 0.267R8 0.1I63G 0.00725 -0.01753 0.0:10.q 0.32909 1.00000 -0.2.H)9 O.OOR'IR -0.00.25 0.00"4 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.7427 0.4277 0.1671 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.6846 0.8476 0.9229 
FOIF -0.13640 0.45921 -0.53419 -0.07183 0.05161 0.03ROI 0.00'149 -0 .• 4091 -0.24109 1.00000 0.00287 0.03969 -0.00250 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0011 0.0195 0.0853 0.6Ci71 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.8966 0.0124 0.9099 
SPANISH -0.04411; 0.00556 0.04'12 -0.16119 -0.13849 -0.03828 0.041i79 0.02713 0.00898 0.00787 1.00000 -O.OSBOR -0.10590 
0.0456 0.80" O.OSCiS 0.0001 0.0001 0.0831 0.0:141 0.2196 0.6846 0.8'166 0.0000 0.OOR5 0.0001 
BLACK -0.0]583 0.03095 -0.00482 -0.071i33 -0.OfiR20 -0.00101 '00742. '0.03902 -0.00425 0.03969 -0.05808 1.00000 -0.07791 
0.2423 0.161:; 0.0272 0.0005 0.0020 0.9Ci37 0.0008 0.0773 0.8476 0.0724 0.0085 0.0000 0.0004 
Asr~N -0.01927 0.01454 0.04801 0.04957 -0.06R75 -0.05034 0.003R5 -0.00811 0.00"4 -0.00250 '0.105":) -0.07791 1.00000 
0.3831 0.5105 0.0297 0.0248 O.OOIR 0.0227 0.8618 0.7135 0.9229 0.9099 0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 
V8 I 0.02717 0.68n84 -0.3RQn5 -0.1547. -0.00870 0.00996 -0.0305. -0.R5970 -0.65GB3 0.45134 '0.01<):1<) 0.03784 -0.020.<) 
0.2162 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.6938 0.6522 0.1670 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.3803 0.0868 0.3537 
Y81 
0.()1717 
0.211.2 
O.fiRfiA' 
0.0001 
-0.38'165 
0.0001 
-0.15424 
0.0001 
-0.00870 
0.6938 
0.00996 
0.6522 
-0.0:105. 
0.1670 
-0.85970 
O.OCOI 
-0.6568) 
0.0001 
0.451:14 
0.0001 
-0.01939 
0.3803 
0.03784 
0.086R 
-0.02049 
0.3537 
I ()()()()O 
0.0000 
'"tI 
o 
o 
...... 
(!) 
0. 
(") 
o-iO 
~'1 
S '1 
(!) (!) 
C/l, ...... 
IlIC1lIll 
S (!) ("f' 
'0 '1 ~ 
...... ~O 
(!) (!) ::s 
to 
3: 
>(")1lI 
'1 ("f' 
o '1 
to ~ 
to >< 
i 
C/l 
(!) 
Q 
("f' 
~ 
o 
::s 
J:' 
o 
IIAIIIAnLE N ME~N S I ANOAUO MINIMUM to4l\X IMUP04 5 TIl rRIIOII SUM IIAII lANCE C.II . 
DEVlhTION VALUE VALUE OF MEAN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _. IIII"'rO - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - _ .• - - - - - - _. - - - . - -. - - _. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _. - - - - -- >tI 
0 
INTIIST 14'17 I I. 85~34RO 2. 1148399 7.500000 18.00000 O.OS4fi!"IIJ62 17742.965 4.47 t7.843 0 
SPill AD 14<)7 -O.IAln,AI O. 433~7~0 -0.990000 2.1()<) 10 0.01120[,07 -271.358 0.19 -239.1<)0 ..... 
LOAN""" 14<]1 63425. gnOBOE'O '6' 17. G"~ lqq2 '34\(;.n'~,14:1 21115,)2.774GA 677.G'tlfi4:?Ot 949<1R('1I3.2(ll 68736091<).79 .. t. J:JG ro t1 
INCOME 1497 2~J2. 2~43 113 1185.736648A 400.000000 6<)37.76M]4 30. f,I'\(,]r:,07 t 3J4 1639. 7'l4 1405971.40 53.119 o.ro 
AGE 1497 37.0227121 10.8543846 19.000000 75 . Q()Q(l() O. 280~39!i9 55423.000 117.82 29.318 til 
SEX 1497 0.R7A4~35 O.32t;90!J2 0.000000 1.00000 0.OOR44'111 1315.0Q0 0.11 37.215 1-')1') 
YEAII 1497 79. 42B 18'l7 t. IJ4n", 7".000000 SI.OOOOO 0.02931472 118904.000 I. 29 I.42R 
..... '1 
SIIIAE I 1497 B.94~7IjR2 1.3221012 6.900000 10.40UOO 0.03417069 13391.800 1.75 t4.779 a ..... 
T(lDIF 1497 0.1056313 1.7950859 -2.060000 2.09000 0.04639534 158.130 3.22 1699.389 ro'O 
FDI F 1497 194. O<JR 1770 564.254274 t -818.1663&9 3624.44206 1A.5B357358 290564.97 I 318382.89 290.706 CIl I cT SPANI SH 1497 0.0801603 0.2716320 0.00('1)00 I. D<X><'O 0.00702053 120.000 0.07 33B.861 III CIl~ ALACK 1497 0.0440AB2 0.2053596 0.000000 1.00000 O.OO~30767 (;6.000 0.00 .65.7IJJ S ro < ASIAN 1497 0.1282565 0.3344869 0.000000 1.00000 0.ooB64507 192.000 0.1 I 260.795 
'0 '1 ro 
...................... --- -- .. ---- ---- ........ -- .......... VR". t ............ --- .................. --- .............................. -- -_ .. -_ .. -- .... --- .... -- •• - - - •• .......... ro ro CIl 
INTRST 553 11.9593128 1.5883675 9.750000 17.25000 0.0675443 6613.500 2.5 13.281 til cT III SPIIE.D 553 -0.0628436 0.~4984~1 -0.990000 0.52740 0.0106244 -34.752 O. I -J97. !iG2 
>OcT LO."'.M 553 78018.4097173 39040.4101952 17889.0R7657 250000.00000 1660.167 I 130 43144180.574 1524153628.2 50.040 
INCOME 553 2650.763Q153 I JB4. 2933734 575.107296 6877.77778 50. 8fifi 1421 1465A72.445 1916268.1 52.222 - '1 ..... 
AGE 553 37.8Bfi0759 1 1.1236319 20.000000 72.00000 0.4730249 20951.000 123.7 29.361 o til 
5EA 553 O. 8A065 10 0.3244923 o . (){)()O()O 1.00000 0.01379B8 487.000 0.1 36.847 til cT 
Y[AR 553 79.5895118 1.0647678 7B.OUOOOO 81.00000 0.04527B5 44013.000 1.1 1.3JB CD ..... 
SRI AEI ~53 8.901'3B92 I. 3A98101 6.9Q(JOOO 10.40000 O.O~I) 1007 4922.800 1.9 15.612 I I') 
TSDIF 553 -0.2523B70 1.7314996 -2.060000 2.0~000 0.07:16309 -139.570 3.0 -6A6.050 CIltll 
FD 1 F 553 35.130B377 335.2446165 - 1579. 34704B 2222 .OB 155 14.2560513 19427.353 1123B9.0 954.274 ro 
SP.NISH 553 0.0542495 O. "67 145 0.000000 1.00000 O.OOf'JGd09 30000 0.1 417.910 I') 
BLACK 553 o. OJ2'~497 0.1776156 0.000000 1.00000 0.0075530 18.000 0.0 545.675 cT 
ASIAN 553 O. 11 3924 I 0.:1 180067 0.000000 1.00000 0.0135230 63.000 O. I 2H.139 ..... 
0 
::s 
.t:" 
(Restricted) 
Cross-Section 
Logistic Regression 
Pooled Time-Series 
Sample 'AA' 
DEPlNUENT VARIABLE: VRM 
2009 OBSERVATIONS 
1474 VRM • 0 
535 V~M - I 
o OBSERVATIONS DELETED DUE TO MISSING VALUES 
VARIABLE MEAN MINIMUM 
INTRST I I .90G6 7.75 
SPREAD -0.I461'G -0.99 
LOANAM 66582.4 10158.7 
FDIF 161.522 -IB07.7 
INCOME 2365.64 425 
AGE 37.7434 19 
,u O. A100·1. a 
SPANISH a 087G05B 0 
BLACK 0.039~23 a 
ASI"N 0.107516 a 
SR IAE I 8. <J017' 6.9 
TBOlr O.OJc:,7:JJ9 -2.06 
- WA~NING: VhRIABLE HAS LIMITED DISPERSION. 
MAXIMUM 
18 
2. la'll 
2GB336 
3624.'4 
7000 
73 
I 
I 
10.4 
2.09 
RANGE 
10.25 
3.099 I 
25A 11 B 
54:12.14 
6515 
54 
I-
I 
3.5 
4.15 
IT MAY BE A BAD ChNDIDATE FOR THE MODEL. 
-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD FOR MODEL CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLY- 2328.61 
MOOEL CHI-SOUAREe 'OB.25 WITH 120.F. 
cnNV~Rr.ENCE onTAINEO IN 5 ITERATIONS. 
MAX ABSOLUTE O[RIVAriVE-O 10770-01. 
MODEL CHI-SOUARE- 209.93 WITH 120.r. 
VARIAEllE BETA STD. ERROR 
rNTFRCEPT 
-0 . • 3f.277!15 0.97771729 
tNTQ~T 
-0. or.A I "OA') 0.04':1301:178 
SPRI'AD I. 174460~~ 0.17284277 
lOMJII" O.OOQOlnn O.OOrlOO'22 
rn I F 
-0.0001B413 O. QOO 1339') 
I Nr.O"'E -0.00000660 O.OOOO5:!81 
AGE 0.001(,(;222 ().OO~O,)I,)' 
o;(X 0 O~O'l!lnl I 0,170"","')7 
~.JrAN1~H O.O·JUlIO' Cl. '49..sn7:lG 
PlAr.l< O. II74H.4') o. ;RA4291R 
A";1 MJ ·0. 3(1R~'It);l'" 0.IR70!l7G9 
SR I AI I -0.' tf"','lO'H. O. O~I:11~G70 
IAUI f -0 :" 18:1~146 0 0:112793 I 
eSCORE STAT. 1 p,o.o 
R- 0.2A3. 
-2 LOG L- 2118.6B. 
(-2 LOG L.R.) p·O.O 
CHI-SQUARE P R 
0.72 0 6:1A2 
2.26 0.1:179 -0.01 I 
42.32 0.0000 0.132 
S:1.41 0.0000 0.149 
8.2' 0.00'1 -0 OC;1 
0 01 0 ~O='5 0 . ()()O 
2.26 0 1J~4 0 (I" 
0.7:l 0 fi:l·18 0 noo 
o,OJ o. ~r.JO 0.0<>0 
n. 1~ 0.6%6 0.000 
?A7 0 onOl -O.Ol!! 
• AO () 07A5 ·O.OJ!, 
53. 17 0 0000 
-0. '"8 
142 
Logistic 
Pooled 
Regression (Unrestricted) 
Time-Series Cross-Section 
Sample 'AA' 
DEP[N£)ENT VARIABLE: I/RM 
2009 CBSE RI/A T IONS 
'474 VQM • 0 
535 VRM • I 
o OBSERI/ATIONS DELETED DUE TO MISSING I/ALUES 
VAR I hBlE "'EAN MINI"'UM MhXIMUM RANfjE 
INTRST 11.901;6 7.75 IB 10.25 
SPREhO -0.146146 -0.99 2.1091 :1. 099 I 
LOANAM 665B2 .• 10158.7 26A336 25Bt7B 
FOIF 161.522 - 1807 . 7 3624.4' 5432.14 
INCOME 2365.64 425 7000 6515 
AGE 31.2494 19 73 54 
SEX O. B79044 0 I I 
SPANI SH 0.OB7"05B 0 
BLACK 0.039323 0 .-
ASIAN O. '015'6 0 1 
SRI AEI B.90114 6.9 10.4 3.5 
TBOIF 0.0351339 -2.06 2.09 •. 15 
VB' 0.247BB5 0 I 
• WARNING: VARIABLE HAS LIMITED DISPERSION. 
IT MAy BE A BAO CANDIDATE FOR THE MODEL. 
-2 LOG LIKEllHOOO FOR MDOEL CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLY- 2328.61 
MODEL CHI-SQUARE' 210.21 WITH 13D.F. 
CONVERGENCE OBTAINEO IN 5 ITERATIONS. 
MAX AOSOlUTE OERIVATIVE-O. '0620-01. 
MODEL CHI -SOU'RE' 211. I,) wlT'i .3 D.F. 
VARIABLE BETA sm. ERROR 
INTERCEPT -'.777')'43A •. S4,)28B56 
lNTRST -0.05345337 0.041214'5 
SPRE AO t.1"773~56 O. '7516483 
LOANAM 0.00001655 0.00000225 
FDIF -0.00039072 0.00013370 
INCOME -0.0000091;. 0.00005399 
AGE G.CC";,~~5,]1 0.OO~09533 
SEl( 0.OS2J8~SO O. 170G5 153 
SPANI SH 0.041s0nl O. 19973246 
BLACK O. 109J9931 O. 2BB 15634 
ASIAN -0. JOG 14106 0.18229170 
SR IAEI -0.000"3804 0.1203G918 
TAOIF -0.2~01430J 0.0603489B 
VB I 0.45935070 0.42470193 
(SCORE STAT.) P'O.O 
R' 0.282. 
-2 LOG L' 2111.51. 
('2 LOG L.R.) P-O.O 
CHI-SOUARE P R 
1.32 0.7511 
I. 2A 0.25A' 0.000 
'12.93 0.0000 O .• 33 
!il\.34 0.0000 0.150 
B.54 0.0035 -0.053 
0.03 0.85B3 0.000 
2.28 0.1:109 0.011 
0.23 0.62'33 0.000 
0.04 0.S342 0.000 
0.14 0.7042 0.000 
2.B2 0.0931 -0.019 
0.00 0.9984 0.000 
13.31 0.0003 -0.070 
1.17 0.279. 0.000 
FRACTION OF CONCOROANT PAIRS OF pnEDICTED PROBABILITIES liND RESPONSES :0. 
RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN PREDICTED PROBABILITY AN!) RE SPDNS[ '0. 
70B 
434 
143 
CORQ[LhTION COErrlClfN15 / PRon > : R ~ UNDER 1I0'RIIO,0 / N 2009 
VAM INTR5T 51'1I[.D LDANA'" INCOME AGE SEX SRIAEI TIlD I F rDI r SPANISH OLACK A';IAN 
VRM 1.00000 -0.00130 0 162:13 O. 19049 0.10213 0.040~0 0.0261;3 0.00!l07 -0.10763 -0. IJ2JO -0.0~13R -0.0171;0 -0.0211' 
0.0000 0.9506 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0702 0.2328 0.6845 0.0001 0.0001 0.2950 O .• 304 0.170& 
INTRST -0.00138 I.OO<XlO -0.4 16~I -0.03790 0.11510 -0.00950 0.00064 -0.&998' -0.57282 O. '6~33 -0.01747 O.OJ 178 0.03075 
0.950(; 0.0000 0.0001 0.0895 0.0001 0.6705 0.9770 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.4JJ9 0.1545 0.1&83 
SPREAD 0.16233 -0.416AI 1.00000 0.00044 -O.OAJOI -0.07660 0.00955 0.35519 0.20435 -0.56009 0.01591 -0.0430B 0.01906 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.9A44 0.0002 0.233' 0.6687 O.CooI 0.0001 0.0001 0.474J 0.0492 0.3933 
LOANM·~ 0.190'9 -0.03790 0.00044 1.00000 0.59106 0.04627 O. 11801 0.06748 0.11326 -0.05760 -0.14516 -0.10003 0.02237 
0.0001 0.0895 0.98A4 0.0000 O.OOOt 0.0381 0.0001 0_0025 0.0001 0.0093 0.0001 0.0001 0.3163 
INCOME 0.10273 O. 11518 -0.08301 0.59106 1.00000 0.I6QOO 0.12584 -0.023~6 0.02665 0.06041 -0.12106 -0.09317 -0.0500v 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.2933 0.2325 0.0063 0.0001 0.0001 0.0250 
AGt 0.04040 -0.00950 -0.02660 0.04627 O. 16900 1.00000 -0.0056. 0.00372 -0.01722 0.04719 -0.02491 -0.02010 -0.0~263 
0.0702 0.6705 0.2334 0.0381 0.0001 0.0000 0.8005 0.8676 0.4404 0.0344 0.2644 0.3678 0_0561 
SEx 0.02663 0.00064 0.00955 O.IIROI 0.12584 -0.00564 1.00000 0.01:116 0.031al 0.01597 0.04475 -0.07418 -0.00923 
0.2328 0.9770 0.6&87 0.0001 0.0001 0.8005 0.0000 0.5556 0.1541 0.4743 0.0449 0.0009 0.6792 
SRIAEI 0.00901 -0.69984 0.35519 0.067'0 -0.02346 0.00372 0.01316 1.00000 0.35161 -0.44905 0.04740 -0.0257' -0.01980 
0.6845 0.0001 0.0001 0.0025 0.2933 0.8676 0.5556 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0)36 0.2488 0.3750 
TflDlF 
-0.10763 -0.57283 0.28'35 O. 11326 0.0'665 -0.01722 0.0."0 I 0.3516 I 1.00000 -0.22527 0.00949 -0.03170 -0.0122. 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2325 0.4404 0.1541 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.670B 0.1545 O. SOH 
rOlF 
-0.13230 0.46433 -0.56009 -0.05160 0.06041 0.04719 0.01597 -0.44905 -0.22527 1.00OCO -0.01742 0.05365 0.00250 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.009B 0.006B 0.0344 O . .n43 0.0001 0.0001 0_0000 0.4353 0.0162 0.910B 
sPANl SH -0.0233B -0.017~7 0.015Ql -0.14516 -0_12706 -0.0~491 0.04415 0.04140 0_00949 -0.01742 1.00000 -0.06269 -0.10155 
0.2950 0.4339 0.4743 0.0001 0.0001 0.2644 0.0449 0.0336 0.670B 0.4353 0.0000 0.0049 0.0001 
BLACK -0.01760 0.0317B -0.043BB -0. 10~03 -0.0~317 -0.02010 -0.0741B -0.02574 -0.03178 0.053fi5 -0.OG269 1.00000 -0.07022 
0.4304 0.1545 0.0492 0.0001 0.0001 0.367B 0.0009 0.24B8 0.1545 0.0162 0.0049 0.0000 0.0016 
ASIAN 
-0.02734 0.030'/5 0.01906 0.02237 -O.O~OOO -0.04'63 '0.00973 -0.019AO -0.01224 0.00250 -0.10755 -0.07022 1.00000 
O.2201i O.16RJ 0.39JJ 0.3163 0.0750 0.0561 0.6792 0.3750 0.5834 0.91OB 0.0001 0.0016 0.0000 
YBI 0.03229 0.68586 -0.40QS8 -0.14247 -0.01799 0.01068 -0.0309B -0.85957 -0.67267 0.44329 -0.04741 0.04399 0.00914 
0.1479 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.420) 0.6323 0.1651 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0336 0.04a7 0.6B21 
Y81 
0.03229 
0.1479 
0.6R5A6 
0.0001 
-0 40959 
0.0001 
-C. '.247 
0.0001 
-0.01799 
0.4203 
0.01068 
0.6323 
-0.O309~ 
0.1651 
-0.85951 
0.0001 
-0.67267 
0.0001 
O .• 4329 
0.0001 
-0.04741 
O. on£> 
0.04399 
0.0487 
0.00914 
0.fiR21 
1.00000 
0.0000 
01j 
0 
0 
I-' 
It> 
0. 
n 
0-,10 
1-"-'1 
a '1 
C/.IIt> It> 
III I I-' 
a C/.IIII 
'0 It> CT 
1-''1 I-"-
It> 1-"-0 
It> ::s 
to 
> 3: 
>nlll 
·S CT 
0 '1 
to I-"-
to >< 
I 
C/.I 
It> 
(") 
CT 
..... 
0 
::s 
.I::" 
.I::" 
VARIABLE N MEAN SlANOhRO MINIMU'" MI\;:.IMtJ" STD rlllloll SUM VARIANCE C.V. 
IJEVIAllON VAI.UE VALUf or MEAN 
-----------------.---.---.------- .. -.-.--.---.-- •. -------.---- VRM'O ------------------------.-------.---------------.-------.---.--
INfRSf ... 74 11.9087870 2. 1072869 7.750000 18.00000 0.0~~88769 17552. A I~ 4.44 17 .6'16 
SPI<[AO 1474 ·0. 18~'J151 0 .• '617'11 ·0.9'10000 2.10910 O.OIOR~OUG ·711.0'11 O. t7 -nG.289 
lOANAM 1474 6JO!i.4.0'6&R04S 2578 I .6802914 10158.730159 2 1~592. 274G8 67 t • ~25"~OS8 929"635.333 6646950J8.96 40.888 
INCOME 1474 2187.4171048 '707. 1401JAfi 425.000000 6937.76824 31.44192772 3371652.A12 1457108.76 5~. 773 
AGE 1474 3G.9898236 '0.4771710 19.000000 73.00000 0.272R9482 54523.000 109.77 28.324 
SEX 1474 O.R73Rt~B o. ~32 1730 0.000000 1.00000 O.OOHfj!j'~B 1188.000 0.11 3R .PI' 
yf hr:! 147. 79.d(}06513 1.1JS1D59 78 . ()()(l<)OO BI.OOOOO 0.02~5R31i. 117115.000 t. 29 1.429 
SR Il.EI 1474 B.8944JrJ9 t . J lQJ£i75 6.900000 to. 40000 O.O:1"IJO~O 13110.400 t. 72 ".732 
TBOI F "7. 0.1517096 t. 7911311 -2.0GO()()() 2.09000 0.04665290 223.620 3.21 1180.63 I 
FOIf '.7. 203.0018102 568.09G787. -742.681403 3614.4~106 U.7<)699710 299276. 142 322733.96 ']19.847 
SPANISH 147. 0.0915875 0.2885401 0.000000 1.00000 0.00151551 135.000 0.08 315.044 
BLACK 1414 0.0413840 0.199"'3 0.000000 1.00000 0.00518964 6 t. 000 0.04 '8 t. 453 
ASIAN 1474 0.1126187 0.3161334 0.000000 1.00000 0.00823681 166.000 0.10 280.800 
------------------------------------.------.------.------.-.-- VRM-I -----------.------------------------------._-----------.-------
INTRSf 535 I 1.9020467 1.649024 I 9.470000 11.25000 0.0712935 G367.595 2.7 13.855 
SPI?EAO 535 -O.Od20RS6 0.26179'11 -0.990000 0.52740 0.01l31A6 -~2.516 0.1 -672.063 
LOAN'M 5:15 7fi303.7A4Sf'76 39921.5409475 16000.000000 7fi8331L 3 14R5 1726.0019578 "OR2752~.7.4 1593809275.7 52.321 
I'KOME 5J5 258 1.167400. 1409. 13111j79 '47.2271<)1 7000.00000 60. 9220~25 1380'124.56' 1985650.6 5~.59J 
AGE 5J5 37.96448fiO II. 1486(;56 21.000000 72.00000 0.48199A8 10311.000 12'.3 29.366 
SEX 5J5 0.89J4579 0.3088189 0.000000 1.00000 0.01J3514 478.000 O. I J4.5li4 
YEAR 535 79.5551402 t. 093 1549 18.000000 81.00000 0.0472612 '-7562.000 1.2 1.37'-
SRIAEI 5J5 B.921!l692 I. .O~R 19R 6 . 9 ()()()(lQ 10.40000 0.()(;0'l5IR 477J.100 2.0 1!'J.802 
rf,OIF 535 ·0.2837'14, 1.74550BR -2.0liOOOO 2.09000 0.0754649 -151.8JO 3.0 ·6t~.061 
fOI F 5~5 ~7.2358930 333.0517267 -1807.70"52 2222.0A ISS 1~.3990RI8 2527 I . 203 110923.5 705.082 
SPANISH 5J5 0.076&~55 0.26676 t2 0.000000 1.00000 0.0115115 41.000 O. I 3<17.438 
ElLACK 535 0.0336449 O. 1804820 O.<XlOOOO 1.00000 0.0078029 IB.OOO 0.0 536.4JJ 
ASIAN 5J5 0.0934579 0.2913455 0.000000 1.00000 0.01259GO 50.000 O. I 311.140 
'"tI 
0 
0 
...... 
III t::I 
0. III 
[II 
I-iP 
..... .., 
e ~ 
,:n III '0 
III I c-t" 
51 r.ll ~ 
'0 III < 
...... .., III 
III ~ 
III en 
[II rt' 
> III 
>Oc-t" 
.., ~ 
0 [II 
[II rt' 
[II ~ 
I 0 
en [II 
III 
() 
c-t" 
~ 
0 
::s 
.... 
~ 
V1 
